With regard to one who kills a High Priest or a High Priest who killed a person, he never departs from the city of refuge. Therefore, I will say that a High Priest is not exiled at all. For that reason, the baraita above teaches us that he is exiled. The Gemara suggests: Why not say that the halakha is indeed that the High Priest would not be exiled, since he would not be able to return home? The Gemara responds: The verse states concerning the city of refuge: “That every manslayer may flee there” (Deuteronomy 19:3), and even a High Priest is indicated by the inclusive term “every.”

The baraita teaches that a High Priest transgresses a positive mitzva and a prohibition. The Gemara understands the baraita as an independent statement asserting that the High Priest must transgress a positive mitzva and a prohibition, and asks: Is it not possible that he doesn’t transgress a positive mitzva and prohibition; i.e., must the High Priest transgress a positive mitzva and a prohibition? The Gemara responds: This is what the baraita is saying: This is not an independent statement asserting that the High Priest must transgress a positive mitzva and a prohibition; rather, the baraita teaches that if he transgressed a positive mitzva and a prohibition, then he is considered to be like an ordinary person concerning all of his halakhot, judged just as anyone else for common transgressions.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara responds: No, as it could enter your mind to say that since we learned in the mishna (2a): The court judges cases involving an entire tribe that sinned, or a false prophet, or a High Priest, only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges, i.e., the Great Sanhedrin, and since Rav Adda bar Ahava says that the phrase “every great matter they shall bring unto you” (Exodus 18:22), refers to the matters of a great person, the High Priest, who is judged in a court of seventy-one, therefore, one might say that this means all the matters of a great person, including non-capital transgressions, are judged in a court of seventy-one. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that for non-capital transgressions, he is treated like an ordinary person, and judged even by a court of three.

The Gemara suggests: But why not say that indeed, the halakha is that all cases involving the High Priest must be adjudicated in a court of seventy-one? The Gemara rejects this. Is it written: The matters of a great person? “Every great matter” is written, meaning actually a great matter, one involving a capital transgression, not only one related to a great person.

§ The mishna teaches that the High Priest testifies before the court and others testify concerning him. The Gemara expresses surprise: He testifies? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that in the verse: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering and ignore them; you shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1), the use of the unusual term “and ignore them,” as opposed to the more direct: Do not ignore them, indicates that there are times when you ignore lost items and there are times when you do not ignore them. How so?

The baraita answers: If the one who found the item was a priest, and the lost item is in the cemetery, where priests are prohibited from entering; or if he was an elderly person and it is not in keeping with his dignity to tend to a lost item of that kind; or if his work, which he would need to suspend in order to tend to and return the item, is of greater value than the lost item of the other, one might think that he must nonetheless return it. Therefore, with regard to those cases, it is stated: “And ignore them.” Since a distinguished individual may ignore a mitzva that is incumbent on others if it is not in keeping with his dignity, perhaps the High Priest would be allowed to ignore the obligation to testify, due to his honor.

Rav Yosef said: A High Priest testifies only about a king, since such testimony would not compromise his dignity. The Gemara objects: But didn’t we learn in the mishna above that the king does not judge and is not judged, and he does not testify and others do not testify concerning him? Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: The meaning of Rav Yosef’s statement is that a High Priest testifies about a son of a king. The Gemara objects: The son of a king is an ordinary person, without special status in halakha, so it is not in keeping with the High Priest’s dignity to testify concerning him.

Rather, the meaning of Rav Yosef’s statement is that he testifies before the king, and it is not in keeping with the dignity of the High Priest to testify if the king is a presiding judge. The Gemara objects: But didn’t we learn in a baraita (Tosefta 2:8) that a king is not seated on the Sanhedrin? The Gemara explains: Rav Yosef is referring to a special arrangement: Due to the honor of the High Priest, the king comes and sits as one of the judges, they receive his testimony, he rises and goes, and we deliberate about the case.

§ Having mentioned this baraita, the Gemara turns its attention to the matter itself: A king is not seated on the Sanhedrin, nor is a king or a High Priest seated on a court for intercalating the year. The Gemara explains: With regard to a king on the Sanhedrin, the source is as it is written: “Do not answer in a cause [riv]” (Exodus 23:2), which is explained to mean: Do not answer to a great person [rav]. Therefore, one whose stature will make the other judges afraid to contradict him may not be appointed to the Sanhedrin.

The Gemara continues its explanation of the baraita: Nor is a king or a High Priest seated on a court for intercalating the year. A king does not serve as a judge concerning this matter due to the sustenance of soldiers. Taxes were collected on a yearly basis, while the soldiers were paid monthly, so the king had a vested interest in not adding a month to the calendar. A High Priest does not serve as a judge concerning this matter due to the cold. If a month is added to the calendar and the High Priest must perform his Yom Kippur immersions and walk barefoot on the floor of the Temple deeper into the cold autumn, he too will have a vested interest in not adding a month.

Rav Pappa says: Learn from the ruling concerning the High Priest that the weather of the year follows the months, meaning that changes in the seasons are in accordance with the sequence of the months in the standard, non-intercalated calendar. The High Priest would not want the year to be intercalated, because then the colder weather of Marḥeshvan would occur during Tishrei. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But isn’t that contradicted by the incident of those three cattle herders that were standing around, and the Sages heard them saying various statements about annual weather signs?

One of them said: If the first grains and the late-ripening grains sprout at the same time, that is Adar, but if not, that is not Adar but still Shevat. And one of them said: If an ox dies in the morning in the snow, indicating that it is still very cold, and at noon in the shade of a fig tree it sleeps, rubbing against it to strip off its skin because of the heat, that is Adar, but if not, that is not Adar. And one of them said: If there is a very strong east wind, which is cold, yet the warm air that you blow with your jaw goes out and toward it and overcomes its effect, that is Adar, but if not, that is not Adar. And since those signs had not yet come to pass, the Sages intercalated the calendar that year.

The Gemara rejects this: And can you understand that the Sages relied on cattle herders to determine halakha? Rather, the Sages relied on their own calculations, and those cattle herders were supported inasmuch as their statements were supported by the Sages’ independent conclusion.

§ The mishna teaches that the High Priest performs ḥalitza with his brother’s widow and his brother performs ḥalitza with his wife, but in any case he does not consummate levirate marriage with his brother’s wife. The Gemara comments: The mishna categorically teaches that the High Priest does not consummate levirate marriage, and there is no difference whether his brother’s wife was a widow from betrothal alone and no difference whether she was a widow from a marriage that had been consummated. Granted, it is understood that he does not consummate levirate marriage with a widow from marriage, since there is both a positive mitzva: “And he shall take a wife in her virginity” (Leviticus 21:13), and also a prohibition: “A widow, or one divorced, or a ḥalala, or a zona, these shall he not take” (Leviticus 21:14),