The Gemara questions this analysis: But doesn’t the mishna deal with a case where the stolen item is hers, and yet Rav says she is not betrothed. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; this case, in the baraita, is referring to a situation where he had arranged to betroth her beforehand, which indicates that she has released him from his obligation to return it, but that case, in the mishna, is referring to a situation where he had not arranged his marriage with her, so it is stolen property and she is not betrothed.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who was washing her feet in a vessel of water. A certain man came along, grabbed a few dinars from another person, and threw them to her, and said to her: You are betrothed to me. That man subsequently came before Rava, to inquire as to the status of the woman. Rava said: There is not anyone who is concerned for this opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: In an ordinary case of robbery the owner has despaired of recovering the stolen item, and it belongs to the robber. Rather, the assumption is that the owner has not despaired of recovering the stolen item. In this case, since the stolen dinars do not belong to the man, his betrothal is of no effect.

The Gemara relates another incident: The was a certain sharecropper who betrothed a woman with a handful [bemoza] of onions [deshamkhei] taken from the field where he worked. He came before Rava to ask about the status of the woman. Rava said to him: Who relinquished these onions to you? Since the owner did not allow you to take them, they are stolen property, and the woman is not betrothed. The Gemara comments: And this matter applies only to a handful, but if he took a bundle of onions and betrothed a woman with them, the sharecropper can say to the owner: I took a bundle, you take a bundle; one bundle for another bundle. Since in any case they divide the crop between them, it is not considered theft.

The Gemara relates another incident: There was a certain brewer [sarseya] who was making date beer for someone, who betrothed a woman with sediment [bifruma] from the beer. The owner of the beer came and found him. The owner said to him: Why don’t you give her the betrothal from this, the sharp sediments that are of better quality than the kind you chose? The brewer came before Rava to ask whether the owner’s comment indicated that he had relinquished his rights to the sediment, which would mean the woman is betrothed. Rava said to him: The Sages said that if the owner discovers that someone has taken something of his without permission and says: Go to and take the item of better quality, that it is a sign he agrees with the man’s action only with regard to teruma alone, and you did not have the right to use the sediment.

The Gemara explains the previous statement: As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 1:5): When did they say that in the case where one separates teruma without the owner’s consent, his teruma is considered teruma? The baraita clarifies: In a case where there was someone who entered another’s field and gathered produce from it, and separated teruma without the owner’s permission, if the owner is concerned about his actions and view it as robbery, his teruma is not teruma, but if he is not concerned, his teruma is teruma.

The baraita continues: And from where would the gatherer know whether he should be concerned that the owner objects and views it as robbery or not? If the owner came and found him separating teruma and said to him: Go to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma from that, then if produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found, his teruma is considered teruma, since the owner is assumed to have been sincere and pleased that the other has separated teruma from his produce. But if not, his teruma is not teruma, as it may be assumed that the owner was angry at him and was speaking sarcastically. The baraita adds: If the owners were gathering and adding to the teruma he had separated, indicating that they agree to his act of separation, either way, whether or not better-quality produce was found, his teruma is considered teruma.

Rava concludes the explanation of his ruling: This halakha applies only to teruma, which is a mitzva that the owner must in any case perform. But here, in the case of the brewer who betrothed a woman with sediment from the beer, the owner acts because of embarrassment, and while he does not feel comfortable protesting, he did not in fact relinquish his rights to the sediment, and she is not betrothed.

MISHNA: With regard to a priest who betroths a woman with his portion of offerings, whether he did so with offerings of the most sacred order or whether he did so with offerings of lesser sanctity, she is not betrothed. One who betroths a woman with second tithe, whether unwittingly or intentionally, has not betrothed her; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he did so unwittingly he has not betrothed her, but if he did so intentionally he has betrothed her.

And with regard to one who betroths a woman with consecrated property belonging to the Temple treasury, if he does so intentionally he has betrothed her, and if he does so unwittingly he has not betrothed her; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says the opposite: If he does so unwittingly he has betrothed her, but if he does so intentionally he has not betrothed her.

GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? As it is taught in a baraita that the verse states with regard to the obligation to bring an offering for taking a false oath concerning unlawful possession of the property of another: “If any one sin, and he commits a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit, or of pledge, or of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbor” (Leviticus 5:21). As the verse is discussing property belonging to another, the phrase “a trespass against the Lord” serves to include in the obligation of an offering a false oath with regard to possession of offerings of lesser sanctity of another person, which are the property of the owner; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. According to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the portion of an offering of lesser sanctity that the priest receives belongs to him, so he should be able to betroth a woman with it.

The Gemara rejects this: You can even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that an offering of lesser sanctity belongs to its owner only while the animal is still alive, but after its slaughter it does not belong to the priest who receives portions from it. What is the reason for this? When the priests receive their portion after the animal has been slaughtered they receive their portion from the table of the Most High, and do not own the portion itself.

The Gemara adds: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: With regard to a priest who betroths a woman with his portion of offerings, whether he did so with offerings of the most sacred order or whether he used offerings of lesser sanctity, has not betrothed her. The mishna does not speak of a priest who betroths a woman with a living offering of lesser sanctity but of one who betroths with the portion of the slaughtered animal he has received. The Gemara concludes: Learn from it that it is only in this case that she is not betrothed.

The Sages taught: After the death of Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda said to his students: Do not let the students of Rabbi Meir enter here into our house of study, because they are vexatious [kanteranim]. And they do not come to study Torah, but rather they come to overwhelm me with halakhot. Sumakhos, a student of Rabbi Meir, pushed and entered anyway. He said to them: This is what Rabbi Meir taught me: With regard to a priest who betroths a woman with his portion of the offerings, whether he did so with offerings of the most sacred order or whether he used offerings of lesser sanctity, he has not betrothed her.

Upon hearing this, Rabbi Yehuda became angry with his students. He said to them: Didn’t I say this to you: Do not let the students of Rabbi Meir enter here into our house of study, because they are vexatious? And they do not come to study Torah, but rather they come to overwhelm me with halakhot. Rabbi Yehuda explained his objection to the statement of Rabbi Meir: This halakha is not relevant, as from where would a woman appear in the Temple courtyard? Women may not enter the area of the Temple courtyard where the priests eat the offerings of the most sacred order, so there is no reason to address an impossible scenario.

Rabbi Yosei, who was present, said: They will say: Meir died, Yehuda grew angry, and Yosei remained silent; what will become of the words of Torah? He said: In fact, this halakha is relevant; but isn’t it common for a man to accept betrothal for his daughter in the Temple courtyard? There is no need to give the betrothal item directly to the woman; it can be given to her father. And additionally, isn’t it common for a woman to designate an agent for herself to accept her betrothal in the courtyard? And furthermore: What would be the halakha if the woman pushed and entered? Since it is possible for her to do so, the halakha in such a case must be determined.

It is taught in a baraita that the Sages discussed the issue of a priest who betroths a woman with his portion of offerings of the most sacred order: Rabbi Yehuda says she is betrothed, and Rabbi Yosei says she is not betrothed. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Both of them derived their opinions from one verse, which states that the priests have a right to a portion of offerings of the most sacred order, but they explained it in different ways. The verse states: “This shall be yours of the most holy things, reserved from the fire” (Numbers 18:9). Rabbi Yehuda holds that the term “yours” indicates that the portion the priest receives is intended for you, i.e., a priest, and for all your needs, including betrothing a woman. And Rabbi Yosei holds that the verse compares the priest’s portion to the fire on the altar: Just as the portion burned on the fire is for the fire’s consumption, so too, the priest’s portion is also for consumption alone, and not for any other purpose.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: