And if you suggest that the priest should first place blood from the mixture inside the Sanctuary and again place blood outside, on the altar, although this resolution is applicable to most offerings whose blood is placed outside, nevertheless the tanna of the mishna chose to omit this case. The reason is that since there are a sin offering and a guilt offering, concerning which, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, when their blood enters the Sanctuary they are disqualified from being placed on the external altar, the tanna could not teach this halakha categorically. In other words, as the tanna could not issue a categorical ruling that applies to all types of offerings, he omitted the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer here.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva would say: Any blood that is to be presented outside that entered to atone in the Sanctuary is disqualified. The Gemara discusses the source for Rabbi Akiva’s ruling. The verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). How does Rabbi Akiva apply this halakha to all offerings whose blood is presented on the external altar? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Hear a parable: To what is this matter comparable? To a student who mixed wine with hot water for his teacher. And the teacher said to him: Mix another drink for me. The student said to him: With what should I mix the wine, hot or cold water? The teacher said to him: Aren’t we dealing with hot water? Now that I requested that you mix me another cup, I mean that you should mix it either in hot water or in cold. Otherwise, the teacher would not have needed to say anything.

Here too, since we have been dealing with a sin offering in that passage (see Leviticus 6:17–22), why do I need the term “sin offering” that the Merciful One writes in this verse? Even without this term it is clear that the Torah is referring to a sin offering. Rather, as in the parable, the Torah mentions a sin offering to teach: I do not say this halakha with regard to a sin offering alone, i.e., that only the blood of a sin offering is disqualified when it is brought inside the Sanctuary, but the blood of all sacrificial animals is disqualified by being brought into the Sanctuary.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this explanation: Accordingly, one should reach the opposite conclusion: Since all sacrificial animals that are sacrificed on the altar are included in this passage of the Torah with regard to scouring and rinsing, as derived by the Sages, despite the fact that this requirement is stated in connection with a sin offering (see Leviticus 6:21), it is already established that this chapter is speaking of all offerings. Consequently, why do I need the term “sin offering” that the Merciful One writes with regard to the matter of blood that entered the Sanctuary? Learn from the verse that in the case of a sin offering whose blood entered the Sanctuary, yes, it is disqualified, but if the blood of any other offering entered the Sanctuary, no, it is not disqualified.

Rav Huna addresses Shmuel’s parable: And if you wish to provide a comparison, it is comparable only to a student who initially mixed wine for his teacher with both hot and cold water, and his teacher then said to him: Mix wine for me only with hot water.

Rav Huna continues: Rather, the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva is from the fact that the verse does not state simply: “Sin offering,” but states: “Any sin offering”; this serves to include all other offerings. As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). I have derived that this halakha applies only with regard to a sin offering; from where is it derived that it also applies to offerings of the most sacred order? The verse states: “Any sin offering.” And from where is it derived that it also applies to offerings of lesser sanctity? The verse states: “And any sin offering.” This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to Rabbi Akiva: Even if you include offerings in this manner from the verse all day long, I will not listen to you. Rather, this verse is referring to a sin offering alone, and it should be expounded as follows: The verse states: “Sin offering”; I have derived only that this halakha applies to the sin offering of an individual. From where is it derived that the same applies to a communal sin offering? The verse states: “Any sin offering.” And one can still say: I have derived only that this halakha applies to a male sin offering; from where is it derived that the same applies to a female sin offering? The verse states: “And any sin offering.”

The Gemara asks: Why is it assumed that the application of this halakha to a male sin offering is more obvious than to a female sin offering? Isn’t it the opposite [kelapei layya], as the standard sin offering of an individual is a female? Rather, this is what Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is saying: One can still ask: I have derived only that this halakha applies to a female sin offering; from where is it derived that the same applies to a male sin offering? The verse states: “And any sin offering.”

