This field that I mortgaged to you and from whose produce you are benefiting will be consecrated when I redeem it from you. The halakha is that it is consecrated, since the field itself was not transferred to another’s ownership.

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: Is it comparable? There, in the case where he mortgaged the field, it is in his power to redeem it, whereas here, with regard to a woman who renders her earnings prohibited to her husband, it is not in her power to divorce herself from her husband. This is only comparable to one who says to another: This field that I have mortgaged to you for ten years will be consecrated when I redeem it from you. The halakha is that it is consecrated. Similarly, in this case, despite the fact that her earnings belong to her husband, when she will be divorced they will revert to her, and since her hands have always belonged to her, she can consecrate her earnings.

Rav Ashi objects to this: Is it comparable? There, after ten years in any case it will be in his power to redeem it, whereas here, with regard to a woman, it is never in her power to divorce herself from her husband. Consequently, there is no way for her to consecrate her future earnings.

Rather, the contradiction between the two rulings of Shmuel must be resolved in a different manner. Rav Ashi said: Did you speak about konamot? Konamot are different, since they are a type of inherent sanctity, and therefore the konam can take effect on an item that is subjugated to another person, in accordance with the halakha articulated by Rava. As Rava said: Consecration, the prohibition of leavened bread on Passover, and the liberation of a slave can all abrogate a lien on property. If property was mortgaged to another person, and then the owner consecrated it, or if leavened bread was mortgaged and Passover arrived and it became prohibited to benefit from it, or if a slave was mortgaged and then liberated by his owner, the lien is abrogated. Since konam is a form of consecration, it can take effect on an item even when it is subjugated to another when the owner prohibited it, similar to the case of mortgaged property.

The Gemara asks: If it is so, that a konam can remove the lien on property, let her earnings become consecrated from now, even before her husband divorces her. The Gemara answers: The Sages reinforced the husband’s lien in order that it not become consecrated now. However, since in general a konam can take effect on mortgaged items, it can take effect on her earnings after she leaves her husband’s jurisdiction.

MISHNA: And these are tasks that a wife must perform for her husband: She grinds wheat into flour, and bakes, and washes clothes, cooks, and nurses her child, makes her husband’s bed, and makes thread from wool by spinning it. If she brought him one maidservant, i.e., brought the maidservant with her into the marriage, the maidservant will perform some of these tasks. Consequently, the wife does not need to grind, and does not need to bake, and does not need to wash clothes. If she brought him two maidservants, she does not need to cook and does not need to nurse her child if she does not want to, but instead may give the child to a wet nurse. If she brought him three maidservants, she does not need to make his bed and does not need to make thread from wool. If she brought him four maidservants, she may sit in a chair [katedra] like a queen and not do anything, as her maidservants do all of her work for her.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him a hundred maidservants, he can compel her to make thread from wool, since idleness leads to licentiousness. Consequently, it is better for a woman to be doing some kind of work. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who vows that his wife is prohibited from doing any work must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract, since idleness leads to idiocy.

GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s choice of terminology the Gemara asks: Could it enter your mind that she grinds the wheat into flour? Ordinarily, grinding is performed in a mill using millstones that are rotated by water or by animals, so the woman herself does not actually grind the wheat. The Gemara answers: Rather, say that she supervises the grinding by bringing wheat to the mill and ensuring that it is ground properly. Alternatively, if you wish, say instead: She can grind the wheat herself with a hand mill.

The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, as Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: A wife is only for beauty, and a wife is only for children, but not for household tasks. And Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: A wife is only for wearing a woman’s finery. And Rabbi Ḥiyya similarly teaches: One who wishes to beautify his wife should clothe her in linen garments, and one who wishes to whiten his daughter so that she will have a fair complexion, should feed her young chickens, and should give her milk to drink toward the time of her maturity.

§ The mishna mentions among a wife’s obligations that she nurses her child. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, as it is taught in a baraita: If a woman took a vow not to nurse her child, Beit Shammai say: Since she vowed, she must remove her nipple from his mouth and not nurse him. Beit Hillel say: Her husband can compel her, and she must nurse the child even against her will. However, if she was divorced and therefore had no further obligations to her husband, he cannot compel her. Nevertheless, if the baby recognized her, then even after the divorce, her husband may pay her a salary as a wet nurse and compel her to nurse due to the danger that the child will starve if he refuses to nurse from another woman. This baraita indicates that according to Beit Shammai a woman has no obligation to nurse her child. If she had a prior obligation to her husband to nurse the child, the vow would not take effect.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Even if you say that the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, here we are dealing with a case where she made this vow and her husband ratified it for her by refraining from nullifying it. Beit Shammai maintain that in that case it is considered as if he had placed his finger between her teeth, i.e., he caused the vow to be in effect, meaning that in that case the responsibility lies with him. Since he declined the opportunity to nullify the vow, her obligation to nurse is canceled. Beit Hillel maintain that in that case she put her finger between her own teeth, i.e., she caused the vow to remain in effect. Consequently, although he ratified her vow, the responsibility rests on her, and for this reason her obligation is not annulled.

The Gemara asks: If so, that the dispute is about who is responsible when a woman vows and her husband ratifies the vow, and it is not specifically about her obligation to nurse her child, then let them dispute about a marriage contract in general, with regard to whether or not a woman is entitled to payment for her marriage contract if she vows to prohibit her husband from deriving benefit from her. And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai explicitly say with regard to all women, not specifically in the context of vows: She does not need to nurse if she does not want to. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.

The Gemara above quotes a baraita where it is taught that if the baby recognized her, her husband can compel her to continue nursing even after she is divorced, but he must pay her for nursing.