screams and says to each of the claimants: I do not recognize you and I find no basis for your claim. The Gemara comments: The one who says that the other screams holds that he need not return the money to each of them if he is screaming that he does not accept their claims. But a reaction of silence is tantamount to admission that the demands of the claimants are legitimate. And the one who says that the other is silent holds that the silence here is not tantamount to admission, as the robber could say to him: The fact that I was silent to each and every one of the claimants is because I said: Perhaps this is he, the robbery victim, but I do not admit that I owe money to more than one person.

The Master said: The robber places the stolen item between them and withdraws from them. The Gemara challenges: And all of them take it and go, possibly resulting in the robbery victim losing his property. But doesn’t Rabbi Abba bar Zavda say that Rav says concerning found items: In any case of uncertainty whether the placement of a found item was deliberate, the finder may not take the item ab initio, and if he took it, he should not return it to one who claims ownership without conclusive proof? Here too, the robber should keep the money until one of the claimants provides conclusive proof that the money is his. Rav Safra says: The baraita means: And the robber should place it in his possession or before the court.

Abaye said to Rava: In disputing Rabbi Tarfon’s opinion with regard to one who robbed money from one of five people, did Rabbi Akiva say: This is not the way to spare him from transgression; he is not considered to have returned the stolen item until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of the five? Apparently, in his opinion, in cases of uncertainty, we expropriate property and return it to those claiming it, and we do not say: Establish the money in the possession of its owner.

The Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Bava Batra 158b): A house collapsed on a person and on his mother, and it is unclear which of them died first. The son’s heirs say: The mother died first and her property was inherited by her son, who then died, and therefore the heirs of the son inherit the property of both. And the mother’s heirs say: The son died first, and therefore the mother’s heirs should inherit all of her property. In this case, both these tanna’im, Beit Shammai, and those tanna’im, Beit Hillel, agree that they should divide the disputed property, although they disagree in similar cases. And Rabbi Akiva said: I concede in this case that the property retains its previous ownership status. Apparently, Rabbi Akiva himself holds that property is not removed from one’s possession in cases of uncertainty.

Rava said to Abaye: There, in the case where the house collapsed, it is where there is an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, as neither party knows what transpired. By contrast, in a case where one robbed money from one of five people, it is a case where there is a certain claim and an uncertain claim, as the robber does not know from whom he robbed the money, but the victims’ claims are based on certainty. The Gemara challenges: But in the mishna here, where one said to two people: I robbed one of you of one hundred dinars, but I do not know from which of you I took the money, it is a case where there is an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, and it is taught: He gives one hundred dinars to this person and one hundred dinars to that person.

The Gemara asks: And from where is it known that the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara answers: This is known, as it is taught in a baraita concerning the halakha taught in that mishna: Rabbi Tarfon concedes that in a case where one says to two people: I robbed one of the two of you of one hundred dinars and I do not know from which of you I robbed the money, the robber gives one hundred dinars to each of them. To whom does Rabbi Tarfon concede? Is it not to Rabbi Akiva, who is his usual disputant?

The Gemara asks: And from where is it known that in the mishna it is a case where there is an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim? Perhaps the victims are certain that they were robbed. The Gemara answers: This is unlikely for several reasons. One, it is not taught in the mishna that they demand payment from him. And furthermore, didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach in a baraita that the mishna is referring to a case where this party says: I do not know, and that party says: I do not know, indicating that these are uncertain claims?

The Gemara resolves the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Akiva: Didn’t we establish the mishna as referring to a case in which the robber is coming to fulfill his obligation to Heaven? Therefore, the robber gives one hundred dinars to each, although he has no legal obligation to do so, as they made uncertain claims.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And did Rava say that in every case where the deposits are given in two separate bundles that the bailee should have been discerning with regard to the identity of the ones giving him the deposits? But didn’t Rava say, and some say that it was Rav Pappa who said: Everyone concedes in the case of two people who deposited animals with a shepherd, that if each claims that his deposit included a greater number of animals than that of the other, the shepherd places the animals among them and leaves? Rav Ashi said to Ravina: There, it is referring to a case where the shepherds deposited animals in the shepherd’s flock without his knowledge. Clearly there is no expectation that the shepherd will discern how many animals belong to each party.

The mishna teaches: And likewise, in the case of two people who deposited two vessels, one worth one hundred dinars and one worth one thousand dinars, and each of the claimants claims that the expensive vessel is his, the bailee gives the small vessel to one of them, and from the proceeds of the sale of the large vessel he gives the value of the small vessel to the other, and the rest of the money is placed in a safe place until Elijah comes. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for the tanna to cite both the case of money and the case of vessels.

The reason is that if the tanna had taught us this first case with regard to money alone, one would conclude that it is in this case that the Rabbis say that each party receives one hundred dinars, and one hundred dinars is kept in a safe place, because in this case there is no loss. But in that case of the vessels, where there is a loss of the large vessel, as it must be broken or sold in order to pay the value of the small vessel to the other party, say that they concede to Rabbi Yosei that both vessels are kept in a safe place. And had the dispute been stated only in that case of vessels, one would conclude that it is in that case that Rabbi Yosei said that both vessels are kept in a safe place. But in this case of money, say that he concedes to the Rabbis. Therefore, it is necessary to cite both cases.