This Gemara questions that response. Is it the wife of a prophet that is returned, and the wife of one who is not a prophet is not returned?

Rather, the explanation is as Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says, as Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: This is what God is saying to Abimelech: “And now, restore the man’s wife” (Genesis 20:7), in any case, whether or not he is a prophet. And as for that which you said: “Will You even slay a righteous nation? Didn’t he say to me: She is my sister” (Genesis 20:4–5), claiming that you are a victim of circumstances beyond your control and exempt from punishment, that is not a valid claim. He is a prophet and it is from you that he learned to conduct himself in that manner. With regard to a stranger [akhsenai] who comes to the city, one asks him about matters of eating and drinking, e.g., whether he is hungry or thirsty. Does one ask him: Is that your wife? Is that your sister? Abraham understood from this line of questioning that you are suspect with regard to abducting women, and that is the reason that he introduced Sarah as his sister. Therefore, you are liable to be executed for her abduction.

The Gemara comments: From here it is derived that a descendant of Noah, i.e., a gentile, is executed for a capital offense even if he says that it is permitted, as he should have learned that it is prohibited and he did not learn.

MISHNA: A blind person who unintentionally murdered another is not exiled; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: He is exiled. The enemy of the victim is not exiled, as presumably it was not a completely unintentional act. Rabbi Yosei says: Not only is an enemy not exiled, but he is executed by the court, because his halakhic status is like that of one who is forewarned by witnesses not to perform the action, as presumably he performed the action intentionally. Rabbi Shimon says: There is an enemy who is exiled and there is an enemy who is not exiled. This is the principle: In any case where an observer could say he killed knowingly, where circumstances lead to the assumption that it was an intentional act, the enemy is not exiled, even if he claims that he acted unintentionally. And if it is clear that he killed unknowingly, as circumstances indicate that he acted unintentionally, he is exiled, even though the victim is his enemy.

GEMARA: Apropos the dispute in the mishna between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir with regard to a blind person, the Sages taught: It is written that one is exiled to a city of refuge if he killed another “without seeing” (Numbers 35:23), indicating that the reference is to one who has the capacity to see. This serves to exclude a blind person; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: On the contrary, the term “without seeing” serves to include a blind person.

The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is as it is written with regard to those who are exiled: “And as one who goes with his neighbor into the forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5), which is stated in general terms, applying even to a blind person. The phrase “without seeing” comes and excludes a blind person from this halakha.

And Rabbi Meir interprets the verses differently: “Without seeing” serves to exclude a blind person, and “without knowledge” (Deuteronomy 19:4) also serves to exclude a blind person. This is an example of a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression, and there is a hermeneutical principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify the halakha and include additional cases. In this case, it includes a blind person in the halakhot of exile as well.

The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda respond to that derivation? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda says that the phrase “without knowledge” comes to exclude one with intent, e.g., one who had intent to kill an animal and who killed a person, from the halakha of exile. Rabbi Yehuda interprets the two restrictive expressions as excluding two unrelated cases from the halakha of exile, and therefore the principle of: A restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify, is not relevant in this case.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei says: An enemy is executed because his halakhic status is like that of one who is forewarned. The Gemara asks: But why is an enemy executed? The witness did not actually forewarn him, and courts administer corporal punishment only to a defendant who was forewarned. The Gemara answers: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One who is devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot [ḥaver] does not require forewarning for the court to administer corporal punishment to him, because fundamentally the obligation to issue forewarning was established only to distinguish between unwitting and intentional actions. The presumptive status of a ḥaver is that of one who knows the halakha; therefore, his action is presumed to have been intentional.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: There is an enemy who is exiled and there is an enemy who is not exiled. The Gemara adds: It is taught in a baraita: In what circumstances did Rabbi Shimon say that there is an enemy who is exiled and there is an enemy who is not exiled? He said that in a case where the rope snapped and the object attached to the rope fell and killed a person, he is exiled, as that appears to be an accident. But if an object was displaced from his hands, he is not exiled, as presumably he loosened his grip until it fell.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: One is never exiled unless his trowel with which he was working was displaced from his hand? As Rabbi Shimon stated that halakha without distinguishing between friend and enemy, therefore, the apparent contradiction between a case where the rope snapped, according to the first baraita, and a case where the rope snapped, according to the second baraita, is difficult. And the apparent contradiction between a case where the object was displaced, according to the first baraita, and a case where the object was displaced, according to the second baraita, is difficult.

