this is mistaken because: “And it shall be kept for the congregation of the children of Israel for a water of sprinkling” (Numbers 19:9) was written, and the use of the term “shall be kept” indicates that one must maintain attention even during these stages. Rather, it is to exclude from the requirement the stage of casting the cedar wood, and the hyssop, and the strip of crimson into the fire. The requirement does not apply to this stage, as they do not pertain to the heifer itself.

An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to the slaughter of the red heifer by a non-priest: Rabbi Ami said: It is valid. And Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said: It is invalid. Ulla said: It is valid, but some say that he said: It is invalid.

Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba raised an objection to the opinion of Shmuel that the slaughter is valid, thereby providing a support for opinion of Rav, who holds that it is invalid: I have a derivation only with regard to the sprinkling of the red heifer’s waters, that they are not valid if sprinkled by a woman as opposed to when sprinkled by a man, and that the sprinkling is valid only during the day. The verse states: “And the pure one shall sprinkle upon the impure on the third day” (Numbers 19:19). The use of the terms “pure one,” in the masculine form, and “day,” indicate that the sprinkling is valid only if performed by a man during the day.

From where is it derived to include the following stages among those stages that must be performed by a man during the day in order to be valid: Its slaughter; and the collection of its blood; and the sprinkling of its blood; and its burning; and the casting of the cedar wood, and the hyssop, and the strip of crimson into the fire? The verse states: “Law” (Numbers 19:2), at the beginning of the section on the red heifer, to indicate that the same rules govern all stages of the rite. As such, I might have thought that I should include even the collection of its ashes, and the filling of waters, and the sanctification. Therefore, the verse states: “This is the statute of the law” (Numbers 19:2). The word this limits the scope of the requirement that the rite must be performed by a man and during the day from applying to these stages.

And if the word “law” serves to include all stages in the halakha and the word “this” serves to exclude some stages, what did you see to include these stages and to exclude those? After noting that the verse includes some stages and excludes others, you should say the following logical argument: Indeed, we learn all the stages from the sprinkling of its waters: Just as the sprinkling of its waters is not valid if done by a woman as opposed to when done by a man, and it is valid only during the day, so too I will include in the same requirement its slaughter; and the collection of its blood; and the sprinkling of its blood; and its burning; and the casting of the cedar wood, and the hyssop, and the strip of crimson.

Since these stages are not valid if done by a woman as opposed to when done by a man, as indicated by the verses that state that they are to be done by a serving priest, who by definition is a man, then it is logical to also include these cases in the halakha that they are valid only during the day. And I exclude the collection of its ashes, and the filling of water, and the sanctification, since these stages are valid when done by a woman as they are when done by a man, as the verses never suggest a requirement that they be done by a man. Therefore, it is logical that these stages are valid both during the day and during the night.

Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba originally cited the baraita to challenge Shmuel’s opinion that the slaughter of the red heifer by a non-priest is valid. The Gemara asks: And what is the challenge from this baraita? If we say that since that these stages are invalid if done by a woman one should conclude that they are also invalid if done by a non-priest, then let the stage of sprinkling the waters serve as a proof that one should not necessarily connect these two halakhot, because the sprinkling is invalid if done by a woman and yet valid if done by a non-priest. If so, what was the basis for the challenge?

Abaye said: This is the challenge: With regard to a woman, what is the reason she may not perform these stages? The verse states “Elazar,” indicating the requirement for a man and not a woman. The same logic should also apply to a non-priest: The verse states: “Elazar,” indicating the requirement for a priest and not a non-priest.

The Gemara considers other aspects of the rite of the red heifer: Ulla said: Throughout the entire passage of the red heifer, certain conditions apply to some stages of the rite, but not to others. These conditions are derived from the phrasing of the verses. In some stages, the conditions implied by the phrasing of the verse preclude the application of conditions that are implied by a previous verse describing a previous stage. A verse describing one stage may imply the existence of a certain condition which applies to that stage but a verse describing a subsequent stage indicates that that condition does not apply to the subsequent stage. However, in other stages, the conditions implied by the phrasing of the verse stand on their own and continue to apply in subsequent stages, i.e., the verses in subsequent stages do not exclude the application of the condition derived from the verses in a previous stage.

The Gemara proceeds to demonstrate Ulla’s claim by expounding the verses throughout the passage of the red heifer: The verse states with regard to the red heifer: “And you shall give it to Elazar the priest and he shall take it out to the outside of the camp, and he shall slaughter it before him” (Numbers 19:3). The word “it” implies that only that red heifer, i.e., the first one, was to be given to Elazar, who was the deputy High Priest, to perform its rite, but that the red heifer in future generations does not need to be given to Elazar, i.e., to a priest of similar rank. If so, who does perform the rite of the red heifer? Some say: In future generations, it should be done by the High Priest. And some say: In future generations, it can be done even by a common priest.

Granted, according to the one who says that in future generations it can be done even by a common priest, it works out well, since there is no indication to the contrary. But according to the one who says that in future generations it should be done by the High Priest, from where does he derive this requirement? He derives the halakha from the service of Yom Kippur through a verbal analogy between the word “statute” (Numbers 19:2) written with regard to the red heifer and the word “statute” (Leviticus 16:34) written with regard to the Yom Kippur service: Just as on Yom Kippur the entire service is performed by the High Priest, so too, in future generations the rite of the red heifer must be done entirely by the High Priest.

The Gemara expounds the next phrase in the verse: “And he shall take it out to the outside of the camp” (Numbers 19:3). The use of the word “it” implies that only it should be taken out, but he should not take out another heifer with it. As we learned in a mishna: If the heifer did not want to go out by itself, we do not take out a black cow with it in order to encourage it to leave, so that people will not mistakenly say that they slaughtered the black cow. And we do not take out an additional red heifer with it, so that people will not mistakenly say that they slaughtered two heifers. Slaughtering an additional heifer would invalidate the rite, since performing any additional labor during the rite of the red heifer disqualifies it. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This is not for that reason, rather it is due to the fact that it is stated “It,” which implies only one heifer may be taken out.

And even according to the first tanna, is it not written “it”? Why does he not derive the halakha from the word “it”? The Gemara explains: Who is the first tanna? It is Rabbi Shimon, who interprets the rationale for the mitzva in the verse and draws halakhic conclusions based on that interpretation. Therefore, he accepts that the halakha is derived from the word “it,” but he also provides a rationale for the halakha. If so, what is the practical difference between them? The practical difference between them is in a case