with regard to a Festival, the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (Shabbat 156b), as we learned in a mishna in this tractate: One may not chop wood on a Festival from beams prepared for use in construction work, nor may one chop kindling wood from a beam that broke on a Festival. As the beams were not prepared for this use when the Festival began, they are classified as muktze; this demonstrates that an unattributed mishna prohibits muktze on a Festival. Consequently, Rav Naḥman establishes the opinion of Beit Hillel in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits muktze. He does so by asserting that the mishna is referring to the case of a chicken designated for laying eggs, which is muktze. This concludes the Gemara’s explanation of Rav Naḥman’s rendering of the tannaitic dispute.

The Gemara asks: Now since, i.e., consider the following: Who is the one who wrote and edited the Mishna, and arranged the unattributed mishnayot? It was Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Since the same Sage formulated the statements in both tractates, the question arises: What is different with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, that he stated the unattributed opinion and ruled for us in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and what is different with regard to the halakhot of a Festival, that he stated the unattributed opinion and ruled for us in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

They answer and say: In the case of Shabbat, which is stringent with regard to its punishments (see 35b), and therefore people will not come to treat it with contempt, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught us the unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who rules leniently. Conversely, with regard to a Festival, which is lenient, as certain labors may be performed on a Festival, and therefore people will be more likely to come to treat it with contempt, he stated the unattributed opinion for us in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who rules stringently.

The Gemara asks: In what manner did you ultimately establish the mishna? It was established as referring to a chicken designated for laying eggs, and the prohibition is due to muktze. If so, rather than disputing with regard to an egg laid on a Festival, let them dispute with regard to the chicken itself. Instead of considering the secondary detail of an egg, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel could discuss whether or not the chicken itself may be slaughtered on a Festival.

The Gemara answers: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel also disagree with regard to the chicken, but the dispute was phrased in this manner to convey the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Beit Shammai. The formulation of the mishna emphasizes the extent of Beit Shammai’s lenient opinion, that even in the case of an egg, which is not a regular muktze item but an item that came into being, an especially stringent type of muktze, Beit Shammai nevertheless permit it. By stating the dispute with regard to an egg, the mishna stresses Beit Shammai’s lenient opinion.

The Gemara raises an objection: And let them disagree with regard to a chicken, rather than an egg, to convey the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Beit Hillel, who prohibit its use even in the more lenient case of muktze. And if you say it is better to present the dispute as in the mishna, so as to clarify the more lenient opinion, as the strength of leniency is preferable (Berakhot 60a), there is another option: And let them disagree with regard to both of these cases.

The mishna could have said: With regard to a chicken designated for laying eggs, it and its eggs, Beit Shammai say: It may be eaten, and Beit Hillel say: It may not be eaten. In this manner, the mishna could have referred to all aspects of the dispute, without the need for any lengthy addition. Consequently, Rav Naḥman’s explanation of the mishna is inadequate.

Rather, Rabba said: Actually, the above explanation should be rejected. We are dealing with a chicken designated for food and we are dealing with an egg that was laid on a Festival that occurs after Shabbat, i.e., on a Sunday. And the relevant issue is not the halakhot of muktze; rather, one may not eat the egg due to the prohibition against preparation from Shabbat to a Festival.

And in this regard, Rabba holds that any egg laid now was already fully developed yesterday, and merely emerged from the chicken today. Consequently, an egg laid on a Festival that occurred on a Sunday may not be eaten, as it was prepared on Shabbat, despite the fact that it was prepared naturally, by Heaven, rather than by man.

The Gemara comments: And Rabba, who prohibits one to derive benefit even from something that was not prepared by man, conforms to his standard line of reasoning. As Rabba said: What is the meaning of that which is written with regard to the manna: “And it shall come to pass on the sixth day, that they shall prepare that which they bring in” (Exodus 16:5)? According to Rabba, it can be inferred from this verse that on an ordinary weekday, “the sixth day,” one may prepare what is needed for Shabbat, and similarly, on an ordinary weekday one may prepare what is needed for a Festival. However, on a Festival one may not prepare for Shabbat, and likewise on Shabbat one may not prepare for a Festival.

Abaye said to Rabba: However, if that is so, and the concern is only due to preparation, let an egg laid on a regular Festival, one that does not occur on a Sunday, be permitted. Rabba responded: That egg is not prohibited by Torah law, but by rabbinic decree, due to the case of a Festival that occurs after Shabbat. Abaye asked: On a regular Shabbat, one that does not occur after a Festival, let it be permitted to eat an egg that was laid on that day, provided that one does not cook it. Rabba similarly answered: It is a decree due to a Shabbat that occurs after a Festival.

Abaye further asked: And do we issue a decree of this kind? But isn’t it taught in a baraita (see 6b): In the case of one who slaughters a chicken on a Festival and finds inside it fully developed eggs with their shells, it is permitted to eat them on the Festival. And if it is so, that the aforementioned decree is in effect, let him issue a decree and prohibit these eggs found inside the chicken, due to those that are laid on that day.

Rabba said to him: This is not difficult, as the case of fully developed eggs found inside their mother is an uncommon matter, and in a case of an uncommon matter the Sages did not issue a decree as a preventive measure (Eiruvin 63b). The Sages issued their decrees only for usual situations, in which people might err, but they did not apply them to rare cases. This concludes the Gemara’s discussion of Rabba’s explanation.

The Gemara proceeds to explain other interpretations of the mishna. Rav Yosef said: An egg laid by a chicken designated for food is prohibited for a different reason: It is a decree due to fruits that fall from a tree (Eiruvin 39b). Fruits that fall from a tree on Shabbat or a Festival may not be eaten, and the same applies to eggs that emerge from a chicken.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: With regard to fruits that fall, what in fact is the reason that the Sages prohibited them?