With regard to witnesses who signed a bill of divorce and whose names are like the names of gentiles, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: There came before us bills of divorce that were signed only with names such as Lukos and Los, and we deemed them valid by means of the witnesses of transmission.

The Gemara infers: And this applies specifically to names such as Lukos and Los, as it is uncommon to find Jews who are called by these names. However, with regard to other gentile names, concerning which it is common to find Jews who are called by these names, no, the documents are not valid, as people might mistakenly rely on the signatures of gentiles.

Reish Lakish raised an objection to this ruling from a baraita (Tosefta 4:8): With regard to bills of divorce that come from a country overseas, and witnesses are signed upon them, even though the names of the witnesses are like the names of gentiles, they are valid, because the names of most Jews outside of Eretz Yisrael are like the names of gentiles. This indicates that a bill of divorce is valid even when the names are not clearly those of gentiles.

The Gemara answers: There the halakha is different, as it teaches the reason explicitly: Because the names of most Jews outside of Eretz Yisrael are like the names of gentiles. Consequently, it can be assumed that the court examined the matter at the time of the signing, and that the document was signed by Jews. However, in Eretz Yisrael it is more likely that ambiguous names are actually those of gentiles, and therefore a document of this kind is valid only when it is clear it was signed by gentiles, to avoid mistakes.

This was one version of the discussion. And there are those who say that Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yoḥanan about the very same case as in the baraita, and he resolved the matter for him from the baraita, that even if the names signed on a bill of divorce brought from outside of Eretz Yisrael are like the names of gentiles, they are valid.

MISHNA: With regard to one who says to another: Give this bill of divorce to my wife, or: Give this bill of manumission to my slave, if before the document reaches the woman or the slave the giver wishes to retract his decision, then with regard to both of them, he can retract. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Rabbis say: One can retract his decision in the case of bills of divorce but not in the case of bills of manumission. The Rabbis explain the reason for their ruling: This is because one can act in a person’s interest in his absence, and therefore the agent acquires the document on behalf of the slave from the moment the owner hands the bill of manumission to the agent. But one can act to a person’s detriment only in his presence. The receipt of a bill of divorce is considered to be to a woman’s detriment, and therefore an agent cannot receive it for her without her consent.

They explain further: The emancipation of a slave is in his interests, despite the fact that he receives sustenance from his master while a slave, as, if the master wishes not to sustain his slave he is allowed not to provide him with sustenance. This demonstrates that slavery is not in the interest of the slave, as he does not receive any guaranteed benefit. But if a husband wishes not to sustain his wife, he is not allowed to proceed in this manner. Consequently, marriage is in the interests of the woman.

Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But even so, it is not in the interest of a slave to be emancipated, as, if his master is a priest, he disqualifies his slave from partaking of teruma by emancipating him, just as a husband who is a priest disqualifies his Israelite wife from partaking of teruma by divorcing her. The Rabbis said to him: It is permitted for a priest’s slave to partake of teruma not because he has a right to sustenance, but rather because he is his master’s acquisition.

GEMARA: The Gemara relates: Rav Huna and Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef were sitting before Rabbi Yirmeya, and Rabbi Yirmeya was sitting and dozing while the other two Sages conversed. And Rav Huna was sitting and saying: With regard to the statement of the Rabbis that a master cannot retract a bill of manumission once he has given it to an agent, one can conclude from it that if a third party seizes a debtor’s property on behalf of a creditor, an act that is certainly in the interests of the creditor, he acquires this property on his behalf. This is similar to the case here, where the agent acquires the bill of manumission on behalf of the slave.

Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef said to Rav Huna: Do you state this halakha even in a case when the seizure of property is to the detriment of others, e.g., if there are other creditors who would lose the opportunity to seize the property? Rav Huna said to him: Yes.

In the meantime Rabbi Yirmeya woke up, due to their conversation, as he was not sleeping deeply. He said to them: Children [dardekei], this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who seizes property on behalf of a creditor in a case where it is to the detriment of others does not acquire. And if you say that the mishna apparently teaches the opposite, as the agent acquires the bill of manumission on behalf of the slave despite the fact that this causes a loss for the master, that case is different.

Rabbi Yirmeya elaborates: The reason for the ruling in the mishna is that anyone who says: Give to so-and-so, is like one who says: Acquire on behalf of so-and-so. Since the master said: Give this bill of manumission to my slave, the agent immediately acquires it on the slave’s behalf, despite the fact that the bill is to the detriment of the master. However, this halakha has no bearing on a case where a person independently seizes property on behalf of another, and by doing so acts to the disadvantage of others.

Rav Ḥisda says: With regard to this issue of one who seizes property on behalf of a creditor in a case where it is to the detriment of others, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. What is this dispute? As we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 4:9): With regard to one who is not poor but collected produce in the corner of the field, which is given to the poor [pe’a], and said: This produce that I have collected is for so-and-so, who is a poor person, Rabbi Eliezer said: He has acquired it on his behalf, and the Rabbis say: He has not acquired it on his behalf; rather, he gives the produce he gathered to whichever poor person appears first before him. Apparently, Rabbi Eliezer holds that one can gather pe’a on behalf of a poor person, despite the fact that he acts to the detriment of other paupers, while the Rabbis disagree.

Ameimar said, and some say that it was actually Rav Pappa who said: