there is permanent disqualification even in a case where the animal possesses sanctity that inheres in its monetary value, rather than inherent sanctity.

§ Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one ate forbidden fat and designated an offering to atone for the transgression, and then apostatized, thereby disqualifying himself from bringing an offering, and later recanted his apostasy, since the offering was already disqualified, it shall be disqualified permanently.

It was also stated that Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one ate forbidden fat and designated an offering to atone for his transgression, and then became an imbecile, who is unfit to bring an offering, and then again became halakhically competent, since the offering was already disqualified, it shall be disqualified permanently.

The Gemara notes: And both statements are necessary. As, if Rabbi Yoḥanan had taught us only the first statement, concerning an apostate, one might have reasoned that the offering is permanently disqualified because he disqualified himself by his own action, but here, in the case of one who became an imbecile, where he was disqualified through a process that occurs by itself, when he becomes competent again he may bring his sacrifice, as it is considered as though he were asleep. If one designated an offering and fell asleep, this certainly does not disqualify it.

And if Rabbi Yoḥanan had taught us only the statement here, with regard to one who became an imbecile, one might have reasoned that the offering is permanently disqualified because it is not in his power to return to competence, but here, in the case of an apostate, since it is in his power to recant his apostasy, I would say that the offering is not permanently disqualified. Therefore, both statements are necessary.

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If one ate forbidden fat and designated an offering for the transgression, and then the court ruled that the type of fat he ate is permitted, thereby rendering the offering unnecessary, and the court subsequently retracted its ruling, in this case, what is the halakha? Is the offering permanently disqualified, or is it not permanently disqualified?

A certain elder [hahu sava] said to Rabbi Yirmeya: When Rabbi Yoḥanan introduced the topic of permanently disqualified offerings, he introduced it with this case. What is the reason? There, in the case of one who apostatized or became an imbecile, although the person was disqualified, the offering itself was not disqualified. Consequently, it is less evident that the offering will be disqualified permanently. But here, in a case where the court ruled that the fat is permitted, the offering itself was also disqualified, as it was rendered unnecessary. Therefore, this is a more obvious example.

§ The mishna teaches: Shimon ben Azzai said: I received a tradition from seventy-two elders [zaken] that all slaughtered offerings that are eaten, if slaughtered not for their sake, are fit. The Gemara asks: Why do I need to teach the phrase seventy-two elders using the singular form: Zaken, rather than the plural form: Zekenim? The Gemara answers: Because they all maintained one opinion, i.e., they all agreed with this halakha.

The mishna continues: Ben Azzai added only the burnt offering to the sin offering and the Paschal offering, which are mentioned in the first mishna as disqualified when sacrificed not for their sake.

Rav Huna said: What is the reason for the opinion of ben Azzai? The verse states: “It is a burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma unto the Lord” (Leviticus 1:13). The word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake, it is fit; if sacrificed not for its sake, it is unfit.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t the word “it” written with regard to a guilt offering as well, in the verse: “It is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5)? Nevertheless, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is not disqualified.

The Gemara answers: That verse is written after the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar. Since the offering is fit even if these portions are not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they are burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t this mention of the word “it” with regard to a burnt offering also written after the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar?

The Gemara answers: The word “it” is written with regard to a burnt offering in two places, both in Leviticus 1:13 and in Exodus 29:18. Although both are written after the burning of the portions consumed on the altar, one of them is superfluous, and is therefore interpreted in reference to the main sacrificial rites, performed before the burning of the portions. The verse therefore teaches that the offering is fit only if these rites are performed for its sake.

The Gemara asks: With regard to a guilt offering as well, isn’t the word “it” written in two places, Leviticus 5:9 and Leviticus 7:5?

Rather, ben Azzai derives his halakha not from a verse, but by an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to a sin offering, which is not totally consumed on the altar but partially eaten by priests, if one slaughtered it not for its sake it is disqualified, so too, with regard to a burnt offering, which is treated more strictly in that it is totally consumed on the altar, all the more so is it not clear that if it is slaughtered not for its sake it is disqualified?

The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for sin, in contrast to a burnt offering, which is not brought for atonement. Therefore, only a sin offering is disqualified when sacrificed not for its sake.

The Gemara suggests: A Paschal offering can prove the point, as it is not brought for atonement, yet it is disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is notable about a Paschal offering? It is notable in that its time is set at Passover eve, in contrast to a burnt offering, which does not have a designated time.

The Gemara suggests: If so, a sin offering can prove the point, since it has no set time. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The halakha is derived from the common element of the two sources: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are disqualified. So too, I shall include a burnt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is disqualified.

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is notable about their common element? It is notable in that they both have an element of karet. A sin offering is brought for a transgression punishable by karet when committed intentionally, and one who refrains intentionally from bringing a Paschal offering is liable to be punished with karet. A burnt offering does not have an element of karet.

The Gemara answers: Ben Azzai