And all agree that they are both prohibited from setting up a mill or an oven in the jointly owned courtyard, or to raise chickens in it.

If only one of the partners was prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from the other, he may not enter the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: He can say to the partner: I am entering into my own portion and I am not entering into your portion. And the court forces the one who took such a vow to sell his portion so that he does not cause the other to transgress.

If someone from the marketplace is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from one of the partners, he may not enter a courtyard of the partners, since it belongs partly to the one from whom he may not benefit. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: He can say to him: I am entering into the portion of another resident of the courtyard and I am not entering your own portion since it does not belong entirely to you.

With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another and he has a bathhouse or an olive press in the city that is leased out and available for public use, if the one who took the vow has a right to profits from usage in the property, i.e., he retains some rights in the property and has not leased them out completely, it is forbidden for the one who took the vow to use it. If he has no right of usage in the property, it is permitted.

With regard to one who says to another: Entering your house is konam for me, or: Purchasing your field is konam for me, then if he, i.e., the owner of the house or field, dies or sells the house to another, it is permitted for the one who took the vow to enter the house or purchase the field, as it is no longer in the possession of the prior owner. But if he said: Entering this house is konam for me, or: Purchasing this field is konam for me, then even if the owner dies or sells it to another, it is forbidden.

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the mishna, the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov disagree with regard to the permissibility of entering a jointly owned courtyard where the partners vowed not to derive benefit from one another. However, if they instead vowed to prohibit one another from deriving benefit from them and their property, what is the halakha? Do we say that they disagree where the partners each vowed not to benefit from the other, but where they each vowed to prohibit one another from deriving benefit from them, the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, as they are each considered to be forbidden due to circumstances beyond their control? Or perhaps the Rabbis disagree even in a case where each vowed to prohibit one another from deriving benefit?

Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If only one of the partners was prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from the other, he may not enter the shared courtyard. Here, the prohibitive vow was stated by the other party, and still the Rabbis disagree and forbid the use of the courtyard. Evidently, the dispute in the mishna applies equally to cases beyond the control of the one forbidden by the vow. The Gemara responds: Teach an emended version of the mishna: If one had vowed to prohibit himself from deriving benefit from another. According to this emended version, the mishna may be addressing only the one who brought the prohibition upon himself.

So too, it is reasonable to assume that the mishna is referring to one who imposes the prohibition upon himself, as it was taught in the latter clause with regard to the same case: And the court forces the one who took such a vow to sell his portion. Granted, if you say that the mishna is speaking of a case where he himself vowed not to benefit from the other, this is consistent with that which teaches that the court forces him to sell his portion; since he created the problem, he is forced to resolve it. But if you say that it is referring to a case where the other prohibited him with a vow, why does the court force him to sell his property? He is put in a situation beyond his control. This clause offers no proof, and the Rabbis may still concede in a case where one is forbidden due to another’s vow.

Rabba said that Ze’eiri said: