It is already referred to as a vow offering [neder]. Rather, the verse indicates that if you did what you vowed to do, i.e., you sacrificed your vow offering properly, it shall be a satisfactory vow offering; and if you did not sacrifice it properly, it shall be rendered a voluntary gift offering unrelated to the vow, and shall not satisfy the obligation of your vow.

The Gemara concludes: And is it permitted to deviate from protocol in the sacrifice of a gift offering ab initio? Clearly it is not. Evidently, even if one of the sacrificial rites was performed for the sake of sacrificing a different offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of the other sacrificial rites in the incorrect manner.

§ Ravina said to Rav Pappa: Since you were not with us last night within the Shabbat limit of Bei Ḥarmakh, you did not hear that Rava raises a contradiction between two superior mishnaic statements and teaches their resolution.

What are these superior statements? We learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. Rava infers: The reason they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner is specifically that they were slaughtered not for their sake. But if offerings were slaughtered without specification of intent, they, as well, satisfied the obligation of the owner. Apparently, if one performs any action without specification of intent, it is also considered as if he performed it expressly for its sake.

And Rava raises a contradiction from another mishna (Gittin 24a): Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman in question is not valid. And it is derived from the continuation of that mishna that if a bill of divorce was written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is also not valid.

And Rava resolves the contradiction: Ordinary slaughtered offerings stand designated for their own sake. From the time that the offering is consecrated, its presumed end is that it will be slaughtered for the type of offering for which is was consecrated. Therefore, even if the one slaughtering it has no particular intention, it is in effect considered slaughtered for its own sake. By contrast, an ordinary wife does not stand designated for divorce. Therefore, a bill of divorce is never presumed to be referring to a given woman unless it is specified explicitly.

§ The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that slaughtered offerings are fit and even satisfy the obligation of the owner if slaughtered without specification? If we say it is from that which we learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, and it does not teach this using the language: All slaughtered offerings that were not slaughtered for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, this cannot be. One cannot infer from this language that slaughter without specification is valid, since the Mishna also teaches with regard to a bill of divorce: Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it does not teach: That was not written for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it is a given that a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid.

Rather, perhaps it is derived from that which we learned in a mishna (13a): How are offerings slaughtered for their sake and then not for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and then for the sake of a peace offering. The Gemara infers: The reason such an offering is unfit is that he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering and then he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering. But if he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering, and then slaughters it without specification, it is fit. Apparently, slaughtering an offering without specification is considered as if one slaughtered it for its sake.

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that anyone who performs an action performs it with his original intent in mind. Therefore, since he specified initially that he was slaughtering the offering for the sake of a Paschal offering, there are no grounds to assume that he then changed his mind. Here, by contrast, he pronounced no initial statement of proper intent.

Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from the latter clause of that mishna: How are offerings slaughtered not for their sake and then for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and then for the sake of a Paschal offering. The Gemara infers: The reason it is unfit is that he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering and then he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering. But if he started slaughtering it without specification and then slaughtered it for the sake of a Paschal offering, it is fit. Apparently, if one slaughters an offering without specification it still satisfies the obligation of the owner.

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that his ultimate intent proves the nature of his original intent. Since his ultimate intent was to sacrifice a Paschal offering, that was presumably his original intent as well. Here, by contrast, there is no ultimate expression of proper intent.

Alternatively, it can be explained that even if one’s ultimate intent is not considered proof of his original intent, the mishna still uses the same term in both clauses to preserve symmetry. Since in the former clause the tanna taught using the language: For their sake and then not for their sake, teaching that original intent is considered proof of ultimate intent, the tanna also taught the second clause using the language: Not for their sake and then for their sake. In any event, there is no proof from that mishna that an offering slaughtered without specification satisfies its owner’s obligation.

Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from that mishna (46b), which states: The offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters: For the sake of the particular offering; for the sake of the one sacrificing the offering, i.e., the owner; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of sacrificing it in a manner that gives an aroma; and for the sake of pleasing God. And the sin offering and a guilt offering are slaughtered for the sake of atonement for the sin.

The mishna on 46b continues: Rabbi Yosei said: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, since this is a stipulation of the court. The Gemara explains Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: The court stipulated that one should not say that he is slaughtering the offering for its sake, lest he come to say that he is slaughtering it not for its sake. Therefore one should not specify his intent at all.

The Gemara infers: And if it enters your mind that if one slaughters an offering without specification it is unfit, would the court arise and stipulate a matter that disqualifies the offering? Clearly, an offering slaughtered without specification is fit and satisfies the obligation of the owner.

§ The Gemara asks: And with regard to a bill of divorce, from where do we derive that if it is written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is not valid?

If we say it is inferred from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 24a): In the case of a man who was passing through the marketplace, and he heard scribes who write bills of divorce dictating to their students: The man so-and-so divorces so-and-so from the place of such and such, and the man said: This is my name and that is the name of my wife, and he desires to use this bill for his divorce, this bill is unfit to divorce his wife with it, that is not a proof.

It can be explained: Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa says: Here we are dealing with scribes who are wont to practice writing bills of divorce; and this bill of divorce is a draft and was not written for the sake of severance, i.e., divorce, at all. But if a bill of divorce is written to be used for divorce, perhaps it is fit even if written without specifying the woman in question.

Rather, derive this halakha from the subsequent clause in that mishna: