§ It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:12): With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another, they dissolve the vow for him only in the presence of the one who is the subject of the vow. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Naḥman said: As it is written: “And the Lord said to Moses in Midian: Go, return to Egypt; for all the men are dead” (Exodus 4:19). Rav Naḥman notes that the verse specifies where God spoke to Moses, and explains that God said to him: In Midian you vowed to Yitro that you would not return to Egypt, go and dissolve your vow in Midian. And where does it say that Moses vowed to Yitro? For it is written: “And Moses was content [vayo’el] to dwell with the man” (Exodus 2:21). The word vayo’el is related to the word ala, and ala means nothing other than an oath, as it is written: “And he…brought him under an oath [ala]” (Ezekiel 17:13), and the halakhot of dissolution of oaths are identical to those of dissolution of vows.

The Gemara cites another proof that one may dissolve such a vow or oath only in the presence of the party affected by the vow or oath. It states with regard to King Zedekiah: “And he also rebelled against King Nebuchadnezzar, who had made him swear by God” (II Chronicles 36:13). The Gemara asks: What was his rebellion? The Gemara answers: Zedekiah found Nebuchadnezzar eating a live rabbit, and the latter was ashamed to be seen doing this. He said to him: Take an oath to me that you will not reveal my behavior and this matter will not emerge in public. Zedekiah took an oath to him.

Later, Zedekiah was physically suffering, as he wanted to tell people what he had seen, but he could not do so due to his oath. He requested dissolution of his oath from the judges of the Sanhedrin, who dissolved it for him, and he publicly said what he had witnessed. Nebuchadnezzar heard that he was being ridiculed for his behavior. He sent for and brought the Sanhedrin and Zedekiah before him. He said to them: Did you see what Zedekiah has done? Did he not take an oath in the name of Heaven: That I will not reveal? They said to him: He requested dissolution of the oath.

He said to them: Can one request the dissolution of an oath? They said to him: Yes. He said to them: Must this be done in the presence of the person he took an oath to, or even not in his presence? They said to him: It must be dissolved in his presence. He said to them: And you, what did you do? What is the reason you did not say to Zedekiah that he can have his oath dissolved only in my presence? Immediately, they fulfilled the verse: “They sit upon the ground, and keep silence, the elders of the daughter of Zion” (Lamentations 2:10). Rabbi Yitzḥak said: This means that they removed the cushions upon which they sat from underneath them, as a sign that they had erred in halakha.

MISHNA: As a continuation of the opinion of the Rabbis in the previous mishna that they may not broach dissolution of a vow based on a new situation, Rabbi Meir says: There are matters that are, at first glance, like a new situation but are not in fact like a new situation, and the Rabbis do not concede to him. How so? For example, one said: Marrying so-and-so is konam for me, as her father is evil, and they told him that her father died, or that he repented. Or he said: Entering this house is konam for me, as there is a bad dog inside it, or a snake inside it, and they told him that the dog died, or that the snake was killed. This is at first glance perceived like a new situation, and yet it is not in fact like a new situation, and this claim may be used to broach dissolution. But the Rabbis do not concede to him.

GEMARA: The mishna taught that according to Rabbi Meir certain matters are similar to, but in fact do not constitute a new situation, such as a vow which states: Entering this house is konam for me, as there is a bad dog there, where the halakha is that if the dog dies, it is not considered to be a new situation. The Gemara asks: Certainly death is a new situation. Rav Huna said: He is considered like one who makes his vow dependent on a matter. In other words, his vow is interpreted as conditional, that he will not enter the house as long as the dog is alive, for he explicitly stated that this was the reason for his vow. Therefore, when the dog dies, the vow is dissolved. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said it means that they say to him: The dog had already died, or: The father had already repented, before the vow, and it was a mistaken vow from the outset that never took effect.