say the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: It is insufficient to merely reduce the quantity of seeds of a different kind; rather, one must pick out all the seeds of a different kind.

The Gemara explains the difficulty: Granted, if you say that a quarter-kav of seeds of a different kind per se’a with regard to diverse kinds is comparable to more than a quarter-kav of impurities per se’a with regard to a sale, then it is about this that they disagree: The first tanna holds that we do not penalize one by requiring him to remove that which is permitted due to that which is prohibited, and consequently it is sufficient to merely reduce the quantity of seeds of a different kind to an acceptable level, whereas Rabbi Yosei holds that we do penalize one by requiring him to remove that which is permitted due to that which is prohibited. But if you say that a quarter-kav of seeds of a different kind per se’a with regard to diverse kinds is comparable to a quarter-kav of impurities per se’a with regard to a sale, then why does Rabbi Yosei rule that one must pick out all the seeds of a different kind?

The Gemara answers: There, with regard to diverse kinds, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei: One must pick out all the seeds, because once he is purifying the admixture of seeds, if he deliberately leaves a quantity of seeds of a different kind mixed in, it appears as though he is intentionally planting and maintaining diverse kinds in his field.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another challenge to Rav Huna’s ruling from a mishna (Bava Metzia 37a): In the case of two people who deposited money with one person, and this one deposited one hundred dinars and that one deposited two hundred dinars, and when they return to collect their deposits, this one says: My deposit was two hundred dinars, and that one says: My deposit was two hundred dinars, the bailee gives one hundred dinars to this one and one hundred dinars to that one, and the rest of the money, i.e., the contested one hundred dinars, will be placed in a safe place until Elijah comes and prophetically determines the truth. In this case, one of the parties is certainly lying, but nevertheless, the Sages did not penalize the parties by placing all of the money in a safe place. Similarly, in the case of a sale, where a seller deceitfully mixed additional impurities into the produce he sold, he should not be penalized and required to take back all of the impurities.

The Gemara rejects this challenge: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the deposits, it is certain that at least one hundred dinars belongs to this Master and one hundred dinars belongs to that Master. Here, in the case of a sale where there is an unacceptable proportion of impurities mixed in, who can say that the seller did not mix in the entire amount intentionally? Accordingly, no proof can be drawn from the mishna.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a support for Rav Huna’s ruling from the latter clause of that mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: If so, what did the swindler lose? He lost nothing by claiming the one hundred dinars that belongs to another, and he has no incentive to admit the truth. Rather, the entire deposit will be placed in a safe place until Elijah comes. Since through his lie the swindler risks losing even the one hundred dinars that he deposited, perhaps that will induce him to admit his deceit. According to Rabbi Yosei, the Sages did penalize one who acts deceitfully, which accords with Rav Huna’s ruling.

The Gemara rejects the proof: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the deposits, there is certainly a swindler, and it is reasonable to penalize both parties in order to induce the swindler to admit his deceit. Here, in the case of a sale where there is an unacceptable level of impurities mixed in with the produce, who can say that the seller intentionally mixed in anything? Perhaps the impurities were inadvertently mixed in during the processing. Accordingly, no proof can be drawn from the mishna.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another support for Rav Huna’s ruling from a baraita: In the case of a promissory note in which the details of a loan with interest were written, the court penalizes the creditor, and he may collect neither the principal nor the interest; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, the Sages did penalize one who acts improperly, which accords with Rav Huna’s ruling.

The Gemara rejects the proof: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a loan with interest, it is already at the time of the writing of the bill that the lender performed the transgression of placing interest upon the borrower. Since he certainly committed a transgression, it is reasonable that the Sages penalized him. But here, in the case of a sale where there is an unacceptable proportion of impurities mixed in with the produce, who can say that the seller intentionally mixed in anything? Perhaps the impurities were inadvertently mixed in during the processing. Accordingly, no proof can be drawn from the baraita.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a challenge to Rav Huna’s ruling from the latter clause of the baraita: But the Rabbis say: He may collect the principal but may not collect the interest. According to Rabbi Meir, the Sages did not penalize one who acts improperly, contrary to Rav Huna’s ruling.

The Gemara rejects this challenge: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a loan with interest, according to strict halakha it is certainly permitted to collect the principal, so the Sages did not penalize him with regard to it. But here, in the case of a sale where there is an unacceptable proportion of impurities mixed in, who can say that the seller did not mix in the entire amount intentionally? Accordingly, no proof can be drawn from the mishna.

Come and hear further support for Rav Huna’s ruling from that which Ravin bar Rav Naḥman teaches (104b). Ravin bar Rav Naḥman’s statement is with regard to a situation when land that was sold is later found to be larger than stated at the time of the sale. If the deviation is not more than an area required to sow a quarter-kav of seed per beit se’a of land, then the buyer need not return any land to the seller. If the proportion of extra land is larger than this, not only must the buyer return the extra land that is beyond the limit of a quarter-kav area per beit se’a, but he must also return to him every one of the extra quarter-kav areas of land that he received beyond the stated area of a beit kor. The Gemara infers: Apparently, when one is required to return part of a sale because of a discrepancy that is beyond the acceptable limit of deviation, then one is required to return the entire discrepancy and not just the amount that is beyond the acceptable limit. This supports Rav Huna’s ruling.

The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared?