Or perhaps he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim made by each claimant.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Ḥiyya taught in a baraita: There are twenty sin-offerings here that the defendant must bring. The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances of the baraita? If the defendant specified each claim of each of the claimants in his oath, does Rabbi Ḥiyya come to teach us a number? Obviously, the defendant is liable to bring twenty offerings. Rather, is it not that the baraita is referring to a case where he did not specify an oath to each claimant, but he specified it to the first claimant and said: And neither are yours, to each of the remaining claimants? And therefore, conclude from the baraita that such a denial is considered specific.

§ The mishna teaches that if one accuses another: You raped or you seduced my daughter, and the other says: I did not rape and I did not seduce your daughter, to which the father replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, the defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if it is false oath, and Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt from liability for a false oath on a deposit. The reason is that the payment for rape or seduction is a fine, and one does not pay a fine based on his own admission; therefore, he is also exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for having taken a false oath. The Rabbis hold that he is liable since he would have been liable to pay compensation for humiliation and degradation resulting from her being raped or seduced, which are monetary claims. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon holds that since the father is primarily claiming the fine and his claim to the other payments is secondary, the defendant is exempt from liability.

Rava says: To what case is this explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon compared? It is compared to a case where a person said to another: Give me back my wheat and barley and spelt that are in your possession, and the other said to him: On my oath your wheat is not in my possession; and it was then discovered that it was only wheat that he did not have, but he did have the claimant’s barley and spelt. In that case, the halakha is that he is exempt from liability for an oath on a deposit, as when he took an oath with regard to the wheat, he took a truthful oath.

Abaye said to Rava: Are the two cases comparable? There, in the case of the grain, the defendant denies only the other’s claim of wheat, but he does not deny his claim of barley and spelt. Here, the defendant denies the entire matter, as he claims that he never raped or seduced the man’s daughter. Rather, this explanation is comparable only to a case where one said to another: Give me back my wheat and barley and spelt that are in your possession, and the defendant said to him: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession at all, and it was then discovered that it was only wheat that he did not have, but he did have the claimant’s barley and spelt. In that case, the halakha is that he is liable for an oath on a deposit. This, then, cannot be the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, as he exempts the defendant from liability.

Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: According to the statement of Rabban Shimon, the father is claiming only the fine and not the compensation for humiliation and degradation resulting from his daughter’s having been raped or seduced. According to the statement of the Rabbis, he is also claiming payment for humiliation and degradation resulting from her having been raped or seduced. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Shimon holds: A person does not forgo a claim to something with a fixed value, such as a fine, and claim something whose value is not fixed and requires an appraisal, such as humiliation and degradation resulting from being raped or seduced. And the Rabbis hold that one does not forgo a claim to something that the defendant is not exempt from paying if he admits his guilt, and claim something that the defendant is exempt from paying if he admits his guilt, such as a fine.

MISHNA: By Torah law, the oath imposed by the judges upon one who admits to part of a claim is administered only when the claim is for the value of at least two silver ma’a, and the defendant’s admission is for the value of at least one peruta. And furthermore, if the admission is not of the same type as the claim, i.e., the defendant admitted to a debt that the claimant did not claim, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath.

How so? If the claimant said to the defendant: I have two silver ma’a in your possession, and the latter responded: You have only one peruta, a coin made from copper, in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath (see 39b). But if the claimant said: I have two silver ma’a and one peruta in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only one peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath.

If the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt, as he denies the entire claim. But if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim.

If the claimant said: My late father had one hundred dinars in your possession, and I am now claiming them, and the defendant responded: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as he is like one returning a lost item, since he could have easily denied the entire claim.

§ The mishna discusses other cases where the defendant denies an entire claim. In a case where one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, I acknowledge that claim; and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is exempt. But if he responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, i.e., he denies that a debt ever existed, he is liable to pay, as he already admitted that he owed him the amount.

