But with regard to the burning of the diaphragm and the two kidneys, which are not written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself, you might say that this halakha should not be derived from it. Therefore, this additional derivation of “their sin offering” teaches us that the two offerings are similar with regard to this detail as well.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: But the tanna said: “With the bull”; this serves to include the bull of Yom Kippur for all that is stated in this matter. This statement indicates that all the details applying to the bull for an unwitting communal sin are extended to the bull of Yom Kippur by means of a single derivation. Rav Pappa responded: This issue is a dispute between tanna’im, as the tanna of the school of Rav amplifies the halakha through this juxtaposition, whereas the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael does not amplify the halakha through this juxtaposition, but maintains that an additional derivation is necessary with regard to the diaphragm and the two kidneys.

§ The Gemara cites a statement that is related to the above halakhot. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For what reason are the diaphragm and the two kidneys stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, and they are not explicitly stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin? This can be explained by a parable: It can be compared to a flesh-and-blood king who grew angry with his beloved servant for his misdeeds, but spoke little of the servant’s offense due to his great affection for him. Likewise, as the Jewish people are beloved by God, the Torah does not describe their sin offering in detail.

And the school of Rabbi Yishmael further taught: For what reason is it stated: “Before the Curtain of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 4:6), with regard to the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, and this is not stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, where it merely states: “Before the Curtain” (Leviticus 4:17)? This can be explained by a parable: It can be compared to a flesh-and-blood king against whom a province sinned. If a minority of that province sinned, his relationship with his entourage [pamalya] remains, i.e., the king continues to treat his loyal followers in the usual manner. But if the majority of the province sinned, his relationship with his entourage does not remain, and he no longer meets even those who remained devoted to him. Similarly, when the entire people sins, God no longer has the same relationship with them, and it is as though the place where the priest sprinkles the blood is no longer sacred.

§ The mishna teaches that all the placements upon the inner altar are indispensable, and therefore if the High Priest placed all the placements in their proper manner, and one in an improper manner, i.e., with the intent to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of the offering. The Gemara states that we learned in a mishna there (Menaḥot 16a), with regard to the burning of the handful of a meal offering and the frankincense, both of which render the meal offering permitted for eating: If the priest had an intention that can render the offering piggul, and this occurred during the burning of the handful but not during the burning of the frankincense, or during the burning of the frankincense but not during the burning of the handful, i.e., he burned one of them with the intention of eating the remainder of the offering beyond its designated time, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is piggul and one who eats it is liable to receive karet.

And the Rabbis say: There is no liability for karet in this case unless he renders the offering piggul during the performance of the entire permitting factor, i.e., the burning of both the handful and the frankincense.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Do not say that the reason of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the offering is piggul, is that he holds in general that one renders an offering piggul even if he intended to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time during the performance of only half a permitting factor. Rather, what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where he initially placed the handful of the meal offering on the altar, to burn it, with the improper intention to eat the remainder beyond its designated time, and afterward he placed the frankincense on the altar silently, i.e., without any particular intent. Rabbi Meir holds: Anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent. Therefore, his action with the frankincense is considered to have been performed with the same improper intention as his action with the handful.

The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish learn that this is the case? He learns it from the fact that the mishna teaches: Therefore, if he placed all the placements in their proper manner and one in an improper manner, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet. Consequently it follows that if he initially placed one placement in an improper manner, with the intent to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time, and all the other placements in the proper manner, the offering is piggul.

The Gemara explains: Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of the Rabbis, don’t the Rabbis explicitly say that one cannot render an offering piggul with an improper intention in the performance of only half a permitting factor? Here, the priest placed one placement in the proper manner. Rather, it must represent the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that if he had an improper intention with regard to the handful and not the frankincense the offering is piggul.

And if Rabbi Meir’s reason is that he holds in general that one renders an offering piggul even during the performance of only half a permitting factor, even if the priest acted as it taught in the mishna, the offering should also be piggul, as he had an improper intention during half the permitting factor. Rather, is Rabbi Meir’s reason not because he holds that anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent? Consequently, if he placed the first placement with an improper intention, the offering is piggul, and if his intention during the first placement was proper, the offering is not piggul.

Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzḥak says: Actually, it is possible that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that one cannot render an offering piggul with an improper intention during half a permitting factor. And what is the meaning of the term: In their proper manner, in the context of the mishna? It means in their proper manner with regard to piggul, i.e., he placed the blood with an intention that renders the offering piggul. The mishna is teaching that although he placed the first placements with an improper intention, one does not say that the last placement, which was placed without any specific intention, was performed with his initial intent.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that it teaches: Therefore, if he placed all the placements in their proper manner and one in an improper manner, the offering is disqualified but there is no liability for karet, which indicates that the offering is disqualified due to the one placement performed improperly, one can learn by inference that the term: In their proper manner, comes to indicate an intention that renders the offering fit, and not an intention that renders it piggul.

Rava says: It can still be explained that the term: In their proper manner, is referring to an intention that renders the offering piggul; and what is the meaning of: In an improper manner? This is referring to the intent to eat the offering outside its designated area. This intention serves to disqualify the offering, which means that it is not piggul, as not all its rites have been performed in the proper manner. Rav Ashi says: The term: In an improper manner, in the mishna, means that he placed one placement not for the sake of the offering being sacrificed, and in the case of a sin offering an intention of this kind disqualifies the offering; therefore, it is not piggul.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, one can learn by inference that when the priest does not perform the last placement with the intent to eat the offering outside its designated area or not for the sake of the offering, but silently, he becomes liable, as the offering is piggul. This is certainly not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as they maintain that one cannot render an offering piggul with an improper intention during half a permitting factor.

The Gemara answers: The wording of the mishna is imprecise, as in fact, even if he placed the last placement silently the offering is not piggul. But since the tanna of the mishna taught in the first clause, with regard to an offering whose blood is placed on the external altar: If he placed the first placement with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time and the second placement with the intent to eat it outside its designated area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for its consumption, he likewise taught the latter clause, with regard to a sin offering whose blood is placed on the inner altar, in a similar manner, that if he placed the last placement with the intent to eat it outside its designated area or not for the sake of the offering, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet for its consumption. One cannot infer from here that if he placed the last placement without intent the offering is piggul.

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from a baraita: In what case is this statement, that the offering is rendered piggul even when he intends to eat it beyond its designated time only in the first placement, said? In the case of blood that is placed on the external altar, where one placement renders the offering permitted.