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באיזה גיל התחלת ללמוד דף יומי






 

Steinsaltz

One verse teaches this halakha in a case where its time of sacrifice, Passover eve, has passed, and its first year has also passed, disqualifying it for sacrifice as a Paschal offering. And one verse teaches the halakha in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but not its first year. And the third one teaches a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year has passed, but it was sacrificed before Passover eve.

And all these verses are necessary. As, had the Merciful One written only one of the verses, I would say that it is referring to a case where both its first year and its time of sacrifice have passed. Only such a Paschal offering should be sacrificed as a peace offering, as it was completely rejected from its status as a Paschal offering. But in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but its first year has not passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on the second Pesaḥ, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering.

And had the Merciful One written only these two verses, one might assume that only these Paschal offerings are sacrificed as peace offerings, as they were both rejected from their status as Paschal offerings. But in a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year have passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on Passover eve, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering. Therefore, all three verses are necessary.

§ Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon, i.e., a sin offering similar to those brought by the princes during the dedication of the Tabernacle (see Numbers, chapter 7), not to atone for a sin but as a gift, is fit and satisfies its owner’s obligation; as the verse states: “This is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), indicating that there is one law for all the sin offerings.

Rava sat and stated this halakha of Mavog. Rav Mesharshiyya raised an objection to Rava from a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another type of meal offering are fit, and satisfied the obligation of the owner, in contrast to animal offerings, which if slaughtered not for their sake do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.

This is because meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. As, if one removes a handful from a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan. Likewise, if one removes a handful from a dry meal offering for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a dry meal offering. The demonstrably incorrect nature of the intention prevents it from affecting the status of the meal offering in any way.

But with regard to slaughtered offerings this is not so. There is one mode of slaughter for all of the offerings, one mode of collection of the blood for all of them, and one mode of sprinkling for all of them. Therefore, improper intention affects the status of the offering; if a rite is performed for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.

Rav Mesharshiyya inferred from the baraita: The reason a meal offering satisfies its owner’s obligation even when one removed a handful for the sake of another type of meal offering is that its mode of preparation proves its true nature. But if its mode of preparation does not prove its nature, it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. Why not? If Mavog’s derivation is correct, let us say likewise that the verse: “This is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), indicates that there is one law for all of the meal offerings, regardless of their mode of preparation.

Rather, if Mavog’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered on the condition that Nahshon, the prince of Judah, be atoned for by it is fit; this is not considered a change of owner, as there is no atonement for the dead.

The Gemara challenges: But if this was Mavog’s statement, why did he mention Nahshon? Let him state this halakha in reference to a dead person in general.

The Gemara answers: This statement of Mavog teaches us that the reason for the fitness of a sin offering slaughtered for the atonement of Nahshon is that he is dead. Consequently, if it was slaughtered for the sake of a living person obligated to bring a sin offering similar to that of Nahshon, it is unfit. And what is that? It is a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering, which are brought not to atone for a sin but to become ritually pure. Consequently, if one sacrifices a standard sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring the sin offering of a nazirite or a leper, it is considered a change of owner, and the offering is unfit.

The Gemara counters: Why is the offering disqualified? These sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper are equivalent to burnt offerings, since they are not brought for atonement. Sacrificing a sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring a burnt offering is not considered deviation with regard to the owner and does not disqualify it (see 3b).

The Gemara answers: Rather, if Mavog’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a sin offering similar to that of Nahshon is fit; Nahshon’s sin offering is equivalent to a burnt offering.

There is one who says that Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon is unfit. This is because a sin offering of Nahshon is equivalent to a burnt offering, and he is therefore considered to have deviated from the type of offering.

The Gemara challenges: But why did Mavog mention a sin offering of Nahshon, which one cannot bring at all? Let him say this halakha with regard to a nazirite’s sin offering and a leper’s sin offering, which are also equivalent to burnt offerings. The Gemara explains: Mavog cited the primary sin offering, the first case of an individual sin offering recorded in the Bible.

§ Rav says: A sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for consuming blood, or for the sake of a sin offering brought for engaging in idol worship, is fit; it is not considered deviation from the type of offering.

But if it was slaughtered for the sake of a nazirite’s sin offering, or for the sake of a leper’s sin offering, it is unfit; these sin offer-ings are equivalent to burnt offerings, as they are not brought for atonement.

Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, what is the halakha? Do we say that the offering is fit, as the latter type of sin offering atones for a transgression punishable by karet when committed intentionally, similar to the transgression of consuming forbidden fat?

Or perhaps is it unfit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is a sliding-scale sin offering, the contents of which vary with the financial situation of the transgressor (see Leviticus 5:3–13), and not a set sin offering, which is always an animal, like a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches a version of Rav’s statement according to which in all of the cases he mentioned, including one where the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for consuming blood or for engaging in idol worship, the offering is unfit. What is the reason? It is derived from the verse: “And slaughter it [otah] for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), that a sin offering must be slaughtered for the sake of that [otah] sin offering, and no other.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: How do you teach Rava’s dilemma? Rava appears to assume that if one slaughters a sin offering for the sake of some other types of sin offering it remains fit. How is this compatible with your version of Rav’s statement, according to which slaughter for the sake of any other type of sin offering disqualifies it?

Rav Aḥa said to him: We teach Rava’s dilemma with regard to deviation with regard to the owner rather than from the type of offering. And this is how we teach it: First, Rava says: A sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for consuming blood, or for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for engaging in idol worship, is unfit. Since the other person is also obligated to bring a sin offering, this is considered deviation with regard to the owner. But if it was slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering, it is fit, as these sin offerings are not brought for atonement. Deviation with regard to the owner disqualifies an offering only if the other owner is obligated to bring a similar offering.

And then we pose the dilemma like this: Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, what is the halakha? Do we say that the offering is unfit, as the one who defiled the Temple or its sacrificial foods is obligated to bring a sin offering for a transgression punishable by karet, similar to the transgression of the owner? Or perhaps it remains fit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is not a set sin offering like a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?

The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ It was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its sake with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its sake but for the sake of another type of offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit, and Reish Lakish says it is fit.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says it is unfit, as in his opinion one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite, i.e., one can disqualify an offering by performing one rite with improper intent about a subsequent rite that he has not yet performed. And we derive this halakha from intent of piggul, i.e., intent while performing one of the main rites to consume the offering after the appointed time, which disqualifies the offering.

And Reish Lakish says that it is fit, as in his opinion one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite, and we do not derive halakhot with regard to deviation from the type of offering from intent of piggul.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish each follow [ve’azdu] their general line of reasoning in this matter; as it was stated:

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
אדם סלומון
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