However, according to Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda, the first ruling was due to abrogation and the latter ruling was also due to abrogation. If so, what is the difference between the reasoning of the initial version of the mishna and the decision of the court that convened after them?

The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to superficial investigation, i.e., the investigation that could have been conducted on his behalf by his female relatives, which could have been only a superficial investigation. One Sage holds that superficial investigation is considered a valid investigation, and therefore once he requested to marry her and the marriage date arrived, there is no concern of a later abrogation, and one Sage holds that superficial investigation is not considered a valid investigation, and consequently there is still concern that when he consummates the marriage he will find some blemish on her and abrogate the marriage.

MISHNA: If one consecrates his wife’s earnings, meaning anything she produces, such as thread that she spins from wool, which, according to the Sages’ ordinance, belongs to her husband, she may work and sustain herself from her earnings, as the consecration is ineffective. However, there is a dispute with regard to the surplus, meaning any earnings she produces in excess of the amount she is required to produce for her husband. Rabbi Meir says: The surplus is consecrated property, and Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler says: The surplus is also non-sacred.

GEMARA: Rav Huna said that Rav said: A woman may say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings. He holds that when the Sages instituted the various obligations and rights of a husband and wife, the husband’s obligation to provide for the wife’s sustenance was the primary one, and they then decreed that her earnings belong to him in return, due to concern about animosity. If he would be obligated to provide for her sustenance but she would be allowed to work and keep her earnings, he would resent her. Since her right to sustenance is the primary one, if she says: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings, she has permission to do so. As the arrangement was established for her benefit, she may cancel it if it is not suitable for her.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: They instituted the husband’s responsibility for her sustenance in exchange for his right to her earnings. This indicates that the primary enactment is the husband’s right to his wife’s earnings, and the ordinance that requires him to provide her with sustenance comes as a result. According to this, the wife would not be allowed to waive the arrangement, contrary to Rav Huna’s statement. The Gemara responds: Emend the text of the baraita and say instead: They instituted her earnings in exchange for the husband’s responsibility for her sustenance.

The Gemara raises an objection: Let us say that the mishna supports Rav Huna’s opinion, as it is taught: If one consecrates his wife’s earnings, she may work and sustain herself from her earnings. What, is it not discussing a woman who is sustained by her husband, meaning that he is willing to sustain her, although she relinquishes her right to sustenance in accordance with Rav Huna’s principle? Therefore, her earnings do not belong to him to consecrate. The Gemara answers: No, it is discussing a woman who is not sustained by her husband, as he does not have sufficient funds to sustain her. Consequently, there is no proof with regard to Rav Huna’s statement.

The Gemara asks: If it is discussing a woman who is not sustained, what is the purpose of stating that he may not consecrate her earnings? Even according to the one who says that a master can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you, this applies only to a Canaanite slave, about whom it is not written: “With you.” But with regard to a Hebrew slave about whom it is written: “It is good for him with you” (Deuteronomy 15:16), this does not apply, and the master must sustain him just as he sustains the members of his own household. And this is true all the more so with regard to his wife, as there is a specific obligation of sustenance. Consequently, if he does not do so, he certainly has no right to her earnings.

The Gemara answers: This halakha did not need to be stated, but the latter clause was necessary, as it contains a novelty with regard to the surplus: Rabbi Meir says that the surplus is consecrated property, and Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler says it is non-sacred.

The Gemara comments: This opinion of Rav Huna disputes that of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish said: Do not say that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir is that since he maintains that a person may consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, the consecration can take effect even on her future earnings. Rather, say that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir is that since he can compel her to produce her earnings for him, it is as if he had a certain legal claim to the products of her hands, i.e., her earnings. Consequently, he is considered as if he had said to her: Your hands are consecrated to the One Who made them, and the consecration can therefore take effect on something that already exists. Since Reish Lakish said that he may compel her to produce earnings for him, the implication is that she may not say: I will not be sustained and I will not work.

With regard to Reish Lakish’s statement, the Gemara asks: But he did not say this to her; rather, he said that he was consecrating her earnings. The Gemara answers: Since we heard that Rabbi Meir said: A person does not say things for naught, and according to this principle, when one says something that has no halakhic meaning, it is interpreted as if he had said something that does have halakhic relevance, he is considered as if he had said to her: Your hands are consecrated to the One Who made them.

The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Meir hold that a person may not consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world? Isn’t it taught in a baraita that if a gentile says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert; or if she was a gentile and he said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me after you convert; or if he was a slave and said to her: After I am emancipated; or if she was a maidservant and he said to her: After you are emancipated; or if she was married and he said to her: After your husband dies; or if he was married to her sister and he said: After your sister dies, as at that point the betrothal could take effect; or if she was a widow waiting for her yavam and he said to her: After your yavam performs ḥalitza with you, Rabbi Meir says: If any of these cases occurred, she is betrothed. Apparently Rabbi Meir maintains that betrothal can take effect even on something that has not yet come into being.

The Gemara answers: Actually, from that baraita, one can learn that this is Rabbi Meir’s opinion, but Reish Lakish merely wanted to say that no inference is to be learned from this mishna, as it is possible to explain Rabbi Meir’s words in another way, based on the principle that a person does not say things for naught.

§ The mishna states that with regard to the surplus, Rabbi Meir says: It is consecrated property. The Gemara asks: According to this opinion, when does the surplus amount become consecrated? Rav and Shmuel both said: The surplus is consecrated only after the woman’s death. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The surplus is consecrated while she is still alive.

Rav Pappa discussed it, as he was perplexed by this dispute: With regard to what do they argue? If we say that the husband provides for her sustenance and additionally provides her with a silver ma’a coin every week for the rest of her needs, as he is obligated to do (see 64b), then what is the reason for the opinion of the one who said it is consecrated only after her death? As the husband has fulfilled all of his obligations and is consequently the owner of his wife’s earnings, he should be capable of consecrating them.

And if we rather say that he does not provide for her sustenance and does not provide her with a silver ma’a for her needs, and she must consequently support herself entirely, then what is the reason for the opinion of the one who said that it is consecrated in her lifetime? It is possible that at some point she will not find sufficient employment, and since her husband does not provide for her sustenance or her other needs, she will need the money for herself and there will not be any surplus at all.

The Gemara answers: Actually, one must explain that they are discussing a situation where he provides for her sustenance, but does not provide her with a silver ma’a for her needs, and this is their dispute: Rav and Shmuel maintain that the main enactment was that they established