Similarly, with regard to the mishna that teaches that there are some relatives who inherit and bequeath, the tanna also had a reason for initially providing examples from the first category: He thereby explains the principal case of the Torah’s halakhot of inheritance first.

The Gemara now returns to its question: But here, let the tanna explain the cases of substitutes first. The Gemara explains: Rather, this is the reason: Since intimations are derived from the exposition of verses and are not explicitly mentioned in the Torah, they are dear to the tanna and he therefore mentions them first.

The Gemara asks: But if that is so, then let him begin with them first in the opening clause of the mishna as well. The Gemara answers: When the tanna begins, he begins with the main offering of the nazirite, i.e., with the halakha that has a basis in the Torah. But with regard to the explanation of these halakhot, he explains the cases of intimations first, as he favors that topic.

§ The mishna taught: One who says: I will be, is a nazirite. The Gemara asks: Perhaps he is saying: I will be fasting, i.e., his intention is to take a vow that will obligate himself to fast rather than to be a nazirite. The Gemara answers that Shmuel said: The mishna is describing a case where a nazirite was passing before him, so that it is clear that he is taking a nazirite vow.

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Shmuel holds as a principle that ambiguous intimations are not considered intimations, i.e., they are not considered vows? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Say that when a nazirite is passing before him, there is no reason to doubt his intention. There is no possibility that he is referring to another matter, and therefore his statement is definitely an intimation of naziriteship. However, it is certainly the case that when a nazirite is not passing before him, and he states: I will be, we say that perhaps he is saying: I will be fasting. It is only in the latter case, where one’s intimation is so ambiguous that it offers no evidence whatsoever of his intentions, that Shmuel holds that one’s statement is not considered a vow.

The Gemara asks: But even if he made his statement when a nazirite was passing before him, perhaps he was saying that he intends to purchase the animals the nazirite will need for his offerings and thereby exempt the nazirite from paying for his own offerings. The Gemara answers: This is a case where he said in his heart that he accepts upon himself a nazirite vow.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, then what is the purpose of stating this halakha? Isn’t it obvious that he becomes a nazirite? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state this halakha, lest you say that we require his mouth and heart to be identical. If that were the case, then if one did not clearly articulate his nazirite vow, he would not become a nazirite even if he intended to become one. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that since his words can be interpreted as referring to a nazirite vow, and that was his intention, he becomes a nazirite.

§ The mishna taught that if one says: I will be beautiful [na’e], he is a nazirite. The Gemara asks: But perhaps when he said: I will be beautiful, he meant: I will be beautiful before Him in mitzvot? As it is taught in a baraita: “This is my God and I will glorify Him [anvehu]” (Exodus 15:2). Anvehu has the same root as the word na’e; therefore, the verse means: I will be beautiful before Him in mitzvot. How is this done? I will make before Him a beautiful sukka, a beautiful lulav, beautiful ritual fringes. I will write before Him a beautiful Torah scroll, and I will wrap it in beautiful silk cloths [shira’in].

The Gemara answers that Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a case where one is holding his hair and says: I will be beautiful. This clearly indicates that he is referring to naziriteship.

The Gemara asks: Since naziriteship is a matter of transgression, can we say about a nazirite that he is beautiful?