then the flesh of both the mother animal and the fetus, excluding the foreleg, is impure due to contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg of the now dead fetus was not permitted through an act of slaughtering, it is regarded as a carcass. It therefore imparts impurity to the rest of the flesh, which was in contact with it. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Rabbis say: Although the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the foreleg, it does serve to prevent the foreleg from imparting the ritual impurity of a carcass. Accordingly, the flesh has the status of having been in contact with a slaughtered tereifa. By Torah law, consumption of the animal is prohibited but it does not impart ritual impurity. The Sages decreed it to be impure in that it disqualifies sacrificial flesh with which it comes in contact.

The Gemara explains the challenge to Rav’s ruling: In any event, the first clause of the baraita teaches: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted. What, is it not referring to the limb, i.e., the foreleg, and the baraita rules that it is permitted, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to the rest of the fetus.

The Gemara questions this: If the baraita is referring to the fetus, say the latter clause: If one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward the fetus returned its foreleg inside, its consumption is prohibited. The Gemara explains the question: And if it is referring to the fetus, why should it be prohibited in this case?

The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to the fetus, and should be explained in a manner similar to that which Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the fetus’s body. If the foreleg was severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and outside when it was extended outside the womb, the location of the cut on the fetus’s body is also prohibited. Here too, one can explain that this ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not return its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is prohibited as well. The foreleg itself, though, is prohibited even if it was brought back inside before the slaughter.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But when Avimi came from Bei Ḥozai he came and brought a baraita with him: One of the sources (see 69a) that the slaughter of a pregnant animal also serves to permit the consumption of the fetus is the verse: “And every animal that has a split hoof and is cloven into two hooves, chews the cud, of the animals, it you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:6). The verse mentions both “hoof” in the singular and “hooves” in the plural to teach that sometimes one may eat two hooves and sometimes only one, as follows: If the fetus extended two of its hooves outside the womb, if it returned one hoof one may eat, if it brought back both hooves one may eat. What, is it not that the baraita means that if it brought back one hoof one may eat that hoof, and likewise if it brought back both hooves one may eat both of them, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling?

The Gemara responds: No, it means that if it brought back one hoof or even both, one may eat the rest of the fetus but not the hooves. The Gemara objects: If it is referring to the permitted status of the fetus, why does it specifically state that it brought back the hoof? Even if it did not bring it back the fetus would be permitted. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said the ruling of the baraita is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the body of the fetus. If the limb were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside when it was extended outside the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus’s body would also be prohibited, but only if the fetus had not brought back that limb before the mother animal was slaughtered.

The Gemara persists: But even given Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s claim the baraita adduces two verses, i.e., the mention of hoof and hooves. What, is it not that one serves to permit the limb, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling, and the other one serves to permit the location of the cut, in accordance with Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s ruling? The Gemara responds: No; one mention does serve to permit the location of the cut, but the other one serves to permit a fetus with non-cloven hooves [kalut] found inside the womb of a cow that was slaughtered. Although the fetus does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species, it is nevertheless permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother.

And it is necessary to have a specific source to permit this according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon says: A calf with non-cloven hooves born from a kosher cow is forbidden, as the calf does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species. The verse teaches that this matter applies only where the fetus emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., it was born before the mother animal was slaughtered. But if it was still inside its mother’s womb when the mother was slaughtered, it is permitted.

§ The Gemara attempted to challenge Rav’s ruling that once a limb of a fetus is extended outside the mother animal’s body it becomes prohibited even if it was then brought back, but did not find a conclusive refutation. It now presents a dissenting opinion: Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And even the limb itself is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal.

Rav Yehuda said to Ulla: But Rav and Shmuel both say the limb itself is prohibited; how can you say otherwise? Ulla said to him: Who will give us some of the dust of the graves of Rav and Shmuel and we will fill our eyes with it; such is the greatness of those Sages. But I follow the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Initially one would assume all flesh that is permitted due to being within a certain boundary, e.g., a fetus inside its mother’s womb, the flesh of offerings of the most sacred order within the Temple courtyard, and the flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity within Jerusalem, was included in the verse: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). The verse is interpreted to teach that if such flesh leaves its boundaries it is rendered forbidden, even should it subsequently return.

