where the hen can hear its voice by day, when sounds cannot be heard as easily as at night. If the chicken is close enough to hear the rooster’s call by day, the rooster is considered close enough to the chicken that the latter will produce eggs only through fertilization by the male.

The Gemara relates: Rav Mari took action in accordance with this opinion, when he found an egg on a Festival morning after he had looked in the nest the day before and failed to find an egg there. He examined up to a distance of sixty houses from the chicken, and although he did not find a rooster within this area, he assumed there was one further away and permitted the egg.

The Gemara comments: And if there is a river between the rooster and the chicken, the chicken does not cross the river; but if there is a bridge, it crosses the river. And if there is only a rope bridge suspended across the river, the chicken will not cross on the rope. The Gemara comments: Nevertheless, an incident occurred in which a chicken crossed over on a rope bridge. However, one may not rely on this possibility.

The Gemara further asks: In what manner did you establish this halakha of Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul, who prohibits eating an egg discovered in a nest on a Festival morning after the previous day’s examination revealed nothing? You said that it is referring to a case in which the chicken absorbed from the earth. If so, why discuss specifically a situation in which one examined the nest the evening before? The same halakha should apply even when one did not examine the nest beforehand.

The Gemara answers: In a case where he did not examine the nest, one could say that the egg was laid yesterday, and there is no reason to prohibit its use. Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul therefore specified that he checked the day before and is certain that the egg was not laid prior to the Festival. The Gemara challenges this: If so, when he examined the nest as well, say: Perhaps this is a case in which most of the egg emerged and returned, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers: The case discussed by Rabbi Yoḥanan, where most of the egg emerged from the chicken and returned, is uncommon, and therefore it is assumed not to have occurred.

Apropos one statement of Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul in the name of Rav, the Gemara cites another ruling that Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul said that Rav said: This crushed garlic poses the danger of exposure. If mashed garlic is not properly covered, there is concern that a snake might have tasted from it and thereby injected its venom into the food. This garlic is consequently prohibited as a health risk.

§ The mishna states that Beit Shammai say: The measure that determines liability for leaven is an olive-bulk. However, the measure for leavened bread is greater, a large date-bulk. According to Beit Hillel, the measure in both cases is an olive-bulk.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Beit Shammai? The Gemara explains: If it is so that the measures are equal, let the Merciful One write only the prohibition of leavened bread, and it would not be necessary to write leaven, and I would say an a fortiori inference: If the measure that determines liability for leavened bread, whose leavening is not as extensive, is an olive-bulk, then leaven, whose leavening is extensive, all the more so should the measure that determines liability be an olive-bulk. If so, why do I need the explicit reference to leaven that the Merciful One wrote in the verse: “Seven days there shall be no leaven found in your houses” (Exodus 12:19)? It must be to tell you that the measure of this, leavened bread, is not equal to the measure of that, leaven. Rather, the measure that determines liability for leaven is smaller.

The Gemara asks: And Beit Hillel maintain that both the mention of both leaven and leavened bread are necessary. As if the Merciful One had written only leaven, I would have said its measure that determines liability is an olive-bulk because its leavening is extensive. However, with regard to leavened bread, whose leavening is not extensive, say no, that is not the measure. Therefore, it is necessary to mention leavened bread as well.

And conversely, if the Merciful One had written only leavened bread, I would have said that the measure that determines liability for leavened bread is an olive-bulk, because it is fit for consumption on its own; however, leaven, which is not fit for consumption on its own but only when used as a leavening agent for dough, say no, its measure is not like that of leavened bread. Therefore, it is necessary to mention both cases.

The Gemara asks: And Beit Shammai, don’t they hold in accordance with Rabbi Zeira’s opinion? As Rabbi Zeira said, the verse states: “Seven days there shall be no leaven found in your houses, for whoever eats that which is leavened, that soul shall be cut off from the assembly of Israel” (Exodus 12:19). The verse begins with leaven and ends with leavened bread to say to you that leaven is equivalent to leavened bread. How, then, can Beit Shammai maintain that the two are prohibited by different measures?

The Gemara answers: Indeed, with regard to the measure that determines liability for eating, everyone agrees that the same measure applies to leavened bread and leaven. When they disagree it is with regard to the removal of leavened bread from one’s house. Beit Shammai hold that we do not derive the halakha of removal from that of eating. Rather, with regard to the obligation of removal, different measures apply to leavened bread and leaven. And Beit Hillel hold that we derive the halakha of removal from the measure that determines liability for eating.

The Gemara comments: This idea was also stated explicitly by amora’im. Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel was stated with regard to the removal of leavened bread; however, with regard to the measure that determines liability for eating, everyone agrees that the measure for both this and that is an olive-bulk.

That opinion is also taught in a baraita. The verse states: “And no leavened bread shall be seen with you, and no leaven shall be found in all your borders” (Exodus 13:7). This obligation to remove leavened bread is subject to a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, as Beit Shammai say: The measure that determines liability for removal of leaven is an olive-bulk, and the measure for leavened bread is a large date-bulk, and Beit Hillel say: The measure for both this and that is an olive-bulk. This baraita indicates that the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is with regard to the obligation to remove leavened bread, not liability for eating it.

§ The mishna states that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel also dispute whether or not one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird on a Festival, without having prepared earth the day before with which to cover the blood after the slaughter, may dig out earth on the Festival itself to cover the blood.

The Gemara analyzes the wording of the mishna: One who slaughters an animal; this indicates that after the fact, yes, one may dig out dirt, but ab initio, no, even Beit Shammai agree that one may not slaughter an undomesticated animal or a bird if there is no prepared dirt. Otherwise, the mishna would have said: One may slaughter an undomesticated animal or a bird on a Festival. Say the latter clause of the mishna: And Beit Hillel say that one may not slaughter it. This proves by inference that the first tanna, Beit Shammai, holds that one may slaughter it even ab initio.

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as Beit Hillel said and meant the following: One may not slaughter an animal and cover the blood. They are emphasizing that one may not cover the blood even if he slaughtered an animal, whereas Beit Shammai maintain that if one slaughtered he may cover the blood ab initio.

The Gemara challenges this explanation: Say the latter clause of the mishna: And Beit Hillel concede that if he already slaughtered, then he may dig with a shovel and cover the blood, which indicates that Beit Hillel were not emphasizing the covering of the blood. This proves by inference that the first clause of the mishna is not referring to one’s action after the fact, but to the halakha ab initio.

Rabba said that this is what the mishna is saying. The phrase: One who slaughters an animal, is not a broad directive on how to act, but rather it means: If there is one who slaughters animals who comes to consult a Sage on how to proceed, what should the Sage say to him? Beit Shammai say that the Sage says to him: Slaughter it ab initio, dig, and cover the blood. And Beit Hillel say: He may slaughter the animal only if he had earth that was prepared while it was still day.

Rav Yosef provided a slightly different explanation of the mishna and said that this is what the mishna is saying: With regard to one who slaughters animals who comes to consult, what does the Sage say to him? Beit Shammai say that he says to him: Go dig, slaughter the animal, and cover the blood. And Beit Hillel say: He may slaughter the animal, only if he had earth that was prepared while it was still day.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Let us say that the Master, i.e., Rav Yosef, and Rabba dispute the following statement that Rabbi Zeira said that Rav said, as Rabbi Zeira said that Rav said: One who slaughters an undomesticated animal or bird is obligated to perform the mitzva of covering the blood, and therefore he must place earth beneath the blood and earth above it, as it is stated: “And he shall pour out its blood and cover it in earth” (Leviticus 17:13). It is not stated: Cover it with earth, but “in earth,” indicating that the blood must be concealed inside the earth. The verse thereby teaches that one who slaughters an animal must place earth beneath and earth above the blood.

Abaye is suggesting that the Master is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, and therefore he requires one to dig first and only afterward slaughter the animal and have the blood flow onto that earth and then cover it with additional earth, and that Rabba is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira.

Rav Yosef said to Abaye: This is not so; rather, both according to me and according to Rabba we are of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, and here we disagree with regard to this matter: Rabba holds that if there is prepared earth beneath, yes, in that case one may slaughter an animal, but if there is no earth prepared beneath, no, he may not slaughter it at all. Why not? Rabba says: We are concerned that perhaps one will reconsider and not slaughter it at all, and he will have dug a hole on a Festival unnecessarily. And according to my opinion, on the contrary: This situation, in which he is permitted to dig first, is preferable, since if you do not permit him to dig in all cases for the purpose of slaughter, he will be unable to eat meat and will refrain from rejoicing on the Festival.

§ That mishna states: And Beit Hillel concede that if one transgressed and slaughtered an animal, then he digs with a shovel and covers the blood. Rabbi Zerika said that Rav Yehuda said: And that is the halakha specifically when one has a shovel already embedded in the ground while it was still day, before the onset of the Festival. The Gemara asks: But what purpose does an embedded shovel serve; doesn’t he still perform the act of crushing, as one must crush the lumps of earth to make the soil fit for covering? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: