Rava said: In a case where there was a loaf of ownerless bread before a person, and he said: This loaf is consecrated, if he took the loaf to eat it, he misused consecrated property. His repayment to the Temple for that misuse is based on the loaf’s entire value. However, if his intent was not to take the loaf for himself but to bequeath it to his sons, he misused the consecrated property, and his repayment to the Temple is based on the discretionary benefit that he derived from the fact that his children are indebted to him for the bequest, as he himself derived no direct benefit from the loaf.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin raised a dilemma before Rava. If one said to another: My loaf is konam for you, and then he gave it to him as a gift, what is the halakha? Should one infer: My loaf is forbidden, i.e., he said to him that when the loaf is in his possession, that is when it is forbidden, but when he gives him a gift, it is no longer in his possession and it is no longer forbidden? Or, perhaps the inference is: Forbidden to you, i.e., he said to him that he rendered the loaf for him like a consecrated item that is forbidden even after the loaf is no longer in his possession.

Rava said to him: It is obvious that although he gave it to the other person as a gift, it is forbidden. Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin asked him: But if that is so, when he said: My loaf is forbidden to you, with emphasis on the word my, what does it come to exclude? Does it not come to exclude a case where he stole it from him, as in that case it is permitted? The same would be true if he gave it to him as a gift. Rava said to him: No, it comes to exclude a case where he invited him to eat from the loaf before he vowed. In that case, that part of the loaf that he invited him to eat is his, and the owner cannot render it forbidden. However, even if he invited the other person before he vowed, the entire loaf remains forbidden if he gave it to him as a gift.