The Gemara answers: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? Rav Ḥisda holds that a contradiction with regard to secondary details does not disqualify the testimony even in capital law, and Rav Yehuda holds that it does disqualify the testimony. Neither Sage is bound by the statement of the other.

The Sages of Neharde’a say: Even if one says that it was a black coin and the other one says that it was a white coin their testimonies are combined.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, that as long as both witnesses testify that the defendant owes the plaintiff the same sum, the testimonies are combined? Say that you heard Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa saying that two testimonies are combined in a case where they do not contradict each other; but in a case where they contradict each other, did he say that they are combined?

Rather, the Sages of Neharde’a stated their opinion in accordance with the opinion of that tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree with regard to a case of two sets of witnesses, where one set says that the plaintiff lent the defendant two hundred dinars, and the other one says that he lent him one hundred dinars. Both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai agree that this is not considered a contradiction, and the testimony is accepted concerning the amount of one hundred dinars, as one hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred, i.e., testimony concerning a large amount includes testimony concerning a smaller amount.

With regard to what case do they disagree? They disagree over the case of one set of two witnesses, where one witness testifies that the defendant owes the plaintiff two hundred dinars, and the other witness says that he owes him one hundred. As Beit Shammai say that their testimony is divided. Since they are not testifying about the same amount, the entire testimony is disqualified. And Beit Hillel say: One hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred. Apparently, according to Beit Hillel’s opinion, as transmitted by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, although the testimonies are not identical, since both attest to the defendant’s liability to pay a certain amount of money, they are combined and accepted to that effect. This is the source for the opinion of the Sages of Neharde’a.

With regard to a case where one witness says that the plaintiff gave the defendant a barrel of wine, and the other one says that he gave him a barrel of oil, there was actually such an incident, and it came before Rabbi Ami. Since wine was cheaper than oil, Rabbi Ami deemed the defendant liable to pay the plaintiff only the value of a barrel of wine out of the value of a barrel of oil, an amount both witnesses agreed that he owed.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? Is it in accordance with the opinion transmitted by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar? Say that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said that two contradicting testimonies can be combined in a case where one hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred; perhaps one of the witnesses saw only half the loan, and the other one saw it all. But in a case like this, where the testimonies are about completely different items, did he say that they can be combined?

The Gemara answers: No, this is not a case of a direct contradiction. This ruling is necessary only with regard to monetary value, i.e., where one witness says that the defendant owes the value of a barrel of wine, and the second one says that he owes the value of a barrel of oil. Therefore, it is comparable to a case of one hundred dinars and two hundred dinars.

With regard to a case where one witness says that the incident took place on the upper floor [badeyota] and the other one says that it occurred on the lower floor, Rabbi Ḥanina says that an incident like this came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and he combined their testimonies. This was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, that since they agree with regard to the matter itself, the secondary details are insignificant.

§ The mishna teaches: And from where is it derived that when the judge leaves the courtroom, he should not say: I deemed you exempt and my colleagues deemed you liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me and consequently you were deemed liable? About this it is stated: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets, but one who is of a faithful spirit conceals a matter” (Proverbs 11:13). The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that when the judge leaves he should not say: I deemed you exempt and my colleagues deemed you liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me and consequently you were deemed liable? The verse states: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets” (Proverbs 11:13).

The Gemara relates: There was a certain student, about whom a rumor emerged that he revealed a statement that was stated in the study hall and should have been kept secret, and the rumor emerged twenty-two years after the time the statement was revealed. Rav Ami removed him from the study hall as a punishment. Rav Ami said: This is a revealer of secrets and he cannot be trusted.

MISHNA: Any time one of the litigants brings additional proof, he can overturn the verdict that was decided according to previous proofs. If one litigant said to the other: Bring all the proofs that you have from now until thirty days from now, if he found additional proof within thirty days, he can overturn the verdict. If he found it after thirty days, he cannot overturn the verdict anymore.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: He can still overturn the verdict, as what should this litigant, who sought and did not find additional proof within thirty days but found it after thirty days, have done?

In a case where one litigant said to the other: Bring witnesses, and the latter said: I have no witnesses, and the former said to him: Bring a proof, and he said: I have no proof, and he later brought a proof or found witnesses, in this case, this proof or these witnesses are worth nothing. It is apparently a false proof or false testimony.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What should this litigant, who did not know that he has witnesses and ultimately found witnesses, or who did not know that he has a proof and ultimately found proof, have done? Therefore, he can still overturn the verdict.

If at the beginning of the discussion in the court one did not bring witnesses or other evidence for his claims, but then he saw that he was about to be deemed liable to pay in the judgment, and said: Bring so-and-so and so-and-so, and they will testify on my behalf, or he pulled out a proof from under his belt [pundato], even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that this is worth nothing. If there was truth in the testimony of these witnesses or in this proof, he would not have hidden it until now.

GEMARA: With regard to the first halakha in the mishna, Rabba bar Rav Huna says: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also says: The halakha is not in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Since he says that the halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, we know by ourselves that the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

The Gemara answers: Lest you say that this statement, that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, applies ab initio, but after the fact, even if the court ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, the ruling is valid, as their opinion was not entirely rejected, Rabba bar Rav Huna therefore teaches us that if the court acts in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, we send the case back to court.

§ The mishna teaches that in a case where one litigant said to the other: Bring witnesses, and he admitted that he had none, and he subsequently found witnesses, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that their testimony is valid. Rabba bar Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Since he says that the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, we know by ourselves that the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

The Gemara answers: This statement of Rabba bar Rav Huna teaches us that specifically with regard to that halakha, the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; but with regard to all other statements of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the corpus of the Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

This is to the exclusion of that which Rabba bar bar Ḥanna says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anywhere that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a ruling in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor, and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan, and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement. Whereas in the former dispute in the mishna here, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, in the latter dispute in the mishna here, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabba bar Rav Huna, by contrast, maintains that in the case of a guarantor and in the case in Tzaidan, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain child who was taken to court before Rav Naḥman. They said to him: Do you have witnesses on your behalf? The child said to them: No. They continued to ask: Do you have evidence? The child said to them: No. Rav Naḥman deemed him liable, in accordance with the claim of the other litigant.

The child was walking and crying. These people heard him, and said to him: We know about the monetary matters of your father and can testify on your behalf. When he brought them before Rav Naḥman, Rav Naḥman said: In a case like this, even the Rabbis concede that the testimony is accepted, as a child does not know about the monetary matters of his father. Clearly, when he said that he has no witnesses or proof, he said so out of ignorance and was mistaken; there is no concern about artifice.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman from whose possession a promissory note emerged, i.e., she was appointed to hold it. She said to the judge: I know that this promissory note was repaid. The creditor should not use it to collect. Rav Naḥman deemed her testimony credible and did not allow the creditor to collect the debt.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: In accordance with whose opinion is your ruling? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says that letters, i.e., the content of a promissory note, are acquired by merely transferring the document? In other words, there is no need to write a deed for the transfer of a monetary document from one individual’s ownership to another. By giving it to the recipient, he becomes the owner of the document. Therefore, since the promissory note is in this woman’s possession, she is considered its legal owner, and her claim that it was repaid is consequently accepted.

Rav Naḥman said to him: That is not the reason for my ruling; rather, here it is different. Here the woman’s claim is accepted in any event, as, since the promissory note was in her possession, if she had wanted to, she could have burned it. Therefore, she is presumably telling the truth.

Some say that there is another version of the story, according to which Rav Naḥman did not deem her testimony credible. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: But if she had wanted to,