Therefore, with regard to overriding the prohibition to bring an offering in a state of ritual impurity, since the beginning of the sacrifice of the daily offering is fit to override the prohibition of offering it in a state of ritual impurity, so too, its end also overrides the prohibition. However, in the case of Shabbat, the beginning of a daily offering of the weekday is not fit to override Shabbat, since by definition it must be brought on its appropriate day. Therefore, its end also does not override Shabbat in the event that limbs remain from Friday’s daily offering.

And it is also not difficult to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, because he does not hold that its end is like its beginning. Rather, he has the following reasoning: The prohibitions of Shabbat are not merely overridden in the case of a communal offering, but they are actually permitted, such that there is no need to try to avoid performing the necessary labors when sacrificing it. Therefore, its end also overrides Shabbat.

However, in the case of the prohibition to bring an offering in a state of ritual impurity, which is merely overridden in the case of a communal offering, it is preferable to avoid doing so. Therefore, the beginning of its sacrifice, i.e., its slaughter and the sprinkling of its blood, and its burning, which is the essential stage that provides atonement, overrides the prohibition and should be done even in a state of ritual impurity. However, its end, i.e., the burning of the sacrificial parts, which is not the essential stage that provides atonement, does not override the prohibitions.

The Torah prohibits the fire on the altar to be extinguished: “A perpetual fire shall be kept burning on the altar, it shall not go out” (Leviticus 6:6). With regard to this prohibition, an amoraic dispute was stated: With regard to one who extinguishes the fire of the coals that are taken with the coal pan for the incense on Yom Kippur or the fire of the coals that are taken in order to light the candelabrum, Abaye said: He is liable. Rava said: He is not liable.

The Gemara elaborates on the dispute: In a case where one extinguished a coal while still standing upon the top of the altar, everyone agrees that he is liable. This is because the verse explicitly is referring to extinguishing a flame “upon the altar.” When they disagree, it is in a case where he brought the coals down to ground level and extinguished a coal there. Abaye said: He is liable, since it is still considered fire of the altar. Rava said: He is not liable, because once it has been removed from the altar it is considered removed and no longer part of the altar’s fire. Therefore, the prohibition does not apply to it.

The Gemara asks: But if so, with regard to this ruling that Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: One who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable, in accordance with whose opinion is he ruling? Could he possibly be ruling in accordance with the opinion of Abaye? Certainly not. In disputes between Abaye and Rava, the halakha follows Rava.

The Gemara explains: You can even say his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava by making the following distinction: There, in the ruling of Rav Naḥman, the coal was not removed to fulfill its mitzva. Therefore, it is still considered to be part of the fire of the altar and the prohibition still applies. Whereas, here, in the dispute between Abaye and Rava, this is a case of coal that was removed to fulfill its mitzva. Therefore, it is associated with its mitzva and no longer considered the fire of the altar.

There are those who say a different version of the dispute:

In a case where he brought the coals down to the ground and extinguished a coal there, everyone agrees that he is not liable. When they disagree it is in a case where one extinguished a coal while still standing upon the top of the altar. Abaye said: He is liable, since it is still considered fire of the altar. Rava said: He is not liable, because once it has been removed from the altar it is considered removed and no longer part of the altar’s fire. Therefore, the prohibition does not apply to it.

The Gemara asks: But if so, with regard to this ruling that Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: He who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable, in accordance with whose opinion is his ruling? It would appear that it is neither in accordance with the opinion of Abaye, nor in accordance with the opinion of Rava. The Gemara explains: You can even say that his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava by making the following distinction: There, in the ruling of Rav Naḥman, the coal was not removed to fulfill its mitzva; it is therefore still considered to be part of the fire of the altar and the prohibition applies. Whereas, here, in the dispute between Abaye and Rava, this is a case of coal that was removed to fulfill its mitzva, and it is therefore associated with its mitzva and no longer considered the fire of the altar.