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili hold that this verse comes for this purpose, to teach the halakha of sin offerings whose blood was brought inside the Sanctuary? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: As we have found the entire matter that is stated in the verse: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 6:23), is not stated with regard to a standard sin offering improperly brought inside the Sanctuary; rather, it speaks only about bulls that are burned and goats that are burned.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili elaborates: These are unique sin offerings, and the Torah states that their blood should be brought inside the Sanctuary. The verse is stated with regard to these sin offerings both in order to command the Jewish people to burn their disqualified ones in the Temple and in order to establish a prohibition with regard to their consumption.

The baraita continues: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: If you expound the verse in this fashion, then from where is it derived that a standard sin offering whose blood entered the innermost sanctum, the Holy of Holies, must be burned? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to them that it is derived from the verse: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the Sanctuary within” (Leviticus 10:18). This indicates that had the sin offering referred to in the verse been brought inside the Sanctuary, it should have been burned. In any event, with regard to the issue at hand, since Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interprets the verse from Leviticus 6:23 in this manner, how can he interpret it differently in his dispute with Rabbi Akiva?

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili spoke according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, i.e., although Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interprets the verse in a different manner, according to Rabbi Akiva’s explanation it should be understood as referring only to a sin offering, not to other offerings.

MISHNA: In the case of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar whose blood the priest collected in two cups, if one of them left the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, the cup that remained inside the courtyard is fit to be presented. If one of the cups entered inside the Sanctuary and was thereby disqualified, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili deems the blood in the cup that remained outside the Sanctuary, in the courtyard, fit to be presented, and the Rabbis deem it disqualified from being presented.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said in support of his opinion: The halakha is that if one slaughters an offering with the intent that its blood be presented outside of the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified, but if his intention was that the blood be presented inside the Sanctuary, the offering is not disqualified. Just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, and yet when some of the blood is taken there it does not render the status of the remaining blood disqualified like that of blood that leaves the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, is it not logical that we will not deem the status of the remaining blood like that of blood that entered the Sanctuary?

The mishna continues: If all of the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar entered the Sanctuary to atone through sprinkling, despite the fact that the priest did not actually sprinkle the blood to atone, the offering is disqualified; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Shimon says: The offering is disqualified only when he atones and sprinkles the blood in the Sanctuary. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he took the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit to be presented.

With regard to all the blood disqualified for presentation that was placed on the altar, the frontplate effects acceptance only for offerings sacrificed that are ritually impure. Although it is written with regard to the frontplate worn on the forehead of the High Priest: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity committed in the sacred matters” (Exodus 28:38), this does not apply to all disqualifications of offerings. This is because the frontplate effects acceptance for offerings sacri-ficed that are ritually impure but does not effect acceptance for offerings that leave the courtyard.

GEMARA: With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis as to whether the blood of a sin offering in a second cup is disqualified if the blood in the first cup entered the Sanctuary, it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said: This is an a fortiori inference: And just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, and yet that blood that was taken outside does not disqualify the blood that is still inside the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, is it not logical that the blood that was taken inside will not disqualify the blood that is still outside the Sanctuary?

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: But the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). This indicates that even if part of its blood is brought inside the Sanctuary, the sin offering is disqualified.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to the Rabbis: If you expound the verse in that manner, then from now one can derive an a fortiori inference with regard to the blood that leaves the courtyard: And just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, the blood that was taken inside disqualifies the blood that is still outside, i.e., in the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, is it not logical that the blood that was taken outside will disqualify the blood that is still inside the courtyard? Why do the Rabbis deem this blood fit?

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili in response: But the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). This teaches that only blood that enters the Sanctuary disqualifies the blood in the courtyard, but the blood that leaves the courtyard does not disqualify the blood in the courtyard.

In light of this discussion, the Gemara asks: And let intent to present the blood inside the Sanctuary disqualify the offering based on an a fortiori inference: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went outside does not disqualify the rest of the blood that is inside the courtyard, and yet intent to present the blood in this place disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the courtyard, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside the Sanctuary, in the courtyard, is it not logical that intent to present the blood in this place will disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the courtyard?

The Gemara explains that one does not derive this a fortiori inference, as the verse states: “And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is piggul; it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 19:7), and the Sages expounded this verse with regard to the halakha of intent while slaughtering an offering.