nevertheless, he has the power, by rabbinic law, to acquire an item by means of an act of acquisition performed by another? Here, also, it is not different; the Jew can perform an act of acquisition on behalf of the gentile even though there is no agency for gentiles.

The Gemara rejects this comparison: But that is not so. A minor Jew will eventually reach the stage of eligibility for agency, but a gentile will not reach eligibility for agency. Consequently, the Sages did not establish the power for gentiles to acquire an item by means of an act of acquisition performed by a Jew.

§ The Sages taught: In the case of a Jew who borrowed money with interest from a gentile, and the gentile lender established the interest as a loan for the Jewish borrower, i.e., he added the amount of interest to the principal and consolidated it into a single debt, and then the gentile converted, the halakha depends on the circumstances. If the gentile established it as a loan for him before he converted, he may collect the principal from the borrower and he may also collect the interest. Since it had already been consolidated into a single debt, it is as though he already collected the interest while he was still a gentile. But if he established it as a loan for him after he converted, he may collect the principal but may not collect the interest, as it still had the status of interest when he became a Jew.

And similarly, in the case of a gentile who borrowed money with interest from a Jew and the Jewish lender established the interest as a loan for the gentile borrower, and then the gentile borrower converted, if he established it as a loan before he converted, the Jew may collect the principal and may also collect the interest. If he established it as a loan for the gentile after he converted, he may collect the principal but may not collect the interest, as it still had the status of interest when he became a Jew.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei says: If a gentile borrowed money with interest from a Jew and converted, whether in this circumstance or whether in that circumstance, i.e., regardless of when the lender consolidated the interest and principal into a single debt, the Jewish lender may collect the principal and he may also collect the interest. Rava says that Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Huna says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rava says: What is the reasoning behind the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? What is the justification for collecting interest from a Jew? It is in order that people will not say: This individual converted due to concern for his money. People will suspect that he converted in order to avoid paying the interest.

§ The Sages taught: In the case of a promissory note in which the details of a loan with interest were written, we penalize the lender, and therefore he may not collect the principal and may not collect the interest; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He may collect the principal but he may not collect the interest. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara explains: Rabbi Meir holds: We penalize him with regard to that which is permitted due to that which is prohibited, and the Rabbis hold: We do not penalize him with regard to that which is permitted due to that which is prohibited.

We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Shevi’it 10:5): Antedated promissory notes, in which the date written in the document is earlier than the date the loan was actually transacted, are not valid, but postdated promissory notes are valid. The Gemara asks: Why are antedated documents not valid? Granted, they cannot be used to collect from the first date, the date written in them, because this could cause loss to people who purchased land from the borrower in the time between the date written on the promissory note and the time the loan was actually granted. The land they purchased would be subject to a lien when it fact it should not be. But at least they should be able to be used to collect from the second date, when the loan was actually granted.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: This mishna is subject to dispute, and it is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said that the lender is penalized with regard to that which is permitted due to that which is prohibited. Here too, since he wrote an incorrect date, the entire document is invalidated as a penalty. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: You may even say that this halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as here there is a rabbinic decree invalidating the document lest he collect from the first date. If the document is not invalidated, the lender will depend on it and will come to collect repayment according to the date written on it.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who mortgaged his orchard to another as security for a loan, and the lender consumed the produce of the orchard for three years. At the end of this time the lender said to the borrower: If you sell me the orchard, that is good. But if not, I will hide the document of the mortgage and I will say: It is purchased, and that is why it is in my possession, meaning I will claim I purchased the field and lost the deed. Since the land has been in my possession for three years I do not have to bring any other proof, as the halakha is that after three years of use of a field there is a presumption of ownership for the one who uses it (see Bava Batra 29b).

When the borrower saw that he could not protect himself against the ruse, he devised a scheme: He went and transferred ownership of the field to his minor son by means of a deed of gift, and afterward sold the field to the lender. Subsequently, he demanded that the sale be annulled, since when he sold the field, it was not his.

The Gemara clarifies the halakha: The sale was certainly not a sale, since the field was not his to sell, but the question is: Are the dinars that the buyer paid similar to a loan with a promissory note, and therefore the buyer can collect the money he paid even from liened property that has been sold? Or perhaps it is similar to a loan by oral agreement, and therefore he cannot collect it from liened property that has been sold. Abaye said: Is this question not the same as that of Rabbi Asi? As Rabbi Asi says: