how could a second-generation Egyptian convert ever achieve purity, so that it is permitted for his offspring, the third generation, to enter into the congregation? He may marry neither a Jew nor a female Egyptian convert. The Gemara answers: Perhaps it means that if he transgressed and married a convert or a Jewish woman, his seed will be purified. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: A case of: That if, is not written in the verse. In other words, the Bible does not speak of situations that can arise only through the commission of a transgression.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the halakha of a mamzer, which is a case of that if, as a mamzer is the child of a forbidden union, and yet the verse writes it? The Gemara answers: A case of that if that results in a prohibition, the Torah writes, but a case of that if that leads to an allowance, the Torah does not write. The Torah teaches the halakha of a mamzer, whose very existence is the result of his parents having engaged in forbidden relations, in order to render it prohibited for him to enter into the congregation. However, it would not teach the halakha of a second-generation Egyptian convert who transgressed and married a woman who was forbidden to him, in order to permit his offspring to enter into the congregation.

The Gemara raises an objection: But isn’t there the halakha governing one who remarries his divorcée after she had been married to another man? This is a case of that if that leads to an allowance, and yet the Torah writes it. The words “It is an abomination before the Lord” (Deuteronomy 24:4) stated with regard to this case teach that although the woman herself is forbidden to her first husband, if she nevertheless remarried him, their children are fit to enter into the congregation. The Gemara answers: There, the Torah writes that case due to the basic prohibition, i.e., that a man may not remarry his divorced wife after she has been married to another man, and the allowance with regard to their children is learned incidentally.

The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with respect to Egyptian and Edomite converts that “the sons of the third generation that are born to them may enter to them, the congregation of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:9). If it is stated “sons” why is it also stated “generation,” and if it is stated “generation” why is it also stated “sons”? One of these terms seems superfluous. The baraita explains: If it had stated only “sons” and not stated “generation,” I would say that the prohibition depends on the number of the son, meaning that the first and second sons of an Egyptian convert are forbidden, whereas the third is permitted. Therefore, it is stated “generation” to indicate that the prohibition depends not on the number of the son but on his generation.

And conversely, if it had stated only “generation” and not stated “sons,” I would say that the generations are counted from those standing on Mount Sinai, so that any Egyptian born after three generations have passed from the time of the giving of the Torah would be permitted. Therefore, it is stated “sons” to indicate that certain sons are prohibited in later generations as well.

The verse states: “The sons of the third generation that are born to them may enter to them, the congregation of the Lord.” The Sages expounded each of the two instances of the words “to them”: The first mention of “to them” teaches that from them you should count. The count of generations begins with the converts themselves, as they are considered the first generation, and therefore their grandchildren are permitted. The second mention of “to them” teaches that you should follow their disqualification. If a male Egyptian convert married a Jewish woman, or if a female Egyptian convert married a Jewish man, the halakha with regard to the offspring born to them is that although one of the parents is not disqualified from entering into marriage, the status of the child follows the unfit parent, who disqualifies his or her offspring until the third generation.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to write “to them,” and it is also necessary to write “that are born.” As, if the Merciful One had written only “that are born,” I would say that one should count the generations from the converts’ sons. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “to them” to teach that the converts themselves are counted as the first generation. And if the Merciful One had written only “to them,” I would say that in the case of a pregnant Egyptian woman who converted, she and her child, i.e., the fetus, are considered one generation, as the fetus is deemed to be a part of its mother. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “that are born,” to indicate that each birth marks a new generation, and accordingly the fetus is regarded as a second-generation Egyptian convert.

The verse concerning a mamzer states: “A mamzer shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to the tenth generation shall none of his [lo] enter into the congregation of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:3). And it is necessary to write “to them” here, with regard to an Egyptian convert, to teach that the child’s status follows the disqualified parent in his case, and it is also necessary to write “to him [lo]” with regard to a mamzer, to teach that a similar halakha applies to a mamzer. In the translation of the verse, lo is translated as: Of his, i.e., of his ilk. However, lo can also be translated as: To him.

Lo is written with regard to both the Egyptian and the mamzer, as, if the Merciful One had written it only here, with regard to an Egyptian, one might have said that only in this case does the child’s status follow the disqualified parent, because the Egyptian comes from an unfit drop of semen, that of a gentile. But as for a mamzer, who comes from a fit drop of semen, as his parents were proper Jews despite their grave sin, one might say that there is no room for such stringency. Therefore, the Torah teaches that the same halakha applies to a mamzer.

And conversely, if the Merciful One had written this stringent halakha only with regard to a mamzer, one might have said that this is because he is forever unfit to enter into the congregation, but here, with regard to an Egyptian convert, I might say that this is not the case. Therefore, both verses are necessary.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If a second-generation male Egyptian convert married a first-generation female Egyptian convert, her child is considered a third-generation convert for whom it is permitted to enter the congregation. The Gemara comments: Apparently Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that we assign the child to him, the father, and not to the mother.

Rav Yosef raised an objection from the following mishna (Kiddushin 69a): Rabbi Tarfon says: Mamzerim can purify themselves over the course of the generations. How so? If a mamzer married his non-Jewish maidservant, the child born to them is a slave. If the slave’s master, the mamzer who owns the maidservant, subsequently freed the child, he becomes a free man and is fit to enter into the congregation. Apparently we assign the child to her, the mother, and not to the father, as the child is deemed a slave rather than a mamzer. The Gemara answers: It is different there, in the case of the slave, as the verse states: “The wife and her children shall be her master’s” (Exodus 21:4). The words “her children” indicate that the children born to a non-Jewish maidservant are assigned to her.

Rava raised an objection from a previously mentioned baraita: Rabbi Yehuda said: Minyamin, an Egyptian convert, was a friend of mine from among the students of Rabbi Akiva, and he said: Following my conversion I was a first-generation Egyptian convert, and so I married another first-generation Egyptian convert. I will marry off my son, who is a second-generation Egyptian convert, to another second-generation Egyptian convert, so that my grandson will be fit to enter into the congregation. Now, if it enters your mind to say that we assign the child to the father, even if he marries off his son to a first-generation Egyptian convert his grandson should be permitted. The Gemara answers: Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan already say to the tanna reciting the baraita: You should teach that Minyamin sought to marry off his son to a first-generation Egyptian convert.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said just the opposite: If a second-generation male Egyptian convert married a first-generation female Egyptian convert, her son is considered a second-generation convert who is prohibited from entering the congregation. Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that we assign the child to the mother and not to the father.

Abaye said to him: But what, then, will you say about that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one set aside a pregnant animal as a sin-offering, and the animal later gave birth to a female, if he wishes he may gain atonement with the mother itself, in which case the young is left to graze until it develops a blemish that renders it unfit for sacrifice, whereupon it is sold and the proceeds are used for a gift offering; and if he wishes he may gain atonement with the animal’s young, and the mother is left to graze until it develops a blemish.

Granted, if you say that a fetus is not considered the thigh, i.e., a part, of its mother but rather a separate creature, despite the fact that it is still attached to her, then an individual in this situation is like one who sets aside two sin-offerings as a guarantee, i.e., one who, owing to his concern that his sin-offering might become lost, sets aside two animals from the outset with the intention of using whichever one he chooses. And Rav Oshaya said with regard to such a case: If one set aside two sin-offerings as a guarantee, so that if one is lost he may gain atonement with the other, he gains atonement with one of them, and the second is left to graze until it develops a blemish and can be redeemed.

But if you say that a fetus is considered the thigh of its mother and is regarded as part of her, it is the young of a sin-offering, and the young of a sin-offering goes to its death. Such an animal is not left to graze. Rather, it is put into isolation and caused to die, as it has been sanctified as a sin-offering through its mother but cannot be sacrificed on the altar and used to gain atonement. In summary, it would appear that Rabbi Yoḥanan himself maintains that a fetus is not considered a part of its mother. Why, then, in the case of the Egyptian convert is the child assigned to the mother and not to the father?

Rav Dimi was silent, momentarily unable to find an answer. Abaye said to him: Perhaps it is different there, with regard to Egyptian converts, as it is written with regard to them: “The sons of the third generation that are born to them may enter to them, the congregation of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:9), indicating that the verse made their prohibition dependent on birth, and therefore the child of Egyptian converts is assigned to the mother. Rav Dimi said to him: Man of great skull, i.e., man of distinction, I saw your head between the pillars of the study hall when Rabbi Yoḥanan taught this halakha. In other words, you grasped the meaning as though you were actually present in the study hall and heard the statement from Rabbi Yoḥanan himself.

The Gemara draws an inference: The reason that the child is assigned to its Egyptian mother is that it is written: “That are born to them.” But generally, with regard to others for whom it is prohibited to enter into the congregation, we assign the child to the father. The Gemara asks: But what about that which Rava said: If a pregnant gentile woman converted, then her son, who was a fetus at the time of the conversion, does not require immersion after he is born. But if the child is not assigned to its mother, why should he not require immersion?

And if you would say that this is because of a statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, there is still a difficulty. As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: By Torah law, if some substance is found on a person’s body during immersion, and it covers the majority of his body, and he is particular and wants the substance removed, only then is it considered an interposition that invalidates immersion in a ritual bath. If, however, the substance covers the majority of his body, but he is not particular about that substance, it is not considered an interposition. Accordingly, it may be argued that although the fetus is covered by its mother, since it is not particular about this necessary covering, the fetus itself is regarded as having undergone valid immersion.