like disqualified consecrated animals, and it should be disqualified from being sacrificed, as though it had developed a blemish.

Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place which He shall choose to place His name there, the tithe of your grain, of your wine, and of your oil, and the firstborns of your herds, and of your flocks” (Deuteronomy 14:23). The verse juxtaposes a firstborn animal to the tithe of grain to indicate that just as the tithe is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next (see Deuteronomy 14:28), so too a firstborn animal is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next. If so, one already derives from this verse that an offering is not disqualified even if it is brought late.

The Gemara responds: Nevertheless, the verse cited by ben Azzai was necessary, as without it, it might enter your mind to say that this matter applies only to a firstborn, which is not for acceptance, i.e., it does not serve to atone for any sin and is merely a gift for the priest, but with regard to other sacrificial animals that are for acceptance, say that they shall not effect acceptance when brought late. Therefore, the verse teaches us that even these others are not disqualified when brought late.

The Gemara asks further: But still, isn’t this halakha derived from a baraita elsewhere: The verse states: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will require it from you; and it will be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22), indicating that there is sin in you, but there is no sin in your offering, and therefore it is not disqualified due to the delay?

The Gemara responds: Ben Azzai requires that verse to teach a different halakha: The phrase “and it will be sin in you” indicates that there will be sin in you, but there will not be sin in your wife. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Elazar said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said: A man’s wife does not die unless his creditors ask him for money that he owes and he does not have it, as it is stated: “If you do not have with what to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you?” (Proverbs 22:27); therefore, one’s wife also dies for this transgression of the prohibition: You shall not delay, since one has failed to fulfill his commitment. Consequently, the verse teaches us that the sin is imputed to him alone.

§ The baraita stated that Aḥerim say: The phrase “neither shall it be credited” indicates that the offering is disqualified by improper intention, and it is not disqualified by consumption beyond its designated time on the third day. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, who derives this halakha from a different source, what does he do with the phrase “neither shall it be credited”?

The Gemara responds: He requires it for that which Rabbi Yannai says, as Rabbi Yannai says: From where is it derived with regard to intentions that they displace one another, i.e., that an additional improper intention prevents the offering from being rendered piggul? As it is stated: “Neither shall it be credited [yeḥashev],” indicating that an offering is rendered piggul only if the priest does not mix other improper intentions [maḥashavot] with intent of piggul.

And Rav Mari teaches that Rabbi Yannai says: From where is it derived that one who has improper intentions with regard to sacrificial animals is flogged like one who transgressed a prohibition? The verse states: “Neither shall it be credited [lo yeḥashev],” i.e., one reads the verse as if it states: One shall not have improper intention [lo y’ḥashev].

Rav Ashi said to Rav Mari: But it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and the principle is that for transgressing any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged. Rav Mari said to him: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: For transgressing a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged.

MISHNA: This is the principle: With regard to anyone who slaughters the animal, or who collects the blood, or who conveys the blood, or who sprinkles the blood, with intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, e.g., the meat of the offering, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, if his intent was to partake of or to burn the measure of an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it, provided that the permitting factor, the blood, is sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.

How is the permitting factor sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one slaughtered the animal in silence with no specific intent, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered it with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood in silence; or if one slaughtered the animal and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, that is the case where one sacrifices the permitting factor in accordance with its mitzva.

How is the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one slaughtered the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time, and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area; or if one slaughtered the animal and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area, these are cases in which the permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with the mitzva.

Similarly, in the case of the Paschal offering and the sin offering that one slaughtered not for their sake, and one collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered the Paschal offering or sin offering with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood not for their sake; or that one slaughtered the Paschal offering or sin offering and collected and conveyed and sprinkled their blood not for their sake, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.

If one performed one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to eat an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it.

Rabbi Yehuda said that this is the principle: In any case where the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it. And if the intent with regard to the area preceded the intent with regard to the time, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. And the Rabbis say: In both this case and that case, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together.

GEMARA: With regard to the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis concerning a case where one has intent with regard to both time and area, Ilfa says: There is a disagreement only with regard to two sacrificial rites, i.e., where each intent was held during a different rite, but if both were held in the course of one rite, all agree that it constitutes a combination of intentions, and the offering is not rendered piggul. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if the intentions were both held in the course of one rite, there is still a disagreement.

The Gemara asks: Granted, the mishna is understandable according to Ilfa, since the first clause of the mishna: If one slaughtered the animal in silence with no specific intent and collected…beyond its designated time, etc., is referring to different intentions held in the course of two sacrificial rites, one can assume that the latter clause is referring to two rites as well. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, could it be that the first clause is referring to two rites, and the latter clause is referring to only one rite?