Rav said to Rabbi Elazar in response: The Torah granted the father only the profits of her youth and nothing else. Therefore, compensation for the injury goes to the daughter. Rabbi Elazar raised an objection to Rav’s statement based on the mishna: One who injures a Hebrew slave is liable for all of the five types of indemnity. This is except for compensation for loss of livelihood occurring during the time that the injured slave belongs to the one that injured him. This should be the halakha with regard to a minor daughter as well, that since the father has the right to the earnings of his minor daughter, he should receive the compensation for her loss of livelihood. Abaye said in response: Rav concedes with regard to compensation for her loss of livelihood that it is paid to the father, since her earnings belong to her father until the time of her adulthood, and therefore her inability to work is her father’s loss.

Rabbi Elazar raised an objection to Rav’s statement based on a baraita: One who injures his adult son must give him his compensation immediately. If one injured his minor son he must make a safe investment [segulla] for him with the compensation money. One who injures his minor daughter is exempt, and moreover, if there were others who injured her, they are liable to give compensation to her father. The Gemara answers: So too here, the baraita is speaking with regard to the daughter’s loss of livelihood alone, which is paid to the father. The other types of indemnity are paid to the daughter.

The Gemara questions the first ruling of the baraita: And is it so that if a father injured his adult son he must give him his compensation immediately? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from that which is taught in another baraita: In a case of one who injures the sons or daughters of others, if they are adults he must give them their compensation immediately; if they are minors he must make a safe investment for them. If one injures his own sons or daughters, he is exempt from paying them compensation.

The Sages say in response: This is not difficult. Here, where the baraita states that the father is exempt, it is dealing with a case where the children are dependent on their father’s table for support. There, where the baraita states that the father is liable, it is dealing with a case where the children are not dependent on his table.

The Gemara challenges this resolution of the two baraitot: In what manner did you interpret the first baraita? You interpreted it as dealing with a case where the children are not dependent on his table? If so, say the latter clause of that baraita: One who injures his minor daughter is exempt, and moreover, if there were others who injured her, they are liable to give compensation to her father. If this is a case where the daughter is not dependent upon her father for support, then the one who injured her would be required to give the compensation to her, because she needs to provide her own sustenance.

The Gemara continues its challenge. And even according to the one who says that a master can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not feed you, i.e., a master is not legally obligated to provide sustenance for his slave, this matter applies only to a Canaanite slave, as the master can say to him: Work for me the entire day, and at night go around, beg, and eat. But in the case of a Hebrew slave, as it is written with regard to him: “Because he fares well with you” (Deuteronomy 15:16), indicating that the Hebrew slave must be “with you” in food and “with you” in drink, i.e., the Hebrew slave is entitled to live with his master as an equal, the master may not compel the slave to serve him unless he feeds him. All the more so is it not the case with regard to his daughter, that she is not required to beg for her sustenance and should receive the compensation herself?

The Gemara answers: This is as Rava, son of Rav Ulla, said concerning a similar matter (Ketubot 43a): This halakha is necessary only for the surplus, i.e., money that a woman earns beyond what she needs for her essential sustenance. Here too, this halakha is necessary only for the surplus. If the compensation for injury is more than the daughter requires for her sustenance, the additional sum is paid to her father.

The Gemara again challenges the resolution of the two baraitot: In what manner did you interpret the latter baraita discussing one who injures the children of another? You interpreted it as dealing with a case where the sons are dependent on their father’s table. But the baraita also stated: If they are adults, he must give them their compensation immediately; if they are minors, he must make a safe investment for them. Why does he make a safe investment for them? Shouldn’t he be required to give the compensation to their father?

The Sages say in response: Where the father is particular about receiving money that would go to his child is specifically in a matter that causes him a loss, as in a case where the father himself injured his child and would need to pay compensation. But in a matter that comes from elsewhere, as in a case where someone else injured his child, he is not particular about receiving the money, and it is paid to the child.

The Gemara challenges that response: But isn’t a found item a matter that comes to the children from elsewhere, and the father is particular about receiving it? The Sages say in response: With regard to profit that comes to the children from elsewhere, and they do not suffer physical pain in obtaining it, the father is particular about receiving the money, as he does not feel that the children deserve it. But in the case of an injury, where they suffer physical pain and it comes to them from elsewhere, the father is not particular about receiving the compensation paid to his child.

The Gemara challenges: But there, in the first baraita, isn’t it discussing a case where the daughter suffers physical pain, and it is a matter that comes to her from elsewhere, and the father is particular about receiving the money, as it teaches: And moreover, if there were others who injured her, they are liable to give compensation to her father?

The Sages say in response: There, the baraita discusses a case where the father is a captious man, which is evident from the case of the baraita itself, as his children are not dependent on his table. A man like this is particular even about matters that come to them from elsewhere. By contrast, here, in the latter baraita, it discusses a case where the father is not a captious man, which is evident from the case of the baraita itself, as his children are dependent on his table. When he is particular about receiving the money, it is in a matter that causes him a loss, but in a matter that comes to them from elsewhere, he is not particular.

The two baraitot stated that the father makes a safe investment for his minor children with the compensation paid to them. The Gemara asks: What is meant by a safe investment? Rav Ḥisda says: The father should purchase a Torah scroll for his child. Rabba bar Rav Huna, says: The father should purchase a date palm, from which the child will consume dates.

The Gemara comments that the amora’im of Eretz Yisrael discussed the same issue as did those in Babylonia. And so says Reish Lakish: The Torah granted the father only the profits of her youth, and nothing else. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The father receives even the compensation for his daughter’s wound.

The Gemara objects: Does it enter your mind that the father receives compensation for his daughter’s wound, which, unlike an injury, does not diminish his daughter’s value? Even Rabbi Elazar raised his dilemma only with regard to an injury,