If there are nuts from Perekh that are orla, and they fell into other nuts and became intermingled with them, the entire mixture is forbidden, even if the nuts that are orla are few in number. This is because they are deemed significant when they are whole and they are not nullified in a mixture. If the nuts were broken afterward, whether they were broken unintentionally or they were broken intentionally, they are not nullified in the mixture, despite the fact that they are no longer regarded as significant and should therefore be subject to nullification; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon disagree and say: If they were broken unintentionally, they are nullified, but if they were broken intentionally, they are not nullified.

The Gemara asks: But here, by Torah law the forbidden substance is nullified if its ratio in the mixture is not more than one in two, i.e., when the majority of the mixture is permitted, and it was the Sages who decreed that significant items are not subject to nullification. And nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda penalizes an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender. This seems to contradict what was stated previously, that Rabbi Yehuda does not impose a penalty for an unintentional offense if the transgression involves the violation of a rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: There, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda, that a penalty was imposed in the case where he unintentionally broke the nuts due to the concern that without a penalty he will come to employ artifice and intentionally break the nuts in order to effect nullification of the Perekh nuts.

The Gemara discusses the previous baraita: And they raised a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yosei and another statement of Rabbi Yosei, as we learned in a mishna (Orla 1:6): If a sapling that has the status of orla or a grapevine sapling has the status of diverse kinds in a vineyard, e.g., one vine in a vineyard had grain planted near it and become prohibited, and the grain was then uprooted, became intermingled with other saplings, and one does not know which is the forbidden sapling, he may not gather the produce of any of the saplings. And if he gathered the produce, the forbidden produce is nullified if its ratio in the mixture is not more than one part forbidden produce in two hundred parts permitted produce, provided that he did not intend to gather the produce in order that the forbidden produce will become nullified.

Rabbi Yosei says: Even if he intentionally gathered the produce in order that the forbidden produce would become nullified, the forbidden produce is nullified if its ratio in the mixture is not more than one part forbidden produce in two hundred parts permitted produce. This seems to contradict what Rabbi Yosei said in the baraita cited previously with regard to nuts, that if the nuts were broken intentionally, they are not nullified.

The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it already stated with regard to that mishna in explanation of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion that Rava says: There is a presumption that a person does not render his entire vineyard forbidden for the sake of one sapling. Therefore, it can be assumed that one does not intentionally plant a sapling that has the status of orla or of diverse kinds in a vineyard among other saplings without properly marking it. If he did so, it is uncommon, and the Sages did not impose a penalty in an uncommon case. And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is a presumption that a person does not render his vineyard forbidden for the sake of one sapling, and therefore the Sages did not impose a penalty.

MISHNA: If priests disqualified an offering with improper intention in the Temple, by expressing, while sacrificing the offering, the intention of sprinkling the blood of the offering, burning its fats on the altar, or consuming it, after its appointed time, and they did so intentionally, they are liable to pay the value of the offering to its owner, who must now bring another offering.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 2:2): If one was preparing ritually pure food with another, and he said to him: The ritually pure food that I prepared with you became ritually impure, or if he was preparing sacrifices with another person, and he said to him: The sacrifices that I prepared with you became disqualified due to improper intention, he is deemed credible with regard to these claims. But if he said to the other: The ritually pure food that I prepared with you on such and such a day became ritually impure, or the sacrifices that I prepared with you on such and such a day became disqualified due to improper intention, he is not deemed credible.

The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the baraita and what is different in the latter clause, that in the first clause he is deemed credible, whereas in the latter clause he is not? Abaye says that the principle is as follows: As long as it is still in his power to do what he said he had done, he is deemed credible. Therefore, while he is involved in the preparation of the ritually pure food or the sacrifices, and consequently he is still able to disqualify them, he is deemed credible when he says that they already became disqualified. But once he makes a statement about actions he performed in the past and he is no longer able to disqualify the objects of those actions, he is not deemed credible.

Rava said: Both the first clause and the latter clause deal with testimony about the past. The difference is that the latter clause is referring to a case where he found him a first time and told him nothing about disqualification, and then afterward he found him a second time and told him what had purportedly happened. In such a case he is suspected of lying, as, if it were true that the pure food had become impure or the offering had become disqualified, he would have imparted that information earlier. Since he had said nothing at the time, and he spoke up only later, it is assumed that he was lying and that his intention was merely to annoy the other.

