and I do not declare her to be the wife of two dead men. The halakha is that a yevama whose requirement for levirate marriage results from marriage to two brothers does not enter into levirate marriage at all. Here, that halakha does not apply, as whichever way you look at it, she was not married to two brothers: If Reuven’s betrothal was a valid betrothal, then Shimon’s betrothal was not a valid betrothal, and she is only Reuven’s widow. And if Shimon’s betrothal was a valid betrothal, it could only be that Reuven’s betrothal was not a valid betrothal. Either way, she had been married to only one of the brothers, and therefore she enters into levirate marriage with the third.

It was stated: If there was a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed to Reuven, and afterward she was emancipated entirely, and she went back and was betrothed to Shimon, who in this case was not the brother of Reuven, then Rav Yosef bar Ḥama says that Rav Naḥman says: Through her emancipation the first betrothal was entirely abrogated, and the second betrothal takes effect. Rabbi Zeira says that Rav Naḥman says: The first betrothal was completed. Reuven’s betrothal took effect immediately once she was emancipated. Consequently, Shimon’s betrothal did not take effect at all.

Rabbi Zeira says: It stands to reason in accordance with my opinion, as it is written with regard to one who engages in sexual intercourse with a designated maidservant: “They shall not be put to death, because she was not free” (Leviticus 19:20), and one can infer: But if she was free, then they will be put to death, because she is a married woman. This teaches that her betrothal is complete once she is emancipated.

Abaye said to him: And according to the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who says: It is referring to a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave, so too, will you say that when she is free they are put to death? Once she is free, her betrothal to a Hebrew slave certainly is abrogated. Rather, what have you to say in order to understand the inference from the verse according to Rabbi Yishmael? That is a case where she was free, and she then went back and was betrothed. Here too, even if the verse is discussing a half-maidservant half-free woman, they will be put to death only in a case where she was free and she then went back and was betrothed, but the emancipation itself does not complete her earlier betrothal.

§ Rav Huna bar Ketina says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: An incident occurred involving one woman who was a half-maidservant half-free woman, and they forced her master to emancipate her, and he made her a free woman. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is it? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who says: For both Adam and Eve the verse states: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it” (Genesis 1:28), indicating that the mitzva to procreate is incumbent upon women as well, and therefore a half-maidservant half-free woman must be freed to enable her to procreate?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: No, it need not be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, as the reason that he was forced to emancipate her was because she was unable to marry, and other men took liberties with her, i.e., engaged in intercourse with her. Consequently, the court forced her master to emancipate her so that she could marry.

MISHNA: In a case of one who sells his slave to gentiles, or even to a Jew outside of Eretz Yisrael, the slave is emancipated. Since the slave, who is partially obligated in the fulfillment of mitzvot, would be restricted in his ability to fulfill them in his new situation, either because he would be under the authority of a gentile or because he will no longer be in Eretz Yisrael, the Sages penalized his original owner that he should become a freeman, so that if he succeeds in escaping his new owner, he is a full-fledged freeman.

GEMARA: The Sages taught (Tosefta, Avoda Zara 3:16): In a case of one who sells his slave to gentiles, the slave is emancipated, but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission from his first master. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement said? When the master did not write a document for him, but if he wrote a document for him, then this is his emancipation and he does not require a bill of manumission.

The Gemara asks: What is the nature of this document? Rav Sheshet said: He writes to him like this: When you will escape from the gentile, I have no business with you. Even though this is not an explicit bill of manumission, it is sufficient for him to be considered a freeman.

§ The Sages taught: If he borrows from a gentile on the basis of the slave, i.e., using the slave as collateral so that the creditor can collect the slave in payment of the debt in the event that the debtor defaults, then once the gentile behaves with the slave according to his law [nimmuso], the slave is emancipated, just like a slave who is sold to a gentile. The Gemara asks: What is defined as: His law? The Gemara answers: Rav Huna bar Yehuda said: He places a seal [nashkei] upon him.

Rav Sheshet raises an objection to this based on a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 2:11): If there was a field owned by a gentile, but there were Jewish sharecroppers, or Jewish tenant farmers, or Jewish family sharecroppers, i.e., an entire family of sharecroppers who work a field generation after generation; or in the case of a gentile who mortgaged his field to a Jew, then even though the gentile acted for the Jew based on his, the Jew’s, law, the field is exempt from tithes, because the field belongs to a gentile. It is not considered as if it were transferred to the Jew.

And if it enters your mind that the phrase: His law, means a seal, is a field able to be sealed? Rather, Rav Sheshet says: The expression: He acted for him based on his law, means time. In other words, a deadline was set and if the debt was not paid by the given date the slave would automatically be transferred to the possession of the gentile.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, there is a difficulty with regard to the issue of time in the case of the slave and the issue of time in the case of the field. In the case of the slave the halakha is that after the set time, he leaves the debtor’s authority and is emancipated, while in the case of the field its produce does not become obligated to be tithed like the produce of a Jew’s field after that set time. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, since the following distinction can be made: This, the case of the slave who is emancipated, is referring to when his time to be transferred has arrived, and this, the case of the field, is referring to where its time to be transferred has not yet arrived.

The Gemara asks: But with regard to a slave whose time to be transferred has arrived, does it need to be said that he is emancipated? Isn’t it obvious that once he is transferred to the authority of the gentile, he is emancipated, just as in the case of a sale? Rather, the Gemara offers a different explanation: This case and that case are referring to when his time to be transferred has not yet arrived, and it is not difficult: This, the case of the slave who is emancipated, is with regard to the slave himself, as the slave himself is to be transferred to the gentile, and that case is with regard to the produce. In other words, the Jewish creditor has the rights to the produce of the field, but he does not take possession of the actual field. Therefore, it remains exempt from tithes.