And if you would say that the Rabbis do not hold that in a case of exploitation of less than one-sixth one must return the money and that if it was more than one-sixth there is nullification of the transaction, can it be maintained that they do not accept these halakhot? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Metzia 56b) that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even in the case of one who sells a Torah scroll, an animal, or a pearl, these items are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation, as they have no fixed price. The Rabbis said to him: The early Sages stated that only these items listed earlier in the mishna, i.e., land, slaves, and documents, are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation. Therefore, the Rabbis should agree that the sale of the yoke is nullified.

The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of the mishna that teaches that according to the opinion of the Rabbis the sum of money is not proof? This means that the transaction is nullified. And if you wish, say instead that the sale of the yoke is not nullified, because when the Sages spoke of exploitation and the nullification of a transaction, they meant that these halakhot apply only in a case where the difference in price is an amount about which one could be mistaken and believe that this is the correct price. But when the difference in price is so great a sum that one could not be mistaken, this sale is not subject to the halakhot of exploitation. In that case, one must say that the buyer gave the extra money to the seller as a gift; he could not have thought that this was the actual price of the object.

MISHNA: One who sells a donkey has not sold its vessels, i.e., its equipment, with it. Naḥum the Mede says: He has sold its vessels. Rabbi Yehuda says: There are times when the vessels are sold, and there are times when they are not sold. How so? If the donkey was before him and its vessels were on it, and the buyer said to him: Sell me this donkey of yours, its vessels are sold. If the buyer said to him: Is the donkey yours; I wish to purchase it, its vessels are not sold.

GEMARA: Ulla says: The dispute in the mishna is referring to the donkey’s sack and the saddlebag [disakkaya] and the kumni, a term explained later in the Gemara. As the first tanna holds: An ordinary donkey is used primarily for riding, and therefore these articles, which are not used for riding but for carrying burdens, are not included in the sale. And Naḥum the Mede holds: An ordinary donkey is used for carrying burdens, and therefore the items that serve this purpose are sold along with the donkey. But with regard to the saddle and the saddlecloth, the harness and the saddle band, everyone agrees that they are sold, as they are used both for riding and for carrying burdens.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita. If a seller says: I am selling you a donkey and its vessels, this one has sold the saddle, and the saddlecloth, and the harness, and the saddle band. But he has not sold the sack, and the saddlebag, and the kumni. And when the seller said to the buyer: I am selling it and everything that is on it, to you; the donkey and all of these items are sold. It can be inferred from here that the reason that the buyer acquires the saddle and the saddlecloth is that the seller said to him: I am selling you a donkey and its vessels. By inference, if the seller did not say this, the buyer does not acquire them.

The Gemara answers: The same is true even if the seller did not say to him: I am selling you a donkey and its vessels. In that case as well, the saddle and the saddlecloth are sold. And this is what the baraita teaches us: That even though the seller said to him: I am selling you a donkey and its vessels, the buyer still does not acquire the sack and the saddlebag and the kumni.

The Gemara inquires: What is the meaning of: And the kumni? Rav Pappa bar Shmuel said: This is the saddle used by women.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does this dispute apply only to a case where the vessels are on the donkey, but when the vessels are not on the donkey, Naḥum the Mede concedes to the Rabbis that they are not sold? Or perhaps the dispute applies to a case where the vessels are not on the donkey, but when the vessels are on the donkey the Rabbis concede to Naḥum that the vessels are sold. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the aforementioned baraita: And when the seller said to the buyer: I am selling it and everything that is on it, the donkey and all of these items are sold. In this case, the vessels are on the donkey, and everything is sold.

Granted, if you say that the dispute applies when the vessels are on the donkey, in accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is the opinion of the Rabbis that although in general one does not acquire the vessels, if the seller explicitly says that he is selling the donkey and everything on it, the buyer acquires it all. But if you say that the dispute applies when the vessels are not on the donkey, but when the vessels are on the donkey everyone agrees that they are sold, in accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? Even according to the opinion of the Rabbis there is no need to say explicitly that he is selling everything.

The Gemara answers: Actually, the dispute applies when the vessels are not on the donkey, and the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the language of the baraita should be emended to say: And when he said to him: I am selling it and everything that is fit to be on it, i.e., those items usually found on a donkey, everything is sold.

The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear a solution from the mishna. Rabbi Yehuda says: There are times when the vessels are sold, and there are times when they are not sold. What, is it not the case that Rabbi Yehuda is referring to that which the first tanna said? If so, the dispute between the Rabbis and Naḥum the Mede must be referring to a case where the vessels are on the donkey, as Rabbi Yehuda addresses the same set of circumstances. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, Rabbi Yehuda