And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says that meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings? He means that they are not similar to most slaughtered offerings. There are, however, certain slaughtered offerings whose preparation, which is unique to that particular offering, is proof that it is that offering. In those instances, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the offerings fulfill the obligations of their respective owners despite the improper intent.

§ The Gemara cites another resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that a meal offering that was sacrificed not for its own sake fulfills the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a meal offering. There, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering.

Rava elaborates: If one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a different meal offering he fulfills his obligation, as the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7). This indicates that there is one law for all the meal offerings, i.e., they are all considered variations of the same offering, and are different only with regard to how they should be sacrificed ab initio. Conversely, if one sacrificed a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering, since the phrase: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering, is not written anywhere, there is no reason to conclude that one fulfills his obligation under such circumstances.

The Gemara questions how Rava can say that the verse “And this is the law of the meal offering” serves as the basis for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: But doesn’t the tanna, i.e., Rabbi Shimon, say that his reasoning is that for any particular meal offering, its mode of preparation proves what it is? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: Even though sacrificing a meal offering for the sake of a different meal offering is a case where it is not recognizable that the intention fits the offering, i.e., the intent does not match the rites being performed, and the offering should therefore be disqualified, the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” which teaches that there is one law for all the meal offerings.

And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says: But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so? This clause indicates that the similarity between the rites of various slaughtered offerings is a reason why they should not be valid, whereas according to the above reasoning the opposite is so.

The Gemara explains this part of Rabbi Shimon’s statement: Even though there is one manner of slaughter for all animal offerings, and therefore one might think that the owner has fulfilled his obligation despite the improper intent, the phrase: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering, is not written. In other words, it is not stated: This is the law of a slaughtered offering, in the manner that a verse states: “This is the law of the meal offering.” Therefore, the owner of a slaughtered offering does not fulfill his obligation if there is improper intent, notwithstanding the similarity between the acts of slaughter.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the phrase “And this is the law of the meal offering” teaches that a meal offering is not disqualified despite the improper intent for a different meal offering, then analogously, a sin offering brought to atone for eating forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering to atone for drinking blood, or for the sake of a sin offering to atone for idol worship, or for the sake of a sin offering of a nazirite, or for the sake of a sin offering of a leper should be valid and effect acceptance. As the Merciful One states: “And this is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), from which it should be derived that there is one law for all sin offerings.

The Gemara responds: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, such a sin offering is indeed valid and effects acceptance for its owner. The Gemara notes: According to the Rabbis, Rava says: A sin offering brought to atone for eating forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering to atone for drinking blood or for the sake of a sin offering to atone for idol worship is valid. But if he slaughtered it for the sake of a sin offering of a nazirite or for the sake of a sin offering of a leper it is disqualified, as with regard to these offerings, there are burnt offerings brought together with them.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches that Rava holds that the halakha in all of these cases is disqualification of the sin offering. The reason is that the verse states: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). The word “it” indicates that it must be sacrificed for the sake of that particular sin offering, and it may not be slaughtered for the sake of a different one.

§ The Gemara cites a third resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Ashi said that it is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering is fit and fulfills the obligation of the owner, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, i.e., he mentions only the vessel and not the offering. There, where it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.

Rav Ashi elaborates: When one bringing a pan meal offering states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, he has intent only with regard to the type of vessel, and intention with regard to the type of vessel does not disqualify offerings, as he is not sacrificing the vessel, and therefore the owner’s obligation is fulfilled. By contrast, when he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, he has intent with regard to the type of meal offering, which improper intention does disqualify. Consequently, the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled.

The Gemara questions how Rav Ashi can maintain that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon: But doesn’t the tanna, i.e., Rabbi Shimon, say that his reasoning is that for any particular meal offering, its mode of preparation proves what it is? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: Even though when he removes a handful from a pan meal offering explicitly for the sake of a deep pan, it is a case where the falseness of the intention is recognizable and the offering should therefore be disqualified, it is nevertheless valid and fulfills the owner’s obligation, as intentions with regard to the vessel are irrelevant.

The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says: But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so? He means that even though there is one manner of slaughter for all offerings, and one manner of sprinkling of the blood for all offerings, and one manner of collection of the blood for all offerings, i.e., if one performs any of these rites for the sake of a different offering it is not recognizable that his intent is false, and therefore it might have been thought that the owner does fulfill his obligation, nevertheless he has improper intent with regard to an aspect of slaughtering, such as slaughtering a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering, which improper intention does disqualify.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, then with regard to a case where one removes a handful from a dry meal offering for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, why did Rabbi Shimon say that it fulfills the owner’s obligation? Since his intent concerns the meal offering itself, it should disqualify the offering. Rav Ashi said to him: When Rabbi Shimon says that such a meal offering fulfills the owner’s obligation he is referring to a case where one removes a handful merely for the sake of mixing, not for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil.

The Gemara challenges: If so, then when one slaughters a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering as well, one can say that his intent is merely for the sake of peace [shelamim] between himself and God. Why then does Rabbi Shimon say that this burnt offering does not fulfill the obligation of the owner?

The Gemara rejects this challenge: How can these cases be compared? There, the offering itself is called shelamim, as it is written: “Who sacrifices the blood of the peace offering [shelamim]” (Leviticus 7:33), and it is also written: “Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:14). Here, by contrast, is a meal offering itself called mixed? It is written: “And every meal offering, mixed with oil” (Leviticus 7:10), indicating that there is a meal offering that is called: Mixed with oil, but it is not simply called: Mixed. One’s intent to sacrifice a dry meal offering for the sake of mixing is therefore not a reference to the offering itself.

§ Three resolutions have been suggested for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two baraitot concerning whether or not a meal offering whose handful was removed not for its own sake fulfills the obligation of its owner. Rabba’s answer was that there is a difference between intent for another meal offering, in which case the owner fulfills his obligation, as the intent is recognizably improper, and intent for someone else, which is not recognizably improper. The Gemara comments: All the other Sages, i.e., Rava and Rav Ashi, do not say as Rabba did in resolving the contradiction, as they do not accept his reasoning, claiming that on the contrary, the Merciful One disqualifies recognizably false intent.

The Gemara continues: Rava resolved the contradiction by saying that a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of another meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), indicating that there is one law for all meal offerings, whereas a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of an animal offering does not effect acceptance. Rabba and Rav Ashi do not say as Rava did in resolving the contradiction, as the verse that states: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” does not indicate to them that there should be one law for all meal offerings.

The Gemara continues: Rav Ashi resolved the contradiction by saying that when one removes the handful from a meal offering for the sake of a vessel the meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as intent concerning the vessel itself is inconsequential, whereas when one removes the handful for the sake of another meal offering, the meal offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation. Rabba and Rava did not say as Rav Ashi did in resolving the contradiction because of the difficulty posed by Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, from a case where one removes the handful of a dry meal offering for the sake of a mixed one. Rabbi Shimon holds that such a meal offering fulfills the owner’s obligation even though his intent concerns the meal offering itself, not the vessel.

The Gemara notes: The matter that is obvious to Rabba in one way, i.e., that with regard to meal offerings recognizably false intention is disregarded, but when the false intention is not recognizable the offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, and that is obvious to Rava in the other way, i.e., that in cases of recognizably false intention the offering should not fulfill the owner’s obligation, is a dilemma for Rav Hoshaya. As Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma, and some say that Rav Hoshaya raises this dilemma before Rav Asi: In the case of one who sacrifices a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering,