The Gemara challenges: If that is so, that the priests are characterized as a congregation, let them bring a bull as an unwitting communal offering if they perform a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court. And if you would say indeed it is so, that is difficult, as the number of tribes has increased to thirteen.

Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rabbi Ya’akov, said: The tribe of Levi is not characterized as a congregation, as it is written: “Behold, I will make you fruitful and multiply you, and I will make of you a congregation of peoples; and I will give this land to your descendants after you for an everlasting possession” (Genesis 48:4). It is derived from here that any tribe that has an ancestral possession bequeathed to it is characterized as a congregation, and any tribe that does not have an ancestral possession bequeathed to it is not characterized as a congregation. The tribe of Levi has no ancestral land, and the priests who are from the tribe of Levi have no ancestral land.

The Gemara challenges: If so, the twelve tribes are lacking in number, as without the tribe of Levi there are only eleven. Abaye said that it is stated: “Ephraim and Manasseh shall be like Reuben and Simeon to me” (Genesis 48:5), and they are counted as two tribes. Rava said: But isn’t it written: “After the name of their brethren shall they be called in their inheritance” (Genesis 48:6), indicating that it is with regard to inheritance that they are likened to tribes, but not with regard to another matter?

The Gemara challenges: And are they not considered independent tribes concerning other matters as well? But aren’t they separate with regard to the banners under which the Jewish people traveled in the wilderness? There were three tribes represented by each banner, and the three tribes under the banner of Manasseh were Manasseh, Ephraim, and Benjamin. The Gemara answers: In accordance with the division of the tribes according to their inheritances, so was the division of the tribes in their encampment around the Tabernacle. This was in order to honor the banners, so that there would be three tribes affiliated with each banner.

The Gemara asks: But aren’t they separate with regard to the matter of princes of the tribes, as the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh had separate princes? The Gemara answers: That was in order to honor the princes, and there is no proof that they are two different tribes with regard to other matters. This is as it is taught in a baraita: Solomon set seven days of dedication of the Holy Temple, and what did Moses see that led him to set twelve days of dedication for the Tabernacle? He did so in order to honor the tribal princes, so that the prince of each tribe would bring his offering on his own day. Due to the honor each prince deserved, Ephraim and Manasseh are considered two tribes.

The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about Rabbi Shimon’s opinion? Does he hold that a sin-offering brought by several partners is different from a communal sin-offering, as Rav Yosef explained, or does he hold that there is no difference between them, as Abaye explained?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: There are five sin-offerings that are left to die, as they may not be sacrificed: The offspring of a sin-offering born after its mother was consecrated as a sin-offering; the substitute of a sin-offering, which assumes sacred status but may not be sacrificed; a sin-offering whose owners have died; a sin-offering whose owners’ sin was atoned for with another offering; and a sin-offering whose first year has passed, as a sin-offering may be brought only within the animal’s first year. And you cannot state a case of the offspring of a communal sin-offering, as the congregation does not designate a female as a sin-offering, And you cannot state a case of a substitute of a communal sin-offering, as there is no substitute for a communal offering. And you cannot state a case of a sin-offering whose owners have died in the case of a communal sin-offering, as the public does not die.

With regard to a sin-offering whose owners’ sin was atoned for and a sin-offering whose first year has passed, we did not hear whether the halakha applies to communal sin-offerings as well. One might have thought they too shall be left to die. You say: One shall derive the vague from the explicit. What did we find with regard to the offspring of a sin-offering, the substitute of a sin-offering, and a sin-offering whose owners died? We found that these matters are stated only with regard to an individual sin-offering, but not with regard to a communal sin-offering. So too, these matters of a sin-offering whose owners’ sin was atoned for and a sin-offering whose first year has passed are stated only with regard to an individual sin-offering, but not with regard to a communal sin-offering. Likewise, one may derive that an individual’s sin-offering must be left to die, while a sin-offering owned by partners is not left to die.

The Gemara asks: And does one derive the halakha of the possible from the impossible? Some of these cases are by their very nature not relevant to communal sin-offerings. One cannot derive the halakha from them with regard to cases that could be relevant to communal sin-offerings. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon learns all these halakhot of sin-offerings that are left to die as a tradition in one place, i.e., as a single halakha. In cases where not all the categories of sin-offerings left to die apply, no category of sin-offerings that are left to die applies.

MISHNA: In a case where an anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, issued an erroneous ruling for himself permitting performance of an action prohibited by Torah law, if he issued the ruling unwittingly and then unwittingly performed the transgression in accordance with his ruling, he is liable to bring a bull as a sin-offering for an unwitting transgression by the anointed priest. If he issued the ruling unwittingly, and performed the transgression intentionally, or if he issued the ruling intentionally and performed the transgression unwittingly, he is exempt from liability to bring any offering, as there is a principle: The legal status of the ruling of an anointed priest for himself is like that of the ruling of the court for the general public. Therefore, the High Priest is liable to bring the bull as a sin-offering for his unwitting transgression in a case when the court would be liable to bring the bull as a communal sin-offering for an unwitting transgression performed by the general public.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: If he issued the ruling unwittingly and then unwittingly performed the transgression in accordance with his ruling, he is liable to bring a bull. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? This is certainly a case of an unwitting transgression, for which the Torah deems him liable to bring an offering.

Abaye said: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where he issued an erroneous ruling and forgot the reason that was the basis upon which he issued the ruling, and at the moment that he erred and performed the transgression, he said: I am hereby performing this action with my ruling in mind. As, lest you say: Since if the reason that was the basis upon which he issued the ruling became known to him at that moment, perhaps he would have retracted his ruling, therefore if he nevertheless performed his transgression, his status is like that of an intentional transgressor, and let him not be liable to bring an offering; to counter this, the tanna teaches us that this too is a case of an unwitting transgression.

§ The mishna teaches: If he issued the ruling unwittingly, and performed the transgression intentionally, or if he issued the ruling intentionally and performed the transgression unwittingly, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, the halakhot unique to the sin-offering for an unwitting transgression by the anointed priest, derived? They are derived from a verse, as the Sages taught in a baraita: It is written: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), from which it is derived that the liability of the anointed priest is incurred like that of the general public. The Gemara discusses this derivation. As one might have thought that the verse is superfluous: Could this not be derived through logical inference?