§ It is related that there was a certain person who said to another: The ritually pure food that I prepared with you on such and such a day became ritually impure. The owner of the food came before Rabbi Ami, asking him what to do. Rabbi Ami said to him: You may continue to treat the food as ritually pure, as in principle, the other person is not deemed credible. Rabbi Asi said before him: My teacher, do you say this? So said Rabbi Yoḥanan in the name of Rabbi Yosei: What can I do when I see that the Torah deemed him credible in such a case?

The Gemara asks: Where does it deem him credible? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna says: The High Priest on Yom Kippur will prove this point, as when he says that he had improper intent, he is deemed credible. And from where do we know that he had improper intent? But isn’t it written: “And no man shall be in the Tent of Meeting when he goes in to make atonement for the holy place” (Leviticus 16:17)? Rather, is it not because he is deemed credible in his testimony even after he performed the service, and it is no longer in his power to disqualify the offering?

The Gemara rejects this argument: But perhaps we heard that he disqualified the offering with improper intention, i.e., maybe he stated his intention out loud while performing the service and it was heard outside. The Gemara answers: Were he not deemed credible about the matter, then even if we heard him voice his intention, he would also not be deemed credible. Why? The reason is that perhaps he actually sprinkled the blood with the proper intention, and it was only afterward that he said what he said, and at that time he could no longer disqualify the offering. Rather, he is certainly deemed credible when he says that he disqualified the offering with improper intention.

The Gemara raises another objection: But perhaps we saw what the High Priest was doing through a small door, through which it was possible to monitor his actions, and we saw that he sprinkled the blood with improper intention. The Gemara says: This is difficult for Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna, as his proof can be refuted.

§ It is similarly related that there was a certain person who came before Rabbi Ami and said to him: In the Torah scroll that I wrote for so-and-so, I did not write the mentions of God’s name with the proper intention that is required when writing a holy name, and therefore the scroll is not valid. Rabbi Ami said to him: This Torah scroll is currently in whose possession? The scribe said to him: It is now in the buyer’s possession. Rabbi Ami said to him: You are deemed credible to cause the loss of your wage, as you admit that you wrote the Torah scroll in a faulty manner, and therefore the buyer can refuse to pay you. But you are not deemed credible to cause a loss to, i.e., to invalidate, the Torah scroll.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: Although he lost his wage with regard to the mentions of God’s name that he wrote in a faulty manner, did he lose his wage with regard to the entire Torah scroll, which he wrote correctly? Rabbi Ami said to him: Yes, he lost his wage for the entire Torah scroll, as any Torah scroll in which the mentions of God’s name have not been written with the proper intention is not worth anything.

The Gemara asks: But let the scribe pass a reed pen [kulemos] with additional ink over instances of God’s name and sanctify them, going over the names with the proper intention. And since there is no option to correct the Torah scroll in this manner, in accordance with whose opinion was this ruling issued? Shall we say that it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

This is as we learned in a baraita: If a scribe writing a Torah scroll was at a point in the text that he needed to write the name of God, spelled yod, heh, vav, heh; and he erred and intended to write Yehuda, spelled yod, heh, vav, dalet, heh, but he made a mistake when writing Yehuda and did not place a dalet in the word, thereby unintentionally writing the name of God in the correct place, then he should pass over it with a reed pen. He writes over what was written and sanctifies it with the intention that he is writing the name of God. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: Even if he adds a second layer of ink, the name has not been written in the optimal manner. The fact that Rabbi Ami did not offer the option to rewrite the mentions of God’s name to correct the scroll indicates that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and not in accordance with that of Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara rejects this argument: You can even say that in general the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but there is a distinction between the cases. Rabbi Yehuda states his opinion only with regard to a single mention of God’s name that was initially written without the proper intention. In such a case, it is possible to pass over the name with additional ink and thereby sanctify it. But passing over all of the holy names found in an entire Torah scroll is not possible. Why not? Because if the scribe would pass his pen over all the names of God found in a Torah scroll, it would look speckled, as the instances of the Divine Name would be written with a thicker layer of ink and stand out.

It is further related that there was a certain person who came before Rabbi Abbahu and said to him: With regard to the Torah scroll that I wrote for so-and-so, I did not process its parchment with the proper intention. Rabbi Abbahu said to him: The Torah scroll is currently in whose possession? The scribe said to him: It is in the possession of the buyer. Rabbi Abbahu said to him: Since you are deemed credible to cause the loss of your wage, as you have admitted that the parchment upon which the Torah scroll was written is invalid, you are deemed credible to cause a loss to, i.e., disqualify, the Torah scroll.