the last one gave her a bill of divorce, he has not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, as she is not considered a divorcée at all, this proves by inference that she does not require a bill of divorce from him. The reason is that if she requires a bill of divorce, even if it is only due to uncertainty, why has he not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood? A bill of divorce of any validity would bar her from marrying a priest. Rather, a bill of divorce given by a man to a woman who is not his wife is clearly of no account, and the reason for the ruling in the latter clause, with regard to betrothal, is that people will say there was no need for a bill of divorce because it was a mistaken betrothal.

The Gemara asks: If so, in the first clause too, they will say it was a mistaken marriage. The Gemara answers: The Sages penalized her by requiring her to receive a bill of divorce, lest people say she divorced this man and went back and married the first one. The Gemara counters: If so, in the latter clause of the mishna let us also penalize her. The Gemara responds: The first clause involves a situation where she violated a prohibition through her intercourse, and therefore the Sages penalized her. Conversely, in the latter clause, when she did not violate a prohibition, as she simply became betrothed, the Sages did not penalize her.

§ The mishna taught that this woman does not have, i.e., she is not entitled to, the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that the Sages instituted a marriage contract in general, for an ordinary woman? So that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her. The necessity to find money for her marriage contract will prevent a hasty decision to divorce her. However, in the case of this woman, on the contrary, the Sages actually prefer that she will be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her, as the marriage was forbidden and she may not remain with him. Consequently, they eliminated her marriage contract to encourage him to divorce her.

§ The mishna further states that she does not have claim to profits, or sustenance, or worn clothes. Why not? Because the stipulations in the marriage contract, i.e., all the rights of a wife stemming from the stipulations that are part of a marriage contract, are considered like the marriage contract itself. Since she has no marriage contract, she does not have the stipulations in a marriage contract either.

§ The mishna also teaches that if she took any of the above from this man or from that one she must return anything she took. The Gemara comments: This is obvious. Since she is not entitled to these articles, of course she must give them back. The Gemara explains: It is necessary, lest you say that since she has already taken hold of them we do not remove them from her possession, as this is merely a penalty and she obtained nothing that did not legally belong to her. The tanna therefore teaches us that the court requires her to return even these items.

§ The mishna taught that the child of either of the men is a mamzer. To clarify this issue, the Gemara cites a different discussion. We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Terumot 2:2): One may not separate teruma from ritually impure produce in order to exempt ritually pure food, and if he separated teruma from impure food unwittingly, his teruma is considered teruma. If he acted intentionally, he has done nothing, that is, his action is of no effect. The Sages debated: What is the meaning of the expression: He has done nothing? Rav Ḥisda said: He has done nothing at all, meaning that even that griva of produce he set aside as teruma returns to its former untithed state, as his entire act is completely disregarded.

Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, said: He has done nothing with regard to preparing the remaining produce from which he separated teruma, but the fruit he separated is itself teruma. Although the portion he set aside is sanctified as teruma, this does not exempt him from separating more teruma from ritually pure produce. The Gemara clarifies the two opinions: Rav Ḥisda did not say his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, as, if you say it is teruma, on occasion he will be negligent and not separate anything more, assuming that if the portion he set aside has the status of teruma he must certainly have done everything required.

The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:1): With regard to one who separates teruma from a serpent melon [kishut] and it was discovered to be bitter, or from a watermelon and it was discovered to be spoiled, it is teruma, and yet he must go back and separate teruma from another serpent melon or watermelon. No concern is expressed in this mishna that one might neglect to set aside teruma a second time. The Gemara answers: Are you raising a contradiction between the case of an unwitting sinner and that of an intentional sinner? There is a difference between them, as one who was unwitting did not commit a transgression and consequently does not deserve to be penalized, whereas one who was an intentional sinner did commit a transgression.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction between this ruling involving an unwitting sinner and another halakha of an unwitting sinner: Here, it is taught that if the one who separated ritually impure produce instead of ritually pure produce was unwitting, his teruma is teruma, which indicates that he does not have to separate teruma again. However, there, with regard to rotten fruit, it is taught that it is teruma and yet he must separate teruma again.

The Gemara explains: There, his was an unwitting act that is close to an intentional one, as he should have tasted it first to ensure that he was separating quality fruit. His failure to do so renders him virtually a willful sinner, and therefore the Sages penalized him by obligating him to set aside teruma again. In the case of impure teruma, in contrast, he may not have been able to investigate the matter when he separated the portion.

And the Gemara also raises a contradiction between one case involving an intentional sinner and another case of an intentional sinner. Here, it is taught that in the case of an intentional sinner who separates teruma, he has done nothing. There, we learned in a mishna (Demai 5:10), that with regard to one who separates teruma from produce growing in a vessel that is not perforated, for produce that grew in a perforated vessel, which is considered connected to the ground, it is teruma, but he must go back and separate teruma a second time. This ruling is based on the principle that anything that grew in a pot without a hole does not require separation of teruma by Torah law. In this case, the fact that he must again set aside teruma does not mean that the portion he separated is not consecrated at all.

The Gemara answers: In a case involving two vessels he will listen. Since the difference between the two vessels is clear to the eye, if the owner is told he must separate teruma again, it can be assumed that he will comply. In contrast, in the case of one vessel he will not listen, as ritually impure and pure produce look the same to him. Consequently, if he is informed that he must set aside teruma a second time despite the fact that the produce he already set aside has the status of teruma, he will take no notice.

The Gemara asks another question: And according to the opinion of Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, who said that he has done nothing with regard to preparing the remaining produce but it is nevertheless teruma,