The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between a case where the rope snapped according to the first baraita and a case where the rope snapped according to the second is not difficult. This case in the second baraita is referring to a friend of the victim, and presumably if the rope snapped it is considered a case of circumstances beyond his control and he is exempt from exile, and that case in the first baraita is referring to an enemy of the victim. In that case, although the presumption is that the act was not intentional, due to his enmity toward the victim, it is also not assumed to be the result of circumstances that were completely beyond his control. Therefore, he is exiled.

The apparent contradiction between a case where the object was displaced according to the first baraita and a case where the object was displaced according to the second baraita is not difficult, as this case in the first baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who ruled in a mishna (7b) that if the blade of one’s ax was displaced from its handle and flew through the air and killed a person, he is exempt from exile, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and that case in the second baraita is the opinion of the Rabbis, who rule that in that case, the person wielding the ax is exiled, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

MISHNA: To where are the unintentional murderers exiled? They are exiled to cities of refuge, to three cities that were in the east bank of the Jordan and to three cities that were in the land of Canaan, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: “Three cities shall you give beyond the Jordan and three cities shall you give in the land of Canaan; they shall be cities of refuge” (Numbers 35:14). The mishna comments: Until the three cities of refuge that were in Eretz Yisrael were selected, an unintentional murderer would not be admitted to the three that were in the east bank of the Jordan, even though the latter three were already selected by Moses (see Deuteronomy 4:41), as it is stated: “Six cities of refuge shall they be” (Numbers 35:13), from which it is derived that they do not become cities of refuge until all six of them admit unintentional murderers as one.

The mishna continues: And roads were aligned for them from this city, i.e., all cities, to that city, i.e., they would pave and straighten the access roads to the cities of refuge, as it is stated: “Prepare for you the road, and divide the borders of your land, which the Lord your God causes you to inherit, into three parts, that every murderer may flee there” (Deuteronomy 19:3).

And the court would provide the unintentional murderers fleeing to a city of refuge with two Torah scholars, due to the concern that perhaps the blood redeemer, i.e., a relative of the murder victim seeking to avenge his death, will seek to kill him in transit, and in that case they, the scholars, will talk to the blood redeemer and dissuade him from killing the unintentional murderer. Rabbi Meir says: The unintentional murderer also speaks [medabber] on his own behalf to dissuade the blood redeemer, as it is stated: “And this is the matter [devar] of the murderer, who shall flee there and live” (Deuteronomy 19:4), indicating that the murderer himself speaks.

Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Initially, either one who killed another unintentionally or one who killed another intentionally would hurry and flee to the cities of refuge, and the court in his city would send for him and would bring him from there to stand trial. For one who was found liable to receive the death penalty in court for intentional murder, the court would execute him, and for one who was not found liable to receive the death penalty, e.g., if they deemed that the death occurred due to circumstances beyond his control, they would free him. For one who was found liable to be exiled, the court would restore him to his place in the city of refuge, as it is stated: “And the congregation shall judge between the murderer and the blood redeemer…and the congregation shall restore him to his city of refuge, that he fled there” (Numbers 35:24–25), indicating that he had been in a city of refuge before his trial.

GEMARA: The Sages taught: Moses designated three cities of refuge in the east bank of the Jordan, and corresponding to them, Joshua designated three cities of refuge in the land of Canaan. And the cities were aligned like two rows of vines in a vineyard: In Eretz Yisrael there was Hebron in Mount Judea, corresponding to Bezer in the wilderness; Shechem in Mount Ephraim, corresponding to Ramoth in the Gilead; and Kadesh in Mount Naphtali, corresponding to Golan in the Bashan. From the term “And you shall divide [veshilashta]” (Deuteronomy 19:3), it is derived that the three cities in Eretz Yisrael will serve as three [meshulashin] lines of demarcation dividing the length of the land into four equal parts, in a manner that the distance from the southern border of Eretz Yisrael to Hebron, the southernmost city of refuge, will be like the distance from Hebron to Shechem, and the distance from Hebron to Shechem will be like the distance from Shechem to Kadesh, and the distance from Shechem to Kadesh will be like the distance from Kadesh to the northern border.

The Gemara questions the distribution of the cities: Why were there three cities designated on the east bank of the Jordan, where two and a half tribes resided, and three cities designated in Eretz Yisrael, where more than nine tribes resided? Abaye said: In Gilead, which is located on the east bank of the Jordan, murderers are common.