teach the same phrase: One who lent to another based on collateral, which indicates that the collateral was given at the time of the loan? Rather, the Gemara proposes a different resolution: It is not difficult. Here, the baraita is referring to a case where he lent him money, whereas there, the mishna is referring to a situation where he lent him produce. Since produce will spoil, the lender benefits from the deal, as he will receive fresher produce in return. Therefore, he is considered a paid bailee for the collateral.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who lent another money is an unpaid bailee, whereas one who lent another produce is a paid bailee, by inference you can conclude that according to the first tanna there is no difference between one who lends money and one who lends produce. If so, the proposed resolution does not fit the text.

The Gemara responds: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: One who lent to another based on collateral is a paid bailee. In what case is this statement said? When he lent him produce. But if he lent him money, he is an unpaid bailee. As Rabbi Yehuda says: One who lent another money is an unpaid bailee with regard to the collateral, whereas one who lent produce is a paid bailee.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, it turns out that the mishna is established not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. This is problematic, as most of the Sages of the mishna were Rabbi Akiva’s students, and anonymous mishnayot are generally presumed to follow his rulings. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer applies only in a case where the collateral is not equal to the monetary value of the loan, and they disagree with regard to a statement of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: With regard to one who lends one thousand dinars to another and the borrower puts before the lender as collateral for the loan the handle of a sickle, which is worth only a small fraction of the loan, nevertheless, if the sickle is lost, the thousand dinars are lost. The Gemara is suggesting that Rabbi Akiva would agree with this ruling, whereas Rabbi Eliezer would disagree with it.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If the case is one where the collateral is not equal to the amount of money constituting the loan, everyone holds that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. But here the dispute is referring to a situation where the collateral does equal the amount of the money constituting the loan, and they disagree with regard to a statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak.

As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that a creditor acquires collateral given to him and is considered its owner as long as the item is in his possession? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “You shall return the pledge to him when the sun goes down that he may sleep in his garment, and bless you; and it shall be a righteousness for you before the Lord your God” (Exodus 24:13). Rabbi Yitzḥak infers: If the creditor does not acquire the collateral, then from where is the righteousness involved in returning it? In this case, the creditor would not be giving up anything of his own. From here it is derived that a creditor acquires the collateral.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: And can you understand it that way? You can say that Rabbi Yitzḥak stated this halakha in a case where he took his collateral not at the time of his loan but at a later stage, in order to collect his debt. But did Rabbi Yitzḥak say this ruling in a situation where he took his collateral at the time of his loan?

Rather, if he took his collateral not at the time of his loan, everyone holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak. And here it is discussing a case where he took his collateral at the time of his loan, and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree with regard to the case of a bailee of a lost item. As it was stated that amora’im disagreed concerning the responsibility of the bailee for a lost item. If someone found a lost item and it is subsequently lost or stolen from him, what responsibility does he bear toward the owner? Rabba said: This individual is considered to be like an unpaid bailee. Rav Yosef said: He is like a paid bailee.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinion of Rav Yosef is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. There is no question that Rabba’s opinion is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as Rabbi Akiva’s opinion cannot be reconciled with his ruling: If one who takes collateral for his loan is considered a paid bailee, the same certainly applies to one who goes out of his way to safeguard a lost item. The Gemara is asking whether there is any way to explain Rav Yosef’s ruling in accordance with the opinions of both tanna’im, or if he must accept that Rabbi Eliezer disputes his opinion. The Gemara responds: No, it is possible with regard to a bailee for a lost item that everyone holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef, even Rabbi Eliezer. And here, in the baraita,