And although two of these distinctions are not precise, the other two are in any event precise distinctions, based upon which a distinction can be drawn.

The Gemara explains why two of the distinctions are not precise: What is different about deviation with regard to the owner, such that its disqualification does not concern the offering itself? It is that this merely constitutes a change of thought. Deviation from the type of offering is also merely a change of thought; the offering is not physically affected. Rather, this distinction between deviation with regard to the owner and deviation from the type of offering is false; one should claim that if deviation from the type of offering disqualifies it once the one who slaughtered it had that intent, here too, once the one who slaughtered it had intent to deviate from its owner, he disqualified it.

The Gemara explains the difficulty with the second distinction, the case where the owner died: And according to Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Mari, who says that disqualification by deviation with regard to the owner applies even after the owner’s death, there is no distinction in this regard between deviation from the type of offering and deviation with regard to the owner. In any event, there are two remaining distinctions based on which the comparison between a deviation from the type of offering and a deviation with regard to the owner can be refuted.

Rather, Rav Ashi says that the halakha that it is prohibited to sprinkle the blood for the sake of one other than the owner is derived from a verse. The verse states: “And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him” (Leviticus 1:4), teaching that the sacrificial rite that atones for the owner, namely, the sprinkling of the blood, must be performed specifically for him, and not for another.

The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this halakha? Isn’t it necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to the verse: “And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him [alav],” Rabbi Shimon says: This indicates that in a case where one consecrated an animal as an offering and it died or was lost, if it was initially incumbent upon him [alav] to bring an offering, i.e., if he had accepted upon himself a personal obligation to bring an offering, he bears responsibility for it, i.e., he is obligated to bring another offering in its stead. But if it was not incumbent upon him [alav] to bring an offering, i.e., if he consecrated a specific animal without accepting upon himself any personal obligation, he does not bear responsibility for it if it dies or is lost.

And Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: What is the reasoning behind this distinction? Once a person said: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering, it is considered as though the offering is loaded upon his shoulders. He does not discharge his obligation until he brings some offering.

The Gemara answers: Rav Ashi says that the halakha that it is prohibited to sprinkle the blood for the sake of one other than the owner is derived from the phrase “And it shall be accepted for him,” not from the term “for him,” on which the baraita is based.

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that slaughter and the sprinkling of the blood must be performed for the sake of the owner. From where do we derive that the collection of the blood must also be performed for the sake of the owner?

And if you would say: Let us derive from slaughter and sprinkling that collection must also be performed for the sake of the owner, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about slaughter and sprinkling? They are unique in that each is a rite for which one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven if he performs it outside the Temple.

Rather, Rav Ashi says that the halakha that the collection of the blood must also be performed for the sake of the owner is derived from the case of a nazirite’s ram. As it is written: “And he shall offer the ram for a sacrifice [zevaḥ] of peace offerings unto the Lord” (Numbers 6:17), indicating that its offering should be performed for the sake of a peace offering. And if the verse is not necessary for the matter of deviation from the type of offering, as we derived that from there, i.e., the verses cited earlier (4a), apply it to the matter of deviation with regard to the owner. It is thereby derived that its sacrificial rites must be performed for the sake of its owner.

Rav Aḥa bar Abba said to Rava, in objection to this derivation: Say that the term: “Shall offer,” is a generalization and: “A sacrifice [zevaḥ],” is a detail. According to the principles of biblical hermeneutics, where there is a generalization and a detail, the generalization includes only that which is specified in the detail. Accordingly, slaughter [zeviḥa], yes, must be performed for the sake of its owner; but no other rite must be performed for the sake of its owner in order for the offering to be fit.

The Gemara answers: If it had been written: Shall offer the ram for peace offerings as a sacrifice [zevaḥ], it would be as you say. The clause: Shall offer the ram for peace offerings, would be considered a generalization, and: Sacrifice [zevaḥ], would be a detail. Now that it is written: “Shall offer the ram for a sacrifice [zevaḥ] of peace offerings,” the term “shall offer” is an incomplete generalization, as the term “for a sacrifice” interrupts between “shall offer” and “peace offerings.” And one cannot derive a halakha from any incomplete generalization by employing the principle of a generalization and a detail.

Ravina says there is a different answer: Actually, one can derive a halakha from verses with incomplete generalizations using the principle of a generalization and a detail. And the reason this halakha applies to other rites besides slaughter is that by adding the term “unto the Lord,” it then makes a generalization.

Before Ravina concluded his interpretation, Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: But the former generalization is dissimilar to the latter generalization. The former generalization includes only the essential sacrificial actions and nothing more, whereas the latter generalization includes any sacrificial duty unto the Lord, and even pouring the remains of the blood on the base of the altar and burning the sacrificial portions of the offering on the altar. Ravina responded: The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught generalizations and details in cases like this.

Ravina concludes his explanation: Since the term: “Unto the Lord,” is another generalization, the verse is formulated as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, and you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the mentioned detail, slaughter, is defined as an essential rite and we require that it be performed for the sake of the owner, so too, we require that every essential rite be performed for the sake of the owner.

The Gemara asks: If the verse is referring only to actions similar to the detail, not all of the essential rites are necessarily included. Perhaps it should be derived that just as the mentioned detail, slaughter, is defined as an essential rite, and one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for performing it outside the Temple, so too, any essential rite for which one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for performing it outside the Temple is included in the verse. Accordingly, slaughter and sprinkling the blood are included, but collection of the blood and conveying it are not.

Alternatively, it could be derived that just as the item mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as an action that requires performance in the north of the Temple courtyard and is performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings, so too, any rite that requires performance in the north and is performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings is included in the halakha. Accordingly, slaughter and collection are included; sprinkling the blood is not.

The Gemara answers: Both possibilities are equally valid; this derivation can be said and that derivation can be said. Either collection or sprinkling might be included in the halakha. Consequently, they are equal, and therefore both are included. Or according to another version of the Gemara’s answer, they are equal, and therefore each one, i.e., both collection and sprinkling, shall stand in its status.

The Gemara provides an alternative answer: If you wish, say instead that sprinkling is derived from the verse that Rav Ashi cited: “And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him.” Therefore, when the verse states: “And he shall offer the ram for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord,” indicating the inclusion of rites similar to slaughter, it is apparently referring not to sprinkling but to collection.

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that a nazirite’s ram must be sacrificed for the sake of its owner. From where do we derive that this halakha applies with regard to other peace offerings as well?

And if you would say: Let us derive from a nazirite’s ram that all peace offerings must be sacrificed for the sake of their owners, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about a nazirite’s ram? It is unique in that there is other blood, i.e., there are other offerings, a sin offering and a burnt offering, that must be brought by a nazirite together with his ram.

The Gemara answers: If that is so, if this halakha is unique to a nazirite’s ram, let the verse write: His peace offerings [shelamav]. What is indicated by writing “peace offerings [shelamim]”? It is written to include all types of peace offerings.

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that a peace offering must be sacrificed for its own sake and for the sake of its owner. From where do we derive that this halakha applies with regard to all other offerings?

And if you would say: Let us derive from a peace offering that all offerings must be sacrificed with these intentions, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about a peace offering? It is unique in that it requires placing hands on the head of the offering, and it is accompanied by libations, and it requires the waving of the breast and the right hind leg by the priest and owner together. No other offering possesses all three of these requirements.

The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). The verse juxtaposes all types of offerings with peace offerings, indicating that just as we require the sacrifice of a peace offering to be performed for its sake, both concerning deviation from the type of offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, so too, we require the sacrifice of every type of offering to be performed for its sake, both concerning deviation from the type of offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner.

§ Having established the source for the requirement to sacrifice offerings with the rightful owner and the specific type of offering in mind, the Gemara inquires: Why not say that in a case where one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are disqualified? Why, according to the mishna, do they remain fit?

The Gemara answers: The verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed [nadarta] freely [nedava] to the Lord your God, that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara interprets the words nadarta and nedava exegetically: How can the offering mentioned in this verse be a gift offering [nedava]? It is already referred to as a vow offering [neder]. Rather, the verse indicates that if you did what you had vowed to do, i.e., sacrificed your vow offering properly, it shall be a satisfactory vow offering; but if you did not sacrifice it properly, it shall be rendered a voluntary gift offering. Although it does not satisfy the obligation of your vow, it remains a valid offering.

And it was necessary for the Torah to include the verse: “That which has gone out of your lips,” and it was necessary to include the verse: “This is the law.” As, had the Merciful One written in the Torah only the verse: “That which has gone out of your lips,” I would say