If this is a case where the seller does not have sufficient funds for the buyer to be reimbursed by him, then let the buyer retain the ox itself in lieu of his money, as people say: If you wish to ensure that you will get paid, collect even bran, an inferior commodity, from one who is in your debt. Consequently, even according to the opinion of Rav, the buyer will be likely to retain the ox. What, then, is the practical difference between the opinions of Rav and Shmuel?

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to discuss the case where the seller does have sufficient funds for the buyer to be reimbursed by him.

The Gemara explains the logic of each opinion: Rav says: This is a mistaken transaction, as in cases of uncertainty we follow the majority, and since the majority of people purchase oxen for plowing, it is presumed that this buyer also purchased the ox for plowing. Accordingly, since the ox he received was not suitable for plowing, the sale is void. And Shmuel could have said to you: When we follow the majority, that is only with regard to ritual matters, but with regard to monetary matters, such as this, we do not follow the majority. Accordingly, there is no basis for voiding the sale.

The Gemara cites a mnemonic that indicates the topics of the cases it will reference to challenge either Rav’s or Shmuel’s opinion: Woman, and slave, ox, oxen, and produce.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s opinion from a mishna (Ketubot 15b): With regard to a woman who was widowed or divorced, and is in dispute with her husband or his heirs over the value of the payment she should receive for her marriage contract, and she says: When you married me I was a virgin, and so I am entitled to two hundred dinars, and he says: That is not the case; rather, when I married you, you were a widow, and so you are entitled to only one hundred dinars, then if there are witnesses that she went out of her father’s house to her wedding with a veil [hinnuma] or with the hair of her head loose, in the typical manner of virgin brides, that is considered sufficient evidence in support of her claim, and so the payment of her marriage contract is two hundred dinars.

The Gemara infers: The reason that she receives two hundred dinars is that there are witnesses to her claim. Therefore, if there were no witnesses, her claim would not be successful. The Gemara asks: But why? Let us say that since there is an uncertainty, one should follow the majority of women, and since the majority of women marry as virgins, it should be presumed that this woman also married as a virgin. Accordingly she should be entitled to two hundred dinars. Since this is not the case, it is apparent that the majority is not followed in monetary matters.

Ravina said: In this case, one cannot decide the case based on the majority of women because there is room to say that it is so that the majority of women marry as virgins and only a minority marry as widows or non-virgins. But it is also so that there is an additional presumption: The marriage of anyone who marries as a virgin generates publicity of that fact. And with regard to this woman, who is in a dispute over the value of her marriage contract, because her marriage did not generate publicity of her marrying as a virgin, the ability to apply what is true of the majority of women to her case is undermined. Accordingly, there is no proof that the majority is not followed in monetary matters.

The Gemara questions this: If it is really true that the marriage of anyone who marries as a virgin generates publicity of that fact, then even when there are witnesses that she was a virgin bride, what of it? From the fact that her marriage did not generate publicity of her marrying as a virgin, perforce they are false witnesses.

Rather, one must modify the above argument to say that the majority of marriages of women who marry as virgins generate publicity of that fact, and with regard to this woman, since her marriage did not generate publicity of her having been married as a virgin, the ability to apply what is true of the majority of women to her case is undermined.

Come and hear a challenge to Shmuel’s opinion from a baraita: In the case of one who sells a slave to another, and the slave is found to be a thief or a gambler [kuvyustus], and the buyer does not wish to have such a slave, nevertheless it has come to him, i.e., the slave is acquired by the one who purchased him and the transaction is nonrefundable. By contrast, if the slave is found to be an armed bandit [listim] or has been judged and written to be executed by the govenment, then the buyer can return the slave to the seller and say to him: That which is yours is before you; return the money I paid for him, as the sale is void.

The Gemara explains the proof from the baraita: In the first clause of the baraita,