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because there are the breast and the hind leg, which the priests eat only if the offering is a peace-offering, but not if it is a Paschal lamb. Due to the distinction between the two types of offerings, the proposed stipulation does not provide a solution. It would remain unclear who should eat these portions of the offering.

The Gemara suggests that it may still be possible to find a way to use the stipulation: Let each one of these five people bringing a new Paschal lamb bring a priest to be registered with him for their Paschal lamb. Then the priest will eat the breasts and hind legs. Since the priest eats these portions of the offering in any event, there is no longer any practical distinction between the two types of offerings. The stipulation should therefore provide a solution.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What are the circumstances of this priest? If he had already performed the ritual of the Paschal lamb during the first Pesaḥ, then, as the Gemara explained previously, he is unable to be registered to partake of a new Paschal lamb. If so, there is concern that perhaps this offering is a Paschal lamb and not a peace-offering, and it will turn out that a Paschal lamb is eaten by those who did not register for it. And if, on the other hand, the priest had not performed the ritual of the Paschal lamb on the first Pesaḥ, there is concern that perhaps this offering is a peace-offering, and it would turn out that this priest did not perform the ritual of the Paschal lamb at all.

The Gemara modifies its suggestion: Let all five together bring one priest, who has not yet performed the ritual of the Paschal lamb. And let the priest register for all these five Paschal lambs. This should provide a solution. Whichever way you look at it, there is one person who has not yet performed the ritual of the Paschal lamb, and the priest will now fulfill his obligation together with him. If the priest then eats the breasts and hind legs of all the offerings, the stipulation should provide a viable solution.

The Gemara identifies a further distinction between a peace-offering and the Paschal lamb that precludes the use of the stipulation: Rather, the reason it is not possible to use the stipulation is because it would reduce the amount of time available for eating the peace-offering, for a Paschal lamb may be eaten only for a day and a night, whereas a peace-offering may be eaten for two days and one night. Were the stipulation to be made, all the offerings would have an uncertain status of either being a peace-offering or a Paschal lamb. They would therefore all be treated with the strictures of a Paschal lamb, and any meat remaining on the morning after the first night would have to be burnt. However, in the event that the offering was actually a peace-offering, this would be premature, since it may still be eaten for another day.

The Gemara modifies the proposed stipulation: Instead of making a stipulation between a Paschal lamb and a regular peace-offering, let each one of them specify that if they have already fulfilled their obligations to bring a Paschal lamb, their intention is to consecrate and bring the current offering as a surplus Paschal lamb. The status of a surplus Paschal lamb is usually achieved when an animal is originally consecrated as a Paschal lamb but for some reason is not offered. Such an animal is offered as a type of peace-offering.

The Gemara assumes here that it is also possible to consecrate an animal directly with this status, and therefore the following stipulation could be used. And when bringing their lambs they should each say: If mine was the blemished lamb, this lamb that I am bringing now shall be a Paschal lamb; and if mine was unblemished, this lamb that I am bringing now shall be a surplus Paschal lamb, which is a type of peace-offering and may therefore be offered even if one has already fulfilled his obligation to bring a Paschal lamb. Although a surplus Paschal lamb has the sanctity of a peace-offering, it may be eaten for only one day and one night, similar to a Paschal lamb. Since there is no distinction between the time allotted to eat the two types of offerings, this stipulation should provide a solution.

The Gemara challenges this suggestion: But can we designate animals initially as surplus Paschal lambs? This cannot be done; the sanctity of a surplus Paschal lamb is achieved only with an animal that was initially designated for a Paschal lamb but remained unused. If so, how is the suggested stipulation tenable? The Gemara explains: Let them trouble themselves to find and bring an unused leftover animal already invested with the sanctity of a surplus Paschal lamb, and let them make the suggested stipulation upon it. In this way, the stipulation should work and provide a solution.

The Gemara identifies a distinction that exists even between a Paschal lamb and a surplus Paschal lamb that precludes the use of even this suggested stipulation. Rather, it is not possible to use the stipulation because of the requirement to perform the act of placing one’s hands on the head of the offering, for a Paschal lamb does not need the act of placing one’s hands, whereas a surplus Paschal lamb, since it is a type of peace-offering, does need the act of placing one’s hands. Due to this distinction, the proposed stipulation cannot provide a solution. It would remain unclear whether the offering requires one to perform the act of placing one’s hands on its head, an act that one is prohibited to do on an offering that does not require it.

This distinction works out well to explain why the stipulation can’t be used for an offering of men, since a man’s offering requires the act of placing one’s hands. However, if the case involved an offering of women, for which there is no such requirement, what is there to say? In such a case, there is no distinction between a Paschal lamb and a surplus Paschal lamb, and therefore the stipulation should provide a solution.

The Gemara identifies a further distinction between a Paschal lamb and a surplus Paschal lamb that precludes the use of the stipulation: Rather, it is not possible to use the stipulation because of the requirement to apply presentations of sacrificial blood upon the altar. For whereas the blood of a Paschal lamb is applied to the altar in one presentation, the blood of a peace-offering is applied to the altar with two that constitute four, i.e., the blood is applied on two opposite corners so that it runs down all four sides of the altar.

What difference does the distinction in the number of presentations make? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: With regard to all offerings whose blood must be presented upon the outer altar, once the blood has been presented with one presentation, the offering has atoned, even if more presentations are ideally required? If so, it should be possible to use the stipulation and then make a single presentation of blood upon the altar, which would be valid for whichever type of offering it turned out to be.

The Gemara identifies a further distinction: Rather, the proposal is not possible because of the following: Whereas the blood of the Paschal lamb must be applied to the altar by pouring it on the base of the altar, the blood of a peace-offering is applied by sprinkling it upon the altar.

What difference does the manner of applying the blood make? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: In the case of all offerings whose blood must be applied to the altar by sprinkling, if one applied their blood by pouring, one has nonetheless fulfilled one’s obligation? If so, it should be possible to use the stipulation and then pour the blood upon the base of the altar. This pouring would be valid, whichever type of offering it turned out to be. The Gemara answers: Say in response that we say that one fulfilled his obligation only if he already did it this way; but would he be allowed to do so ab initio as well? Certainly not. Since the offering cannot be offered in a manner that is permissible ab initio, the distinction in the manner of applying the blood will preclude the use of the stipulation.

MISHNA: In the case of one who says to his children: I am slaughtering the Paschal lamb on behalf of whomever of you goes up first to Jerusalem, as soon as the first of the children has entered his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires on behalf of his brothers their portions together with him.

GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: You can learn from the case in the mishna that there is retroactive clarification. Although when the father slaughters the Paschal lamb it cannot be known which child will ultimately enter Jerusalem first, once one of the children does enter, the children are considered to have been registered for the father’s Paschal lamb from the outset. This is problematic, as no halakhic conclusion has been reached in the matter of retroactive clarification.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The mishna is not based on retroactive clarification. Rather, the father included all his children in his Paschal lamb from the outset. He created this competition only in order to enthuse them, so that they would be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot; but in fact his statement had no halakhic implications.

According to the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan, the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: And he acquires on behalf of his brothers their portions together with him. Granted, if you say that the father registered them from the beginning, before slaughtering the Paschal lamb, the case is well understood. But if you say that he did not register them from the beginning, but only after he slaughtered the Paschal lamb, can they then be registered? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: People can be registered and withdraw themselves from being registered for a Paschal lamb until it is slaughtered, but not after? Clearly, then, the children must have already been registered from the outset, and we may learn from this precise reading of the mishna that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation is correct.

That the competition was meant only to enthuse his children to be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot was also implied by that which was taught in the conclusion of a baraita that also records this competition: There was an incident such as this, and the daughters preceded the sons. And it turned out that the daughters demonstrated that they were enthusiastic, whereas the sons demonstrated that they were lazy.

MISHNA: Additional people can always be registered for a Paschal lamb, as long as there will be at least an olive-bulk of the lamb’s meat for each and every person registered. People can be registered and withdraw themselves from being registered for a Paschal lamb until it is slaughtered. Rabbi Shimon says: Even until the priest sprinkles the blood.

GEMARA: What is the first clause of the mishna teaching us? It is obvious that additional people can be registered. This comes to teach us that although this group was registered for it, the entire group can withdraw and a different group can register for it, despite the fact that no one from the original group remains.

We learned in the mishna: People can be registered and withdraw themselves from being registered for a Paschal lamb until it is slaughtered. Rabbi Shimon says: Even until the priest sprinkles the blood. The Gemara discusses the scope of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon: Abaye said: The dispute is only with regard to when one is able to withdraw from being registered. Both sides derive their opinions from the following verse: “And if the household be too little for a lamb [miheyot miseh], then shall he and his neighbor next to his house take one according to the number of the souls; according to every man’s eating you shall make your count for the lamb” (Exodus 12:4). The phrase miheyot miseh literally means: From being from a lamb. It is exegetically interpreted to refer to withdrawing from being registered for a lamb.

The Rabbis hold that “from being [miheyot] from a lamb” indicates that one can withdraw only during the life [meiḥayutei] of the lamb, i.e., while the lamb is still alive. And Rabbi Shimon holds that the phrase indicates that one can withdraw during the happenings [meihavayatei] of the lamb, i.e., as long as the sacrificial service is still being performed, which culminates with the application of the blood upon the altar. But with regard to being registered for the Paschal lamb, all agree that one can be registered for a lamb only until it is slaughtered, as the previously cited verse concerning registration states, in its conclusion: “According to the number [bemikhsat] of the people,” and then “you shall make your count [takhosu].” The word takhosu is taken to mean: You shall slaughter, in accordance with its meaning in Aramaic. The order of the verse therefore indicates that people can be registered only prior to the animal’s slaughter.

That was also taught in a baraita: People can be registered and withdraw themselves from being registered for a Paschal lamb until it is slaughtered. Rabbi Shimon says: They can be registered until it is slaughtered and withdraw themselves from being registered until the priest sprinkles the blood.

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
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