that does not have written in it the formulation: We are aware of so-and-so’s duress, i.e., we are aware of the nature of the coercion that forced him to enter this arrangement against his will, is not a valid preemptive declaration.

For what type of transaction is the preemptive declaration being stated? If one were to say that it is a preemptive declaration for a bill of divorce or for a gift, the preemptive declaration is merely revealing the matter. Since these actions can’t take place unless he desires it, it is sufficient that he stated that he does not desire them, and he need not specify a particular reason for nullifying them. And if it is for a sale, but doesn’t Rava say: We do not write a preemptive declaration for a sale?

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to a preemptive declaration for a sale, as Rava concedes in a case where one was compelled to act due to a threat of monetary loss, as with the incident of the orchard, as there was a certain man who mortgaged his orchard to another for three years. After he worked and profited from it for the three years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership, he said: If you sell the orchard to me, it is well. And if not, then I will hide the mortgage document and I will say that this land is purchased and that is why it is in my possession, and you will receive no payment for the orchard. In a case like this, we write a preemptive declaration. The declaration states that he does not actually desire to sell his property but was forced to do so.

§ Rav Yehuda says: With regard to this document detailing a concealed gift, we do not collect with it. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of a concealed gift? Rav Yosef said: It is referring to a case in which the giver said to witnesses: Go and hide and write a document for the recipient of this gift. And there are those who say that Rav Yosef said: It is referring to a case in which the giver did not say to witnesses: Sit outdoors in the marketplace and write it for him. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the two versions of Rav Yosef’s statement? The Gemara answers: The difference between the two versions is in a case where his instructions were without specification, i.e., he did not tell them to write the document in private or in public.

Rava said: But a concealed gift is effective as a preemptive declaration for another gift. In other words, if he first gave an item as a concealed gift to one person, and then he gave this item as a gift to someone else, the second gift is null and void. Rav Pappa said: This ruling of Rava was not stated explicitly; rather, it was stated by inference, and he did not, in fact, hold accordingly.

Rav Pappa explains the inference: As there was a certain man who went to betroth a woman. She said to him: If you write a document signing over all of your property to me, then I will be your wife, and if not, I will not be your wife. He went and wrote a document signing over all of his property to her. His eldest son came and said to him: And that man, i.e., me, what will become of him if you give all of your property to this woman? The father said to two witnesses: Go hide in Avar Yemina and write a document for the son, giving him the father’s property as a gift. Later, the witnesses came before Rava. He said to them: This Master, i.e., the son, did not acquire the property and that Master, i.e., the wife, did not acquire it either. The son did not acquire the property because it was a concealed gift.

The Gemara explains why the wife does not acquire it as well. One who observed this incident assumed that Rava invalidated the wife’s acquisition because the concealed gift to his son was a preemptive declaration to the other gift, but that is not so. There, in the case of the woman and the son, the matter is self-evident that he wrote a document signing over his property to her because of duress, as she had told him that she would not marry him otherwise; but here, in a typical case of giving one person a concealed gift and then giving a public gift to another, that is not the case. It is possible that it is simply amenable to him that this Master, i.e., the one to whom he gave it publicly, should acquire the gift, and it is not amenable to him that this Master, i.e., the one to whom he gave it privately, should acquire the gift. Consequently, an incorrect inference was drawn concerning Rava’s opinion.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: