The Gemara asks: Is there really a case like this where people wear one shoe on top of another? The Gemara answers: Yes, for the Sages saw Rav Yehuda, who went out once to the market wearing five pairs of shoes, which were similar to slippers, one on top of another.

Rav Yehuda said another halakha that Rav said: An underage yevama who grew up among her husband’s brothers before any ḥalitza was performed is permitted to marry one of the brothers through levirate marriage, and we are not concerned about the possibility that during the time she was in the company of her yevamin she removed a sandal from one of them, and thereby she would have already performed ḥalitza. The Gemara infers from this statement: The reason it is permitted to perform levirate marriage now is specifically that we did not see her remove one of their shoes, but if in fact we did see her do so, we are concerned and treat her as a yevama who already performed ḥalitza and is thereby forbidden to all the brothers.

The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Whether he intended to perform ḥalitza and she did not intend to, or whether she intended to perform ḥalitza and he did not intend to, the ḥalitza is invalid, unless they both intended it as one to perform a proper act of ḥalitza? The Gemara answers: This is what Rav said: Even if we did see that she removed a shoe from one of them, we are not concerned that perhaps they intended to perform ḥalitza.

And there are those who say the inference from Rav’s statement should be made in the opposite manner: The reason it is permitted for her to perform levirate marriage now is specifically that we did not see her remove a shoe from one of the brothers. But if we did see, we would be concerned and would treat her as a yevama who already performed ḥalitza, despite our knowledge that she did not intend to perform ḥalitza. And with regard to that which was taught in the baraita, that intention is required, this applies only as far as validating the act of ḥalitza in order to permit her to marry a stranger. But performing an act of ḥalitza even without intention is sufficient to disqualify her for the brothers, rendering prohibited an act of levirate marriage afterward.

Rav Yehuda also said that Rav said: One may not perform ḥalitza using a sandal that was sewn together with threads made of flax, as it is stated: “And I made you shoes of taḥash skin” (Ezekiel 16:10), which is the skin of an animal, implying that a shoe is something made entirely of leather. The Gemara challenges: If the source is “taḥash,” let us say: A shoe made of taḥash skin, yes, it is valid; but if made of anything else, no. The Gemara rejects this: Because “shoe” and “shoe” are written in the Torah multiple times, this amplifies and includes all types of shoes crafted from leather skins as valid for performing ḥalitza.

The Gemara asks: If the inclusion of the words “shoe” and “shoe” amplifies, then should one include as valid for performing ḥalitza shoes crafted from even any other materials as well, including those not produced from leather at all? The Gemara answers: If so, what purpose does “taḥash” serve, as nothing is learned from it? Rather, from the word taḥash it is derived that the shoe must be crafted entirely of leather, but all types of leather are included because the word “shoe” is repeated in the Torah numerous times.

Rabbi Elazar asked Rav: What is the status of the following type of sandal used for performing ḥalitza? In a case where it, the shoe itself, is made of leather, and the sections that hold its straps [tereisiyyot] are made of hair, as they were woven together with goat’s hair, what is the halakha? He said to him: Do we not refer to such a sandal as: “And I made you shoes of taḥash”? Since it is crafted from material that comes from an animal it is valid. The Gemara asks: If that is so, i.e., that anything derived from an animal is valid, then even if it is fashioned entirely of hair it should also be valid. The Gemara answers: That would be called a slipper, not a shoe.

Rav Kahana said to Shmuel: From where is it known that this phrase: “And she shall remove [ḥaltza] his shoe from on his foot” (Deuteronomy 25:9), means to remove? As it is written: “Then the priest shall command, and they shall take out [ḥiltzu] the stones in which the plague is” (Leviticus 14:40), indicating that the word ḥaltza means that they shall remove the stones from their place.

The Gemara asks whether the word ḥaltza can be interpreted differently based upon its apparent meaning in other contexts: But could you say it is a term for strengthening, as it is written: “Arm [heḥaletzu] men from among you for the army” (Numbers 31:3), meaning that men among you will be strengthened and take up arms to prepare for battle? The Gemara answers: There too, the meaning of the word is referring to taking something from its place, as it means removing people from their houses in order to go out to war.

The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it written: “He delivers [yeḥaletz] the afflicted by His affliction [be’onyo]” (Job 36:15)? This indicates that the afflicted one becomes stronger due to his affliction, as, if the intention was to deliver him from his affliction, it should have said: From His affliction, rather than “by His affliction.” The Gemara answers that the verse should be interpreted as follows: Be’onyo, in other words, as reward for his suffering from affliction, He shall deliver him from the judgment of Gehenna, as is understood from the term be’onyo, through the reward due to his affliction.

The Gemara challenges further: But with regard to that it is written: “The angel of the Lord encamps around those who fear Him and delivers them [vayeḥaltzem]” (Psalms 34:8), doesn’t vayeḥaltzem rather mean: He shall strengthen them? The Gemara answers: The verse means: As a reward for those that fear Him, He shall deliver them from the judgment of Gehenna. Therefore, the Gemara interprets vayeḥaltzem as “delivers them,” not as: Strengthens them.

The Gemara challenges further: But with regard to that which is written: “And the Lord will guide you, and satisfy your soul in drought, and make your bones strong [yaḥalitz]” (Isaiah 58:11), and Rabbi Elazar said regarding that verse: This is the greatest of blessings, and Rava said it means: Strengthening of bones. This seems to indicate that the root of the word ḥalitza is referring to strengthening. The Gemara answers: Yes, it has this connotation, and it has this connotation, i.e., the root ḥ-l-tz sometimes connotes removal and sometimes connotes strengthening. But here, only one meaning is possible, as, if it enters your mind that ḥalitza here connotes strengthening, then let the Merciful One write in the Torah: She shall strengthen [ḥaletza] his shoe on his foot [beraglo], indicating that she should tighten the shoe on his foot, rather than stating: “From on his foot [me’al raglo],” which indicates that she is removing something from his foot.

The Gemara responds: If the Merciful One had written in the Torah: On his foot [beraglo], I would have said she must strengthen and tighten the shoe on his foot, yes, but on his calf, no; and if his foot were amputated she may no longer perform ḥalitza. Therefore, the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “From on his foot [me’al raglo],” to teach that she may strengthen the shoe even on his calf, which is part of the leg, or regel, above the foot. The Gemara answers: If so, and ḥalitza really means strengthening, let the Merciful One write in the Torah: She shall strengthen his shoe on the upper part of his foot [beme’al raglo], indicating that the shoe can also be tightened on the area of the calf. What then is the meaning of “from on his foot [me’al raglo],” which is written in the verse? Learn from here that in this context the word ḥalitza clearly indicates removal, meaning that the mitzva of ḥalitza is for the yevama to remove the shoe of the yavam and not to tighten it on his foot.

Parenthetical to this discussion, the Gemara relates: A certain heretic said to Rabban Gamliel: You, the children of Israel, are a nation whose Master removed [ḥalatz] Himself from them, for God has left you in much the same way in which a yavam would perform ḥalitza with his yevama, as it is written: “With their flocks and with their herds they shall go to seek the Lord, but they shall not find Him. He has removed [ḥalatz] Himself from them [meihem]” (Hoshea 5:6). The heretic tried to use this verse as scriptural support that God has performed ḥalitza with the Jewish people.

He, Rabban Gamliel, said to him: Imbecile, does it say: He performed ḥalitza to them [lahem]? Rather, it says “ḥalatz from them [meihem],” meaning it is as if they, the Jewish people, performed ḥalitza on Him. But if a yevama had her shoe removed by her yevamin, does this have any significance? Here too, the meaning of the verse is that the nation of Israel abandoned God by removing themselves from Him, and this abandonment has no significance.

The Gemara analyzes the phrase used in the mishna that discusses the types of shoes that can be used for ḥalitza. It was taught in the mishna that if he was wearing a soft shoe [anpileya] made of cloth for ḥalitza, her ḥalitza is invalid. The Gemara explains: That is to say that an anpileya is not considered a shoe.

And we also learned similarly in a mishna (Shekalim 3:2): The one who collects the funds of shekels donated to the Temple from the chamber and puts them into baskets in order to be used may not enter to collect the funds wearing a garment [pargod] that is cuffed [ḥafut], nor wearing an anpileya, and needless to say that he may not enter wearing a shoe or a sandal, because one may not enter the Temple courtyard wearing a shoe or a sandal. It is prohibited for the one collecting funds from the chamber to enter the chamber wearing a garment or footwear in which money could be hidden, lest people come to suspect that he hid in them funds collected from the chamber. In any case, the wording of the mishna indicates that an anpileya is not considered a type of shoe, since it is permitted to enter the Temple wearing an anpileya when there is no reason for suspicion, unlike a shoe or sandal, which can never be worn in the Temple.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita concerning what footwear is permitted on Yom Kippur, which seems to indicate otherwise: The halakha is the same for a soft leather shoe, and a hard leather sandal, and an anpileya, as one may not walk in them from one house to another, nor from one bed to another on Yom Kippur, due to the prohibition against wearing shoes, indicating that at least as far as Yom Kippur is concerned, an anpileya is considered a shoe.

Abaye said: There, with regard to Yom Kippur, it is referring to an anpileya that has cushioning, and this is forbidden due to the pleasure that one derives from cushioned footwear on a day when people are commanded to afflict themselves. Rava said to him: But is footwear that is not considered to be shoes forbidden on Yom Kippur due to the pleasure one derives from wearing them? But Rabba bar Rav Huna would wrap a scarf on his feet and go out on Yom Kippur so his feet would not be injured, implying that there is no prohibition against wearing something comfortable on one’s foot, as long as it is not defined as a shoe. Rather, Rava said: This is not difficult. Here, when they said that an anpileya has the status of a shoe, it is referring to an anpileya made of leather. There, when they do not consider it a shoe, it is referring to an anpileya made of cloth.

The Gemara adds: And so too, it is reasonable to distinguish in this manner, as, if you do not say so, it is difficult to reconcile the seeming contradiction between one statement about Yom Kippur and another statement about Yom Kippur. As it is taught in a baraita: A person shall not walk while wearing slippers [kordakisin] within his house on Yom Kippur, but he may walk while wearing an anpileya within his house. This would imply that wearing an anpileya is permitted, but the baraita quoted above taught that it is prohibited. Rather, must one not conclude from here that here, where it indicates that an anpileya is forbidden, it is referring to an anpileya made of leather, as they are considered like a shoe, and there, where an anpileya is permitted, it is referring to an anpileya made of cloth? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from here that it is so.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: If she performed ḥalitza using a shoe whose seams were opened up, which still covered most of the foot; or if she performed ḥalitza with a sandal whose sole was partially opened that still held most of the foot; or if she performed ḥalitza with a sandal made of cork [sha’am], or of fibers from a tree; or with a prosthetic foot of an amputee; or with a felt shoe [muk]; or with a leg blanket that an amputee makes for his feet as a covering in which to put the stumps of his legs, which is not an actual shoe; or with a leather anpileya; and likewise, a woman who performs ḥalitza with her yavam when he is an adult man,