and if you say it was with regard to the ritual impurity of animal carcasses, we already learn that halakha as well in another baraita.

The Gemara elaborates: With regard to the ritual impurity of food, it is as it is taught in a baraita: The hide and the placenta of an animal, which people do not typically eat, cannot become impure with the ritual impurity of foods. But a hide that one cooked until it became edible and a placenta that one intended to eat can become impure with the impurity of foods.

With regard to the ritual impurity of animal carcasses also, we already learn in a baraita: The verse states: “And when a domesticated animal dies, of those that you eat, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39). The verse indicates that one is rendered impure if he touches its carcass, but not if he touches its hide, and not its bones, and not its sinews, and not its horns, and not its hooves.

And Rabba bar Rav Ḥana said with regard to this baraita: This derivation is necessary only for a case in which one prepared these parts of the animal as a meat pudding [tzikei kedera], in which they are cooked for an extended period and spices are added. One might have thought they would be considered edible flesh and therefore impart the impurity of a carcass. The baraita therefore teaches that this is not so.

Given these two baraitot, why did Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa inquire about the status of the cooked hide of a donkey? The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa was inquiring about the impurity of foods, and although the halakha was already taught in the first baraita, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa thought it is possible that the hide of a donkey is different, as it is repulsive and perhaps even when cooked it is not regarded as food.

§ The mishna states: With regard to a placenta, part of which emerged from the womb before the mother was slaughtered, its consumption is prohibited, as there is a concern that the head of the fetus might have emerged in that part of the placenta. Commenting on this mishna, Rabbi Elazar says: The Sages taught this halakha only in a case where there was no fetus found in the mother’s womb. But if there was a fetus with its head and the majority of its body in the womb, one need not be concerned for the existence of another fetus that might have been in the placenta. Therefore, the consumption of the placenta is permitted. But Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Whether there was no fetus found in the womb, or whether there was a fetus, one needs to be concerned for the existence of another fetus in the placenta, and therefore its consumption is prohibited.

According to the way the Gemara records the dispute, Rabbi Yoḥanan rules stringently and Rabbi Elazar rules leniently. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabbi Yirmeya say concerning this dispute: Rabbi Elazar said an explanation of the mishna that presents a stringency?

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Elazar says: The ruling of the mishna is that the placenta is prohibited even if a fetus is found inside the womb. But the Sages taught this only in a case where the placenta is not attached to the fetus found inside. Consequently, one must be concerned with the possibility that the placenta came from another fetus that already left the womb, and it is therefore prohibited. But if it is attached to the fetus found inside, there is no concern for the possibility that the placenta came from another fetus, and therefore it is permitted.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In my understanding of the mishna, we have the ruling that the placenta is prohibited only in a case where there is a placenta without any fetus being found. But if a fetus was found with it, then whether it is attached to the fetus or whether it is not attached to the fetus, there is no concern for the existence of another fetus. The Gemara confirms: And this understanding of the two opinions is in line with that which Rabbi Yirmeya says: Rabbi Elazar said an explanation of the mishna that presents a stringency.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar: The periods of purity and impurity observed by a woman after giving birth apply only after delivering a fetus with a human form. With regard to a woman who expels a fetus that has the form of a type of domesticated animal, undomesticated animal, or bird, and there is a placenta with them, the halakha is as follows: When the placenta is attached to them, there is no concern for the existence of another fetus that may have had a human form. But if the placenta is not attached to them, it is possible there was another fetus that had a human form and so I must impose upon the woman the severity of two types of births, i.e., both the longer period of impurity observed after delivering a female, and the shorter period of purity observed after delivering a male.

The reason is that I can say: Perhaps the placenta that was found did not come from the fetus that was found, but from a fetus with a human form. To say this one must be concerned with the possibility that perhaps the fetus of the placenta that was found had a human form, and that fetus dissolved, and perhaps the placenta of the fetus that was found dissolved.

§ The mishna states: If an animal that was giving birth to its firstborn expelled a placenta, one may cast it to the dogs. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this ruling? Rav Ika, son of Rav Ami, said: The majority of domesticated animals give birth to something that can be consecrated with firstborn status, i.e., an animal with the same form as its mother, but a minority of animals give birth to something that cannot be consecrated with firstborn status, and what is this? It is an animal that resembles a species other than that of its mother.

And furthermore, with regard to all gestating animals, when they give birth, half of their offspring are male and half are female. Therefore, one can combine the minority of animals that resemble another species with the half that are females, and arrive at the conclusion that male offspring that resemble their species, which are the only offspring that can be consecrated with firstborn status, are the minority. Accordingly, one does not need to be concerned that the placenta found was from an animal consecrated with the status of a firstborn.

§ The continuation of the mishna states: But in the case of sacrificial animals the placenta must be buried, because it came from a fetus that is assumed to have been sacred. The Gemara asks: What is the reason to assume this? The Gemara answers: It is because the majority of the offspring of sacrificial animals are fit to be sacred, as, in contrast to firstborn status, both female and male offspring of sacrificial animals can be sacred. Therefore, one must be concerned that the offspring, and its placenta, were sacred.

§ The mishna adds: But one may neither bury it at an intersection, nor may one hang it on a tree, due to the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite. The Gemara cites Abaye and Rava, who both said: Anything that has an apparently effective medicinal purpose or any other logical reason behind it is not subject to the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite. But if it does not have an apparently effective medicinal purpose it is subject to the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite.

The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If there is a tree that sheds its fruit prematurely, one may paint it with red paint and load it with stones, even though this is the practice of the Amorites? The Gemara explains the difficulty: Granted, it is permitted to load it with stones, as one does so for a logical reason, in order