In a case where the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant said to him: Yes, to which the claimant responded: Give the money to me only in the presence of witnesses, then if the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is liable to pay, as he is required to give it to him in the presence of witnesses, and he cannot prove that he did so.

§ The mishna resumes discussion of the oath imposed by the court in a case where the defendant admits to a part of a claim. If the claimant said: I have a litra, i.e., a specific weight, of gold in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a litra of silver in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as his admission relates to a different item than that which the claim relates to. But if the claimant said: I have a gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar, or a tereisit, or a pundeyon, or a peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type; they are all coins. Since the claim concerns money, the difference between the different types of coins is disregarded, as the claim is essentially referring to the monetary value, not to a specific type of coin.

If the claimant said: I have a kor of grain in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a half-kor of legumes in my possession, he is exempt. But if the claimant said: I have a kor of produce in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a half-kor of legumes in my possession, he is liable, as legumes are included in produce.

If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. According to Rabban Gamliel, one who admits to a part of the claim is liable to take an oath even if the admission is not of the same type as the claim.

With regard to one who claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the latter then admitted that he owes him pitchers, i.e., the jugs themselves, but not the oil, Admon says: Since he admitted to him with regard to a part of the claim, and his admission was of the same type as the claim, i.e., the claim included both containers and oil and he admitted to owing him containers, he must take an oath. And the Rabbis say: The partial admission in this case is not of the same type as the claim, as he completely denied owing him oil. Rabban Gamliel said: I see the statement of Admon as correct.

If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or conversely, he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath, as oaths are not taken concerning claims involving land. If he admitted to part of the claim about the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim about the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the entire claim, as property that does not serve as a guarantee, i.e., movable property, binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., the land, so that the oath about the movable property can be extended to require him to take an oath concerning the land as well.

One does not take an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor. And the court does not administer an oath to a minor. But one does take an oath to a minor, or to a representative of the Temple treasury with regard to consecrated property.

GEMARA: How does the court administer an oath to someone who is liable to take an oath? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The court administers to him the oath stated in the Torah, as it is written in Abraham’s instruction to his servant: “And I will make you swear by the Lord, the God of heaven” (Genesis 24:3).

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In accordance with whose opinion is Rav’s statement? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Idi, who says that when one is liable to take an oath, we require him to take it using the ineffable name of God?

Rav Ashi said to him: You may even say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that one is merely required to take an oath using an appellation of God. And the practical ramification of Rav’s statement is that just as in the aforementioned verse, Abraham said: “Please put your hand under my thigh, and I will make you swear” (Genesis 24:2–3), instructing his servant to grasp his circumcised penis, which is considered sacred to some degree, so too, in oaths administered by the court, one must grasp a sacred item in his hand while taking the oath.

And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rava; as Rava said: This judge who administers an oath “by the Lord, the God of heaven,” without instructing the litigant to grasp a sacred item, is considered like one who made a mistake with regard to a matter that appears in the Mishna; in which case his ruling is revoked, and the litigant must repeat the oath. And Rav Pappa said: This judge who administers an oath in which the litigant grasps phylacteries, not a Torah scroll, is considered like one who made a mistake with regard to a matter that appears in the Mishna; in which case his ruling is revoked, and the litigant must repeat the oath.

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, but the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava that if the litigant merely took an oath using the ineffable name of God, he is required to take another oath, as he was not grasping any sacred item in his hand; but the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa, that if the litigant was grasping phylacteries he is required to take another oath, as he was grasping a sacred item in his hand, even though it was not a Torah scroll.

One takes an oath while standing, but a Torah scholar takes an oath while sitting. One takes an oath grasping a Torah scroll ab initio, but a Torah scholar may take an oath grasping phylacteries ab initio.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: An oath imposed by the judges may also be recited in its language, i.e., in any language spoken by the one taking the oath. It is not required that the oath be in Hebrew.

Before he takes the oath, the judges say to him: Be aware