And a similar halakha applies with regard to cases of monetary law. If one appoints agents to perform a transaction for him, e.g., paying a debt to his creditor, they can testify that he has paid.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for Rav Naḥman to teach this halakha in each of these legal domains, as had he taught us this halakha only in the case of betrothal one could say that the agents can serve as witnesses because they are coming to render her forbidden to everyone else, and therefore there is no reason to suspect them of lying, as their testimony renders her forbidden to them as well. But with regard to divorce, we should be concerned that perhaps the agent cast his eyes upon her and is testifying falsely so that he can marry her.

And had Rav Naḥman taught us this halakha only in the case of divorce, it could have been said that the agents are not suspected of lying because a woman is not fit for marrying two people, and since they testify as a pair there is no concern that they both might have designs upon her. But with regard to money, one might say that these two can divide it between them, and perhaps they never paid the debt but kept the money themselves. Therefore, all the examples are necessary.

The Gemara asks: What does Rav Naḥman hold? If he holds that in the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the debtor must repay him in the presence of witnesses, then these agents are affected by their testimony. As, if they say: We did not repay him but returned the money to the one who appointed us, then the one who appointed them will say to them: Pay me back the money I gave you to repay the debt. The agents are considered as the debtors of the one who appointed them, as they took money from him. They would not be deemed credible to state that they returned the money to the one who appointed them, as they do not have witnesses that they did so. Consequently, they have a financial incentive to testify falsely that they fulfilled their agency and repaid the debt.

Rather, Rav Naḥman actually holds that in the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the debtor does not need to repay him in the presence of witnesses. And since the agents are able to say: We returned the money to the debtor, even without there being witnesses to substantiate their claim, they can also be deemed credible to say: We repaid the creditor, as they have no financial incentive to lie.

The Gemara comments: And now, since the time of Rav Naḥman, when the Sages instituted an oath of inducement, an oath instituted by the Sages in a case where a defendant completely denies a claim, these witnesses are affected by their testimony. If they were to claim that they returned the money to the one who appointed them, they would be required to take an oath of inducement to that effect. Consequently, they have an incentive to lie and claim that they fulfilled their agency and repaid the loan. Therefore, their testimony that they fulfilled their agency is not deemed credible. Instead, these witnesses take an oath in court that they gave the money to him, i.e., the lender, and the lender in turn takes an oath that he did not take the money owed to him, and then the debtor pays the lender his debt a second time, as the Sages ruled in similar cases.

§ The mishna teaches that a man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman. We learned in a mishna there (Gittin 64b): With regard to a betrothed young woman, she and her father are each eligible to receive her bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda said: Two hands do not have the right to acquire an item on behalf of one person as one. If the young woman is able to acquire an item on her own, her father cannot receive her bill of divorce. Conversely, if she is not able to acquire an item on her own, only her father can receive the bill of divorce. Rather, her father alone receives her bill of divorce on her behalf. The mishna states another principle: And any female who is unable to safeguard her bill of divorce, either due to her young age or mental incompetence, is unable to be divorced, since a bill of divorce is effective only for one who understands the severing of ties that a divorce engenders.

Reish Lakish says: Just as there is a dispute with regard to divorce, as to whether both a young woman and her father can accept her bill of divorce or only the father can do so, so too there is a dispute with regard to betrothal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute is with regard to divorce, but with regard to betrothal everyone agrees that her father has the right to accept it but not her.

And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yoḥanan, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that there is a distinction between divorce and betrothal? In the case of divorce, when she brings herself back into her father’s authority by means of the bill of divorce, it is considered as though the father has obtained the bill of divorce via his daughter, and therefore either she or her father can receive it. In the case of betrothal, where she removes herself from her father’s authority, she cannot do this by herself. Consequently, only her father can accept the betrothal, but not her.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the case of levirate betrothal, where the yevama removes herself from her father’s authority, and yet we learned in a baraita: