hates the yavam, and she would therefore take advantage of any testimony to rid herself of him. Rav Sheshet said to them that you learned it in the mishna. If they said to her: Your husband died and afterward your child died, and she married another man, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, she must leave the other man, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer.

Again, Rav Sheshet analyzes the case: What are the circumstances? If we say that they are two and two, i.e., the account of two witnesses was contradicted by two other witnesses, what did you see to make you rely on these second witnesses when you can equally rely on those? Why should she have to leave this man? And furthermore, why should the child be a mamzer? At worst he is an individual whose status as a mamzer is uncertain, as there is no proof that the second witnesses are more reliable. And if you would say that the tanna of the mishna was not precise in his language, but from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the mishna: The first is a mamzer and the last is not a mamzer, one can learn from here that the mishna was taught specifically in this manner.

Rather, is it not the case that this is referring to one witness, and the reason is that two others came and contradicted him. It may be inferred from this that if it was not so, the sole witness is deemed credible. The Gemara refutes this proof: Actually, the mishna is speaking of a case when two witnesses came first, followed by another two witnesses, and the ruling is as Rav Aḥa bar Manyumi said, with regard to a different issue, that it is referring to witnesses of false, conspiring testimony. In other words, the second set of witnesses did not offer an alternative account of the same incident. Rather, they claimed that the first witnesses lied, as they were with them, elsewhere, during the time that they supposedly witnessed the husband’s death. In this case, the first witnesses are entirely disqualified, as the account of the second pair is accepted.

Here too, we are dealing with witnesses of false, conspiring testimony. Consequently, the question of whether the court believes one witness who testifies that a yavam is dead cannot be resolved from the mishna.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi, and some say it was Rav Aḥa who said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a proof from a different source (Yevamot 118b): A woman is not deemed credible if she says: My yavam is dead, so that I may marry, i.e., to permit herself to marry another man. And she is not deemed credible if she says: My sister is dead, so that I may enter her house, i.e., to marry her husband. The Gemara infers: It is she herself who is not deemed credible. It may be inferred from this that if one witness issues this report, he is deemed credible.

The Gemara refutes this argument. And according to your reasoning, say the latter clause of that same mishna: A man is not deemed credible if he says: My brother is dead, so that I may enter into levirate marriage with his wife. And he is not deemed credible when he says: My wife is dead, so that I may marry her sister. Following the above reasoning, it is he himself who is not deemed credible, which indicates that one witness is deemed credible. Yet this cannot be correct: Granted, with regard to a woman, due to the concern that she be left a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient in her case, by allowing her to rely on a single witness. However, with regard to a man, what can be said? There is no concern that he will be left deserted, as a man can marry more than one woman, so he certainly cannot marry a woman on the basis of such flimsy testimony.

Rather, the case of one witness cannot be decided from the mishna, as when is this halakha that a woman is not deemed credible when she says that her yavam is dead necessary to be stated? It is necessary for the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Akiva said that the offspring born of intercourse for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is a mamzer, which indicates that even the offspring of a yevama who unlawfully wed another man is a mamzer, one might say that she is concerned for the ruin of her offspring and is consequently exacting in her investigation and would marry only if she received clear, unambiguous testimony. The tanna therefore teaches us that she is concerned for her own ruin, e.g., if there is uncertainty as to whether her husband died, which would force her to leave both him and her second husband, but she is not as concerned for the ruin of her offspring, and in this case she is likelier to marry unlawfully.

§ Rava said: One witness is deemed credible in the case of a yevama by means of an a fortiori inference: If for a prohibition involving karet, i.e., adultery of a married woman, you permitted the testimony of one witness, then for a regular prohibition, that of a yevama to another man, is it not all the more so? One of the Sages said to Rava: She herself, a woman who testifies with regard to herself, can prove otherwise: For a prohibition involving karet you permitted her, i.e., if she testifies that her husband is dead she may marry another man and there is no concern that she might still be a married woman, and yet for a regular prohibition you did not permit her, as she is not deemed credible when she claims that her yavam is dead.

But rather, she herself, what is the reason that she is not deemed credible? Since sometimes the woman may hate him, she is not exacting in her examination of the matter and marries. With regard to one witness, the same concern also applies: Since sometimes the woman may hate him, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again. The court believes one witness only because they assume that she herself is careful to examine the matter. The a fortiori inference is therefore groundless, and the question remains unresolved.

§ The mishna states that this was an exposition taught by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya: The verse states with regard to priests: “Neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7). This teaches that a woman is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood by a bill of divorce she receives from a man other than her husband. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Rabbi Elazar should have taught this verse as a pearl but in fact he taught it as an earthenware shard. In other words, he could have arrived at a more significant conclusion.

The Gemara asks: What pearl does he mean? As it is taught in a baraita: “Neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband,” even if she was divorced only from her husband. Even if the woman was separated from her husband and was not permitted to marry anyone else, e.g., if her husband wrote in the bill of divorce: This is your bill of divorce but you are not permitted to any other man, this document is certainly not considered a full-fledged bill of divorce, and yet she is disqualified from the priesthood. If her husband later passes away, she has the status of a divorcée, not a widow, which means that she is prohibited from marrying a priest. And this is the trace of a bill of divorce, which is not an actual bill of divorce and yet disqualifies from the priesthood.

MISHNA: In the case of one whose wife went overseas and people came and told him: Your wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward his wife came back from overseas, the original wife is permitted to return