is not subject to the prohibition of malicious speech, as it is already public knowledge. The Gemara elaborates on the suggestion that the dispute hinges upon this point: The one who says that a protest can be lodged in the presence of two people is not of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna and holds that even if only two people hear of a matter it will become a matter of public knowledge. Therefore, it is sufficient to protest in the presence of two witnesses. And the one who says that a protest must be lodged in the presence of three people is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna, and here they disagree with regard to this: The one who says that a protest can be lodged in the presence of two people holds that a protest that is lodged not in his presence is not a valid protest. Therefore, two witnesses suffice, as they are needed to attest only to the fact that the owner protested. And the one who says that a protest must be lodged in the presence of three people holds that a protest that is lodged not in his presence is a valid protest. Since the protest can be lodged not in the possessor’s presence, three people are needed to ensure that word of the protest will reach him.

If you wish, say instead that everyone holds that a protest that is lodged not in his presence is a valid protest, and here they disagree with regard to this: The one who says that a protest can be lodged in the presence of only two people holds that we require testimony, and two are sufficient for testimony. And the one who says that a protest must be lodged in the presence of three people holds that we require that the matter of the protest be revealed, and for that purpose three people are needed.

§ The Gemara relates: Giddel bar Minyumi had a protest to lodge with regard to his property. He found Rav Huna and Ḥiyya bar Rav and Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tuvi, who were sitting, and he protested before them. After a year, he came to them again to protest. They said to him: You do not need to do so; this is what Rav says: Once the owner protested in the first year, he no longer needs to protest. And there are those who say that Ḥiyya bar Rav said to him, not in the name of Rav: Once the owner protested in the first year, he no longer needs to protest.

Reish Lakish says in the name of bar Kappara: And he needs to protest at the end of each and every period of three years, so that the possessor will not hold his property for three consecutive years uncontested. Rabbi Yoḥanan expressed surprise at this ruling of Reish Lakish and said: But does a robber have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership? Once the owner lodged one protest, he demonstrated that the possessor occupied his land unlawfully. Therefore, the possessor should never be able to establish the presumption of ownership. The Gemara clarifies: Does it enter your mind that the possessor is actually a robber? There is no evidence that he robbed, there is only a protest by the prior owner. Rather, emend his question as follows: Does one who is akin to a robber have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership?

Rava says that the halakha is: The owner needs to protest at the end of each and every period of three years. Bar Kappara teaches: If the owner protested, returned and protested, and then returned and protested, if, when he protested the later times, his protest was based on the same claim as the initial claim, the possessor has no presumptive ownership. But if the later protests were not based on the same claim as the initial protest, the possessor has presumptive ownership since each time the owner advanced a new claim, he thereby nullified his earlier claims.

§ Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: A protest can be lodged in the presence of two witnesses,