Once another verse applies the concept for you specifically with regard to a sin offering, teaching that if it went outside of its boundary and returned it is prohibited (see Leviticus 10:18), then it is apparent that the Merciful One specifically applied the concept to a sin offering. But with regard to all other items that left their boundary, once they are brought back they are permitted, including the limb of a fetus that was extended outside the womb and then was brought back.

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita: It is derived from the verse: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat,” that flesh that leaves the boundary in which it is permitted is thereby rendered forbidden like a tereifa. Why must the verse state that it is like a tereifa? The baraita explains: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that even though they went outside of their boundary, which is the city of Jerusalem and the only place where it is permitted to eat them, nevertheless if they are brought back to there they are once again permitted, one might have thought that also with regard to this prohibition, that of flesh that leaves its boundary, it is so, i.e., if it is brought back it once again becomes permitted for consumption. Therefore, the verse states: “A tereifa.”

The Gemara clarifies: What is the biblical derivation from the term “a tereifa”? Rabba said: The verse indicates that the prohibition of flesh that left its boundary is like the prohibition of a tereifa. Just as with regard to a tereifa, once an animal is mortally wounded, rendering it a tereifa, it can no longer regain a permitted status, so too with regard to flesh referred to in the verse: Once it has gone outside of its boundary it can no longer regain permitted status. Accordingly, if the limb of a fetus was extended outside the womb it would thereby become permanently prohibited, contradicting the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the statement of Ulla is indeed a conclusive refutation.

The Gemara analyzes the baraita, which states: The Master said: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that although they left their boundary, if they are brought back there they are again permitted. The Gemara asks: Where did we find this, i.e., what is the source for this halakha?

The Gemara explains that it is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows that you have vowed, nor your voluntary offerings, nor the offering of your hand. But you shall eat them before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:17–18). The phrase “the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil” is referring to second tithe, and the phrase “the offering of your hand” is referring to first fruits. The verse states that all the items listed may be eaten only “before the Lord your God,” i.e., within the city of Jerusalem. The prohibition stated in the verse is that within your gates, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, you may not eat these items. But by inference, if these items went outside of their boundary, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, and then were brought back, they are permitted.

§ The Gemara explained the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan in the way in which it was taught in Babylonia. The Gemara notes that in the West, Eretz Yisrael, they taught the dispute like this: Rav says there is a concept of birth with regard to limbs. When a limb is extended outside the womb, it is considered born and is independent of the mother animal. Consequently, it can never be permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says that there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs. Since the limb is never considered to have been born, as long as it is inside the mother animal when the mother animal is slaughtered it will be permitted by virtue of that slaughter.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two versions which explain why Rav deemed the limb forbidden? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case in which only the majority of a limb was extended outside the womb. In that case, the issue is whether or not to prohibit the minority of the limb that remained inside. If the limb is forbidden because it is considered to have been born, the entire limb would be forbidden and not just the part that was extended. If the limb is forbidden because it left its boundary, then only the part that extended outside the womb would be forbidden.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the statement of the one who says there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs, if the fetus extended its foreleg outside the womb and brought it back, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and brought it back, and continued to extend parts of its body outside until the total amount that had been outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that ultimately the majority of the fetus has left the womb and the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born, and consequently the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit its being consumed? Or perhaps, since it brought each limb back, the limbs are considered to have been brought back; therefore, the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb and it is not regarded as having been born. In that case, the slaughter of its mother would still permit its being consumed.

The Gemara asks: If you want to say that since it brought back each limb, they are considered to have been brought back and the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb, the following dilemma still arises: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and someone severed it, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and someone severed it, and this continued with its other limbs until the total amount outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that since the majority of the fetus has left the womb, the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born and therefore the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit it? Or perhaps, in order for the fetus to be regarded as having been born we require a majority of the fetus to leave simultaneously, which does not exist in this case.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: