This is the principle concerning a minor girl who refused her husband and then married several times: If the bill of divorce followed the refusal and she remarried, she is forbidden to return to him. If the refusal followed the bill of divorce, she is permitted to return to him. Since the refusal followed the bill of divorce it is clear that she was a minor and neither the marriage nor the divorce were valid by Torah law. However, when the ultimate separation is by means of a bill of divorce, there is no indication that she was a minor at the time and there is potential for confusion with an adult divorcée.

If a minor girl refuses one man and marries another, and he divorces her, and then she marries another man and refuses him, and then she marries another man and he divorces her, this is the principle for this case: With regard to anyone she leaves by means of a bill of divorce, it is prohibited for her to return to him. With regard to anyone she leaves by means of refusal, she is permitted to return to him.

GEMARA: It was taught in the mishna that if the man gave his minor wife a bill of divorce but subsequently remarried her and she refused him, and then she married someone else, she is permitted to remarry the first husband when her marriage to the second is concluded. Apparently, refusal comes and nullifies a bill of divorce.

The Gemara raises a contradiction from the end of the mishna: If a minor girl refuses one man and marries another, and he divorces her, and then she marries another man and refuses him, and then she marries another man and he divorces her, this is the principle: With regard to anyone she leaves by means of a bill of divorce, she is prohibited from returning to him. With regard to anyone she leaves by means of refusal, she is permitted to return to him. Apparently, a refusal of another man does not come and nullify one’s own bill of divorce. If the refusal completely nullified the marriage to the second husband, there would be no obstacle to her remarrying her first husband, as an ex-wife who did not marry another man is permitted to remarry her first husband. However, the divorce, combined with the second marriage, does generate a prohibition, and she is prohibited from remarrying in this case.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This mishna is disjointed, and he who taught this halakha, that she may remarry her first husband if she refused him after he divorced her, did not teach that halakha, that her refusal of another man does not render her permitted to her divorced husband.

Rava said: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps her refusal of him nullifies his bill of divorce, while her refusal of the other man does not nullify the original husband’s bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: In what way is her refusal of the other man different, that it does not nullify his bill of divorce? Isn’t it that because she is familiar with the intimations and gestures [keritzotav] of her first husband, he will lead her astray and bring her back to him, by causing her to refuse her new husband and then return to him? Consequently, it was decreed that she may not return to her first husband by refusing the second. But for this same reason the refusal against the first husband himself also should not nullify his own bill of divorce, as, since she is familiar with his intimations and gestures, he will lead her astray and bring her back to him after she has married another man.

The Gemara answers: But he already tried to lead her astray and she was not led astray. In other words, he already remarried her after the divorce and she still refused him, which proves that he does not have sufficient influence to lead her astray.

But if there is a difficulty, it is the contradiction between one halakha involving another man and a different halakha involving another man that is difficult, as the mishna states: If she refused him and he subsequently remarried her, and this time he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man, and she was widowed or divorced, she is prohibited from returning to her original husband. The reason is specifically that she was widowed or divorced by the other man. But if she had refused the second husband, she would be permitted to return to the first husband. Apparently, a refusal of the other man would have come and nullified his bill of divorce, permitting her to remarry the first husband, despite her erstwhile marriage to the other man.

This raises a contradiction, as it is taught later: If a minor girl refuses one man and marries another and he divorces her, and then she marries another and refuses him, this is the principle: With regard to anyone she leaves by means of a bill of divorce, she is prohibited from returning to him. With regard to anyone she leaves by means of refusal, she is permitted to return to him. Apparently, refusal of the other man cannot come and nullify his own bill of divorce.

Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed, and he who taught this halakha did not teach that halakha. Ulla said: The last clause, in which it says her refusal does not nullify the bill of divorce, is referring to a case where she was divorced three times. Since she was divorced three times, she appears to be an adult, and therefore the Sages did not allow her refusal to cancel the effect of the divorce.

§ The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Elazar, who holds that the mishna is disjointed, who is the tanna that taught that a minor may always remarry a husband she refused but not one who divorced her? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This can be determined based on the following incident. What is the meaning of that which is written: “We have drunk our water for money; our wood comes to us for a price” (Lamentations 5:4), implying that Torah, which is analogous to water, can be purchased with money. The Gemara explains: During the time of danger, i.e., religious persecution by the Romans, this halakhic ruling was requested: If she, a minor, left her first husband by means of a bill of divorce and her second by refusal, what is the halakha with regard to her returning to the first?

Those involved hired one person for four hundred dinars for the dangerous mission and asked Rabbi Akiva, who was incarcerated in prison by the Romans for teaching Torah, and he ruled that it is forbidden. They asked Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira in Netzivin, in Babylonia, and he also deemed it forbidden.

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: This question was not what they asked, as it was unnecessary: If you rendered permitted a prohibition for whose violation one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet], i.e., if the prohibition against sexual intercourse with a married woman is dissolved by the refusal, as the marriage is nullified retroactively, then is it not clear all the more so that after a refusal, the regular prohibition against remarrying one’s ex-wife after she was married to another should be permitted? The opinion in the mishna that refusal does not cancel the effect of divorce is in accordance with that of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, while the opinion that she is permitted to return to her first husband after refusing the second one is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei.

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, continued: Rather, this is what they asked: If the minor was the wife of someone’s mother’s brother, a secondary forbidden relative, i.e., a relative forbidden to him by rabbinic law, and afterward his paternal brother married her and died, so that she became eligible to him for levirate marriage, what is the halakha with regard to the following: May she refuse now and uproot the first marriage to the mother’s brother, so that she will no longer be a forbidden relative, and likewise her rival wife will not be the rival wife of a forbidden relative, so that her rival wife may enter into levirate marriage? In other words, in a case where there is a mitzva of levirate marriage, is refusal after the husband’s death valid or not?

Those involved hired two people for four hundred dinars, and they came and asked Rabbi Akiva in prison and he deemed it prohibited. They asked Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira in Netzivin and he deemed it prohibited.

Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashyan said: Rav concedes that she is permitted to the brother of the man to whom she is forbidden. Rav Yitzḥak is referring to a case of a minor who refused her husband, remarried the same man, and was subsequently divorced, and then married another man and refused him. Although she may not remarry the first husband, she may marry his brother, despite the fact that one may not ordinarily marry one’s brother’s divorcée.

The Gemara asks: It is obvious. It is he, her former husband, whose hints and gestures she recognizes, but not those of his brother, so that there is no concern that the brother will persuade her to refuse her husband. The Gemara explains: Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashyan saw fit to point this out, lest you say: Issue a decree rendering it prohibited for her to marry this brother due to the risk that such a marriage would lead people to think she is permitted to marry that brother, her original husband. Therefore, he teaches us that no such decree was instituted.

And there are those who say a different version of the discussion: Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashyan said: Just as she is forbidden to him, to the man who divorced her, so is she forbidden to his brothers. The Gemara asks: But she is not familiar with their intimations and gestures. Why is it prohibited for her to marry them? The Gemara answers: It is a rabbinic decree concerning the ex-husband’s brothers due to him, the ex-husband. If she were to be permitted to her ex-husband’s brothers, people might mistakenly think that she is even permitted to remarry the ex-husband himself.

MISHNA: With regard to one who divorces a woman and remarries her and then dies childless, his wife is permitted to enter into levirate marriage with her yavam,