We are not concerned about any rumor after marriage. If a rumor spread about a woman after her marriage that she was forbidden to her husband, the court takes no notice of these reports. The Gemara answers: There is a novel aspect to this teaching: Lest you say that since she came to the court and they permitted her, the very fact that her case had to be discussed indicates that her status is not fully established, and consequently one might think that it should be considered like a rumor before marriage, and she should therefore be forbidden, Rav Ashi therefore teaches us that even in this case, once she is married the court takes no notice of unsubstantiated rumors.

§ The mishna further taught that if she married by permission of the court she must leave him, but she is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. On this issue, Ze’eiri said: The mishna is not accepted, and this is derived from what was taught in the study hall, as it was taught in a baraita in the study hall: If the court ruled that the sun had set at the conclusion of Shabbat, which means it is permitted to perform labor, and later the sun shone, this is not a ruling for which the court is to blame, but an error. Consequently, the court does not have to bring an offering for the unwitting communal sin. Rather, each individual is liable to bring a separate offering. Here too, although the woman married with the consent of the court, they did not issue a mistaken ruling of halakha but simply erred with regard to the facts. She is therefore an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring an offering.

And conversely, Rav Naḥman said that the court’s permission is considered a ruling that renders them liable to bring an offering for an unwitting communal sin.

Rav Naḥman said: You can know that her permission to marry is a ruling, as in the entire Torah one witness is not deemed credible, and yet here he is deemed credible. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered a ruling, i.e., she does not rely on the witness but on the decision of the court? By contrast, Rava said that we can know that her permission to marry is an error. His reasoning is that had the court ruled with regard to forbidden fat or with regard to blood that it is permitted, and they went back and saw a reason to prohibit it, if they subsequently retract and say that it is permitted we take no notice of them. If they did not find a conclusive proof but merely offered a new argument, this claim does not cancel the earlier ruling that the substance is forbidden.

Whereas in the case of marriage, when one witness comes the court permits her, and when two witnesses subsequently come and testify that her husband is alive, they render her forbidden. When one other witness again comes forward, claiming that the husband is dead, they permit her. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered an error of the court, as they did not issue their rulings based on their own reasoning but in reliance on the facts they had garnered from the witnesses? It is therefore considered a factual error, not a mistaken ruling.

The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Eliezer also maintains that the ruling of the court is an error, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If a woman married by permission of the court and it later turned out that her husband was alive, let the law pierce the mountain, i.e., the matter must be fully investigated. If it turns out that the ruling of the court is incorrect, it is nullified and she brings a choice sin-offering. Granted, if you say that it is an error, it is due to that reason that she must bring an offering. However, if you say it is a ruling, why does she bring an offering? It is the court that should be liable to bring an offering for its incorrect ruling.

The Gemara asks: But perhaps Rabbi Eliezer maintains that an individual who acted by ruling of the court is also liable to bring an offering, and this is why he obligates her to bring an offering, despite the fact that she went ahead with the consent of the court. The Gemara refutes this suggestion: If so, what need is there for the special mention of the rationale: Let the law pierce the mountain? He should simply have said that she is liable to bring an offering. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer evidently maintains that in general an individual does not have to bring an offering for a sin he committed based on the ruling of a court. Here, however, she must bring a sin-offering because there was an error with regard to the facts.

§ The mishna taught that if the court instructed her to marry, and she went and ruined herself, she is liable to bring an offering. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Ruined herself? Rabbi Eliezer says: She engaged in licentious sexual relations with a man, i.e., intercourse not for the purpose of marriage. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It means that she married in a prohibited manner, e.g., a widow to a High Priest, or a divorcée or a yevama who had performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza] to a common priest.

The Gemara elaborates: According to the one who says that she engaged in licentious sexual relations, she is all the more so liable to bring an offering if she is a widow who had sexual relations with a High Priest, as she performed an act prohibited by Torah law. Conversely, according to the one who says that the mishna is speaking of a widow who engaged in relations with a High Priest, it is only in that case that she must bring an offering; however, if she engaged in licentious sexual relations she is not liable to bring an offering. What is the reason? As she can say: It is you who deemed me unattached, and although my behavior was unseemly, I may live with whomever I choose as a single woman.

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If the court ruled that she may marry, and she went and ruined herself, for example a widow who engaged in intercourse with a High Priest, or a divorcée or a ḥalutza who engaged in intercourse with a common priest, she is liable to bring an offering for each and every sexual act, as each is a separate transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Elazar.

And the Rabbis say that she brings one offering for all of them, as she performed them all in a single lapse of awareness. And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Elazar that if a married woman married in error, e.g., to five people, that she is liable to bring an offering for each and every one of them, since they are separate bodies. She is obligated to bring an offering for each separate man with whom she engaged in sexual relations.

MISHNA: With regard to a woman whose husband and child went overseas, and witnesses came and said to her: Your husband died and afterward your child died, she does not require levirate marriage, as she had a child when her husband died. And for this reason she married another man. And if afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, i.e., the child died before the husband, which means that she did require levirate marriage, she is therefore a yevama who married a stranger without ḥalitza and she must consequently leave her second husband. And with regard to the first child, the one born before they heard about the reversal, and the last one, born after they realized who actually died first, each of these children is a mamzer.

Conversely, if they said to her: Your child died and afterward your husband died, and she therefore entered into levirate marriage, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, which means she married her husband’s brother when there was no obligation of levirate marriage, she must leave her husband, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer. If they said to her: Your husband died, and she married, and afterward they said to her that he was alive at the time of her marriage and he later died, she must leave the second husband. And the first child, born when her original husband was still alive, is a mamzer, and the last one, born after his death, is not a mamzer.

If they said to her: Your husband died, and she became betrothed to another man, and afterward her husband came, she is permitted to return to him, as betrothal alone does not render her forbidden to her husband. Furthermore, although the last man, i.e., her betrothed, gave her a bill of divorce, he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. She was never his wife, for the betrothal was invalid, and a bill of divorce given to the wife of another man does not disqualify her. This was taught by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya: The verse states with regard to priests: “Neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7), which indicates: And not one who was divorced from a man who is not her husband, e.g., the second man in this case.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks a question with regard to the first section of the mishna: What is the meaning of first child and what is the meaning of last child in this context? If we say that the first means the one born before her hearing that the report was erroneous, and the last means the one born after she heard, let him teach simply: The offspring is a mamzer, as there is no difference between the two cases.

The Gemara explains that because the tanna wanted to teach in the latter clause: If they said to her your husband died, and she married, and afterward they said to her that he was alive and he later died, the first child is a mamzer and the last one is not a mamzer, he also taught in the first clause: The first and the last are each a mamzer, despite the fact that in this case it makes no difference whether the child was born before or after she heard.

§ The Sages taught: This mishna is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who would say that betrothal does not take effect for those liable for violating regular prohibitions, and therefore the child of a yevama who transgressed a prohibition by marrying someone else is a mamzer. However, the Rabbis say that there is no mamzer from a yevama. The Gemara asks: And let the Rabbis say, as a principle: There is no mamzer from those liable for violating regular prohibitions.

The Gemara answers: This tanna called the Rabbis is in fact another tanna citing the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who claims that Rabbi Akiva said that a child born from those liable for violating prohibitions proscribing sexual relations with close relatives is a mamzer, but one born from those liable for violating regular prohibitions, i.e., a prohibition that does not involve a family relationship, such as the prohibition that “the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin” (Deuteronomy 25:5), is not a mamzer. Rav Yehuda said