Rather, suggest that Shmuel meant that there is no public domain above ten handbreadths. It is a mishna, and why would he repeat an explicit mishna? As we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who throws an object four cubits in the public domain, and the object came to rest on a wall standing in the public domain above ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he were throwing an object in the air and it never landed. If it came to rest below ten handbreadths off the ground, it is as if he were throwing an object to the ground. That is an explicit mishna stating that the area of the public domain does not go beyond ten handbreadths off the ground.

Rather, it must be that Shmuel’s statement was referring to a karmelit; there is no karmelit above ten handbreadths. And, if so, the Sages were lenient with regard to a karmelit and applied some leniencies of the private domain and some leniencies of the public domain. The Gemara elaborates: Some leniencies of the private domain: That if there is an area of four handbreadths, then it is a karmelit, and if there is not an area of four handbreadths, it is merely an exempt domain. Some leniencies of the public domain: That until a height of ten handbreadths, it is a karmelit, above ten handbreadths is not a karmelit.

To the matter itself: It was mentioned above that Rav Giddel said that Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said: A house that does not have inside it walls that are ten handbreadths high, and with its roofing it reaches a height of ten handbreadths above the ground; on its roof, one may carry on all of it, as its roof is a private domain in every sense, and inside it, one may only carry four cubits, as inside the height is insufficient to render it a private domain and it retains karmelit status.

With regard to this halakha, Abaye said: And if he dug out an area of four by four handbreadths in the floor of the house and in the place where the digging took place, its height to the ceiling reaches ten handbreadths, the house becomes a private domain, and it is permitted to carry in the entire house. What is the reason for this? Since the dug out area is a private domain, the rest of the house is ancillary to it, and it assumes the legal status of the holes of the private domain, and the holes of the private domain, although they lack the measure of a private domain, are considered like the private domain itself. As it was stated: Everyone agrees that the holes of the private domain are considered like the private domain; since they are subsumed within the private domain, they are judged to be like it. However, they disagreed with regard to the holes of the public domain. Abaye says: They are considered to be like the public domain. And Rava says: They are not considered to be like the public domain; they are either a karmelit or an exempt domain.

Rava said to Abaye: According to you, who said that the holes of the public domain are considered like the public domain, in what way is it different from this halakha? As when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This addition of karmelit to the Tosefta was only necessary to teach the case of a corner adjacent to the public domain. And, according to your opinion, let this corner be like the holes of the public domain, and its legal status should be that of a public domain itself and not that of a karmelit. Abaye answered: There is a distinction between the cases. There, the corner, its use is not convenient; here, the holes of the public domain, their use is convenient. Since it is convenient to utilize the holes of the public domain, and they are in fact utilized, they are a public domain in every sense.

The Gemara raised an additional difficulty for Abaye’s opinion: We learned in a mishna with regard to one who throws an object four cubits in the public domain, and the object came to rest on a wall standing in the public domain above ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he were throwing an object in the air and it never landed. If it came to rest below ten handbreadths off the ground, it is as if he were throwing an object to the ground, and he is liable. And we discussed this halakha: What is the reason that when the wall is not ten handbreadths high it is as if he threw it to the ground? The object did not come to rest on the wall, as presumably the object hit the wall and then fell to the ground. Since there was no act of placement, he did not perform the prohibited labor of carrying in the public domain.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said that they learned this mishna as referring to a case when he threw a juicy cake of figs that sticks to the wall and remains there. And should it enter your mind to say that the holes of the public domain are considered like the public domain, why do I need to establish the mishna as referring to the case of a juicy cake of figs? Let us establish it simply as referring to the case of a run-of-the-mill stone or object, and that it came to rest in a hole.

Sometimes Abaye would answer the question by saying that a stone or object is different from a juicy fig in that they come back when they are thrown and do not come to rest in the hole. Therefore, it was simpler to establish the mishna in the case of a fig. And sometimes he would answer it by saying that the mishna is referring to a wall that has no hole. And from where does he find support for this explanation? From that which we learned in the first clause of the mishna: One who throws above ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he is throwing in the air and it never landed. And if it should enter your mind to say that we are speaking here about a wall that has a hole in it, why should it be as if he threw it in the air and it never landed? It rested in a hole, and that hole is a private domain, as it is above ten handbreadths, and in that way the prohibited labor of carrying in was performed.

And if you say that the mishna is referring to a case where holes do not have an area of at least four by four handbreadths, which is common for holes in the wall, and therefore the holes have exempt domain status, didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rabbi Ḥiyya said: One who threw an object above ten handbreadths and the object went and came to rest in a hole of any size, we have arrived in this matter at the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis? The decision whether or not there is a prohibition here depends on an analysis of that dispute. Rabbi Meir holds that in all cases where a certain minimum area is required for a specific halakha to take effect and the existing area is smaller, if, theoretically, circumstances would allow to carve out and create an area of the requisite size, one considers it as if he carves out the space to complete it, i.e., the space has the legal status as if it was actually enlarged. And the Rabbis hold that one does not carve out the space to complete it. Rather, the legal status of the area corresponds to its actual size. Consequently, according to Rabbi Meir, if an object landed in a small hole, one considers the area as if it were carved out to complete the hole to four by four handbreadths, and its legal status is like that of a private domain in every sense. Rather, can we not conclude from the mishna that maintains that one who throws an object onto a wall above ten handbreadths it is as if he threw it in the air, that it is referring to a wall that has no hole in it, and the possibility of carving out the space was never raised? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it.

The Gemara again returns to the matter that was mentioned above in passing itself [gufa]. Rav Ḥisda said: One who stuck a stick in the ground of the private domain, and an object that he himself threw from the public domain rested atop it, even if that stick was a hundred cubits high, he is liable. The reason for this is because the private domain rises up to the sky. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that when Rav Ḥisda said his statement, it was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The tanna’im disagreed with regard to a similar issue, as it was taught in a baraita: One who threw an object on Shabbat in the public domain, and the object rested on a projection of any size, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Consequently, only according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is there no need for the object to come to rest on an area of a specific size, and therefore the statement of Rav Ḥisda with regard to the stick can only be in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion.