The Gemara responds: If so, that the mother should be compared to the fledglings, then why do I need the word “tzippor” to exclude a non-kosher bird? One could simply derive it from the fact that one is exempt from the mitzva in the case of non-kosher fledglings, since they are not fit for consumption. Rather, since it was necessary for the verse to teach that non-kosher birds are not included in the mitzva of sending away the mother, it must be that no such comparison is to be drawn.

The Gemara questions the statement of Rav Kahana that the mitzva of sending away the mother bird from the nest does not apply in the case of fledglings unfit for consumption: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to a mother of fledglings, in the case of a tereifa, one is obligated to send away the mother bird from the nest? The baraita appears to teach that even if the fledglings themselves are tereifot, one is obligated in the mitzva. Abaye said in response: The word tereifa is not referring to the fledglings. Rather, this is what the baraita is saying: In the case of a fledgling whose mother is a tereifa, one is obligated to send away the mother bird. This baraita, then, is in accordance with the statement of Rav Kahana.

§ With regard to the statement of Rav Kahana above, Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma: If one stretched his hand into a nest containing a mother bird and its fledglings and slaughtered, i.e., severed, a minority of the two organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter [simanim], i.e., the windpipe and the gullet, of the fledglings,what is the halakha with regard to sending away the mother bird?

The two sides of the dilemma are explained: Do we say: Since if those fledglings are left as they are, with only partially severed simanim, they will eventually be rendered tereifot, one is therefore exempt from sending away the mother because we require that the fledglings be taken “for yourself,” and not for your dog? Or perhaps, since it is in his power to complete the act of slaughter, thereby permitting the fledglings for consumption, we may call this case: “Take for yourself,” and one is obligated to send away the mother bird. Since no answer is given, the Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: In a case where a rag is lying in the nest between the mother bird and the eggs, what is the halakha? Does it interposebetween them,such that the mother is not considered to be resting upon the eggs? If so, one would be exempt from sending away the mother. Similarly, if feathers are detached from a bird’s wings and are lying between the mother bird and the eggs, what is the halakha? Do they interpose between the eggs and the mother?

Rabbi Yirmeya continues: If unfertilized [muzarot] eggs separate between the mother bird and fertilized eggs, what is the halakha? Additionally, in a case where two sets of fertilized eggs are lying one on top of the other, what is the halakha? Does the upper set of eggs interpose between the mother and the lower set? Furthermore, what is the halakha in a case where a male bird is resting on top of the eggs and a female bird is resting on top of the male? Does the male bird interpose between the female and the eggs? No answers are given, so the Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved in all of these cases.

§ Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: If a pigeon is resting upon the eggs of a tasil, a kosher bird resembling a pigeon, what is the halakha with regard to sending away the mother bird from the nest? Likewise, if a tasil is resting upon the eggs of a pigeon, what is the halakha?

Abaye said: Come and hear that which is taught in the mishna: In a case where a non-kosher bird is resting upon the eggs of a kosher bird, or a kosher bird is resting upon the eggs of a non-kosher bird, one is exempt from sending away the bird. One may infer from the mishna that in a case involving a kosher bird and kosher eggs, e.g., a tasil resting on the eggs of a pigeon, one is obligated to send away the mother bird. The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps this inference applies only to the case of a female pheasant, which normally rests upon the eggs of other birds. Since this is its normal behavior, one is obligated to send it away even if it rests upon the eggs of another kosher bird. This may not be the case with regard to a tasil or pigeon.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to the case of a male pheasant that rests upon the eggs of its species, Rabbi Eliezer deems one obligated to send away the pheasant, and the Rabbis deem one exempt from sending it away. With regard to this dispute, Rabbi Abbahu said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer? According to Rabbi Eliezer, a verbal analogy between brooding stated with regard to a male pheasant and brooding with regard to a female bird comes to indicate that the resting of a male pheasant upon its eggs is considered an effective resting. It is written here: “As the pheasant that broods over young that he has not brought forth” (Jeremiah 17:11), and it is written elsewhere about a female bird: “There shall the great owl make her nest, and lay, and hatch, and brood under her shadow” (Isaiah 34:15). Just as a female bird broods over its nest, so too, a male pheasant broods over a nest. Therefore, one is required to send away the male bird from the nest as well.

With regard to this dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis, Rabbi Elazar says: Their dispute is only with regard to a male pheasant, but with regard to a female pheasant all agree that one is obligated to send away the bird. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious, given that we learned in the mishna: A male pheasant? The Gemara responds: Lest you say that the Rabbis deem one exempt from the mitzva of sending away the mother bird even in the case of a female pheasant, and as for that which the mishna teaches the dispute in the case of a male pheasant, the reason is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, in that he requires one to send away even a male pheasant, therefore, Rabbi Elazar teaches us that the Rabbis agree that one must send away a female pheasant.

And Rabbi Elazar also says: The dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis is only with regard to a male pheasant, but with regard to male birds in general, all agree that one is exempt from the mitzva of sending away the bird from the nest. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious, given that we learned in the mishna: A male pheasant? The Gemara responds: Lest you say that Rabbi Eliezer deems one obligated to send away even male birds in general, and that which the mishna teaches: A male pheasant, is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, in that they also deem one exempt from sending a male pheasant, therefore, Rabbi Elazar teaches us that even according to Rabbi Eliezer, one is exempt from sending away male birds in general.

The Gemara notes: This explanation of Rabbi Elazar is also taught in a baraita: With regard to a male bird in general, one is exempt from the mitzva of sending it away, but with regard to a male pheasant, Rabbi Eliezer deems one obligated to send it away from the nest, and the Rabbis deem one exempt from sending it away.

MISHNA: If the mother bird was hovering over the eggs or fledglings in the nest, when its wings are touching the eggs or fledglings in the nest, one is obligated to send away the mother. When its wings are not touching the eggs or fledglings in the nest, one is exempt from sending away the mother. Even if there is only one fledgling or one egg, one is obligated to send away the mother, as it is stated: “If a bird’s nest happens before you” (Deuteronomy 22:6), indicating that one is obligated to send away the mother bird from the nest in any case.

If there were fledglings capable of flying, or unfertilized eggs from which a fledgling will not hatch, one is exempt from sending away the mother bird from the nest, as it is stated in the same verse: “And the mother is resting upon the fledglings or upon the eggs.” From the juxtaposition of the fledglings and the eggs one derives: Just as the fledglings are living, so too, the eggs must be capable of producing living fledglings. This excludes unfertilized eggs, which cannot produce a living fledgling. And furthermore, just as the eggs need their mothers to hatch them, so too, the fledglings must be those that need their mothers. This excludes fledglings that are capable of flying.

GEMARA: The mishna discusses the case of a mother bird that hovers over the nest. With regard to this, the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse teaches that one is obligated to send away the mother bird only when it is at rest, as it states: “And the mother is resting upon the fledglings” (Deuteronomy 22:6), and not when it is hovering. One might have thought that one is exempt even if the mother is hovering and its wings are touching the nest. Therefore, the verse states: “Resting,” indicating that in fact one is obligated in the mitzva in such a case. The Gemara asks: What is the biblical derivation, i.e., how is this derived from the word “resting”? The Gemara responds: It is derived from the fact that the word sitting is not written in the verse. Although a bird whose wings are touching the nest is not sitting upon it, such a bird is considered to be resting upon it.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: If the mother bird was sitting above the eggs or fledglings between two tree branches, one looks at the following factor in order to determine whether the obligation to send away the mother applies: In any case where if the branches were to separate, the bird would slip between them and fall upon the eggs or fledglings, one is obligated to send away the mother bird. And if the bird would not fall upon them, but to the sides, one is exempt from the mitzva of sending away the mother bird.

The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rav from that which was taught in a baraita: If the mother bird was sitting among the eggs or the fledglings, one is exempt from sending it away, as the verse states: “And the mother is resting upon the fledglings, or upon the eggs” (Deuteronomy 22:6), i.e., upon and not among. If it was sitting above them, one is obligated to send it away. If it was hovering, even if its wings are touching the nest, one is exempt from sending it away.

What, is it not that the case of sitting above them is similar to the case of sitting between them? The Gemara elaborates: Just as in the case of sitting between them one is exempt where she is touching them, so too, in the case of sitting above them one is obligated where she is touching them. If so, conclude from this baraita that one is obligated only if the bird is touching the fledglings or eggs, but if it is sitting between two tree branches above the eggs or fledglings without touching them, one is exempt from sending her away.

The Gemara rejects this: No; actually, the case of sitting above them is similar to that of sitting between them in the following manner: Just as the case of sitting between them is one where she is not touching them from above, but from the side, so too, the case of sitting above them is one where she is not touching them from above. Accordingly, the baraita teaches that one is obligated to send away the bird if it is resting on branches above the nest, even though it is not touching the eggs or fledglings. And that is the case where the mother is sitting between two tree branches.

The Gemara notes: This, too, stands to reason, that one is obligated to send away a mother bird that is sitting between two tree branches above the nest. As, if it should enter your mind that one is exempt when the mother bird is sitting between two tree branches, then one may ask: Rather than teaching that if it was hovering, even if its wings are touching the nest, one is exempt from sending it away, let the baraita teach that one is exempt in the case of a mother bird that is sitting between two tree branches, and all the more so if the mother is hovering.

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps one is exempt from sending the mother bird if it is resting between two tree branches. Nevertheless, it was necessary for the tanna to teach the case of a hovering bird, in order to teach that even if its wings are touching the nest, one is exempt from sending away the mother bird. Had the tanna taught the exemption in a case of a bird resting between two tree branches, one might have thought that this is because the bird’s wings are not touching the nest.

The Gemara now questions the baraita itself: How can the baraita state that even if the hovering bird’s wings are touching the nest, one is exempt from sending the bird away? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: When its wings are touching the nest, one is obligated to send away the mother? Rabbi Yirmeya said: When the case of the hovering mother bird is taught in the baraita, it is referring to a bird touching the nest from the side. In such a case, one is exempt because its wings are not touching the nest from above. By contrast, the mishna is referring to a case where the bird is hovering directly above the nest and touching the nest with its wings from above.

There are those who say that the discussion proceeded as follows: Let us say that the following baraita supports the opinion of Rav: If the mother bird was sitting among the eggs or the fledglings, one is exempt from sending it away. If it was sitting above them, one is obligated to send it away. If it was hovering, even if its wings are touching the nest, one is exempt from sending it away.

What, is it not that the case of sitting above them is similar to that of sitting between them in the following manner: Just as the case of sitting between them is one where she is not touching them from above but from the side, so too, the case of sitting above them is one where she is not touching them from above? If so, the baraita teaches that if the bird rests on branches over the eggs or fledglings without touching them, one is obligated in the mitzva. And that is the case where the mother is sitting between two tree branches.

The Gemara rejects this: No, the case of sitting above them is similar to that of sitting between them in the following manner: Just as the case of sitting between them is one where she is touching them, so too, the case of sitting above them is one where she is touching them. Accordingly, one is obligated only if the bird is touching the nest from above; but if it is sitting between two tree branches without touching the eggs or the fledglings, one is exempt from sending it away. The Gemara objects: If that is so, rather than teaching in the last clause: If it was hovering, even if its wings are touching the nest, one is exempt from sending it away,