With regard to the contradiction presented by Rabbi Yoḥanan, which led him to suggest that the opinions should be reversed, Ravina said that this is not the only possible resolution: Actually, do not reverse the opinions. Rather, in the case of the two Festival days, one could claim that Rabbi Yehuda spoke to them in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, rather than presenting his own opinion.

If so, Rabbi Yehuda’s statement should be understood as follows: In my opinion, even on the first Festival day, the egg is also permitted, as it is food that was separated. However, according to your opinion, which is that you prohibit liquid that comes from food, at least agree with me that it is permitted on the second day, as they are two sanctities. The first and second days of Rosh HaShana are not one unit, but two separate entities. Therefore, it is possible that the first day is sacred, while the second is a weekday. Consequently, an item prohibited on the first day might be permitted on the second. And the Rabbis said to him: No, the two days are one sanctity, i.e., they are viewed as a single continuous unit. The uncertainty applies equally to both of them.

Ravina, son of Rav Ulla, said: There is an alternative resolution to the contradiction raised by Rabbi Yoḥanan. Here, in the case of the egg laid on a Festival, Rabbi Yehuda prohibited eating the egg since it is not from a chicken designated for food, whose legal status is that of food. Rather, the case refers to a chicken designated for laying eggs, and Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he holds that there is a prohibition of muktze. Since the egg is produced by something muktze, it is certainly muktze itself, which means that the halakha of food that was separated is inapplicable to this case.

§ The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita, which clarifies the issue differently: Both an egg that was laid on Shabbat and an egg that was laid on a Festival are considered to be muktze, and therefore in both cases, one may not move the egg, neither for the sake of food nor for any other purpose: Not to cover a vessel with it, nor to support the legs of a bed with it.

However, if one wishes, he may cover the egg with a vessel, without handling the egg itself, so that it does not break from being accidentally trodden upon. Although it is prohibited to move the egg itself, it is nevertheless permitted to move a vessel for its sake. And even if there is uncertainty with regard to whether this egg was laid on a Festival, it is prohibited to move it. And, furthermore, if it became intermingled with a thousand permitted eggs, they are all prohibited.

The Gemara notes: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabba, who said that an egg is prohibited due to the lack of preparation, this case involves an uncertainty with regard to the legal status of an item prohibited by Torah law; and in any case of an uncertainty with regard to the legal status of an item prohibited by Torah law, the ruling is stringent. Therefore, the egg is prohibited even if there is uncertainty whether it was laid on a Festival.

However, according to the opinions of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yitzḥak, who say that an egg is prohibited due to a decree, this case involves an uncertainty with regard to the legal status of an item prohibited by rabbinic law, and in any case of an uncertainty with regard to the legal status of an item prohibited by rabbinic law, the ruling is lenient.

The Gemara answers: In the latter clause of the baraita, we have arrived at a different case. The case does not involve the prohibition of an egg laid on a Festival; the case involves an egg laid by a chicken with regard to which there is uncertainty whether it is an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], which is prohibited by Torah law. The uncertainty with regard to the legal status of the chicken is relevant to the egg.

The Gemara raises a difficulty with this response: If so, say the latter clause of that same baraita: If it became intermingled with a thousand other eggs, they are all prohibited. Granted, if you say that there is uncertainty whether the egg was laid on a Festival and uncertainty whether it was laid on a weekday, then it is an object whose prohibition is temporary, as the egg will be permitted on the following day, and the principle is: Any object whose prohibition is temporary is not nullified, even by a thousand permitted items. Since its prohibition will lapse on its own, there is no need to make use of the option of nullification.

However, if you say that the egg referred to in the baraita is an uncertain tereifa, it is an object whose prohibition is not temporary, as there is no way to permit the prohibition of tereifa, and it should therefore be nullified by a simple majority.

The Gemara adds: And if you say that an egg is significant and is not nullified, as nullification applies only to items that have no intrinsic significance, while a significant object cannot be nullified, that works out well according to the one who said that we learned: Any item whose manner is also to be counted, i.e., that is sometimes sold by unit, rather than by weight or volume, is considered significant. An egg falls into that category, as it is sometimes sold by unit.

However, according to the one who said that we learned: That item whose manner is exclusively to be counted, i.e., that is always sold by unit, is considered significant, what can be said? Although eggs are often sold by unit, they are also often sold by weight or volume.

The Gemara cites the mishna where the dispute cited above appears. As we learned (Orla 3:6–7): With regard to one who had bundles of clover, a type of legume, that were diverse kinds of food crops that grew in a vineyard, from which it is prohibited to derive benefit, those bundles must be burned. If the bundles were intermingled with others, and those others were intermingled with others, they must all be burned. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They may be nullified by one part in two hundred similar parts. When the prohibited portion is less than one-half of one percent of the permitted portion, the prohibition is nullified.

The mishna continues: Rabbi Meir says that they must all be burned, as Rabbi Meir would say: That whose manner is exclusively to be counted, is considered significant and cannot be nullified. Therefore, it renders the entire mixture forbidden, and it must be burned. And the Rabbis say: Only six items are sufficiently significant to render the entire mixture forbidden. Rabbi Akiva says: There are seven. And they are: High-quality nuts from Perekh, and pomegranates from Badan, and sealed barrels of wine, and branches of spinach, and cabbage stalks, and Greek pumpkin. Rabbi Akiva adds: Even loaves of a homeowner.

Different prohibitions apply to these seven items. That which is fit to be forbidden due to orla, fruit that grows during the first three years after a tree is planted, is forbidden due to orla. That which is fit to be forbidden due to diverse kinds of food crops that grew in a vineyard is forbidden due to diverse kinds in a vineyard (Avoda Zara 74a). And it was stated about the wording of this mishna that there is an amoraic dispute. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that we learned: Only that whose manner is exclusively to be counted is significant and cannot be nullified, and it is therefore prohibited by Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said that we learned: Any item whose manner is also to be counted, is significant and cannot be nullified.

Returning to the matter of the egg, the Gemara reprises its question: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, but according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, what can be said? Since an egg is not sold exclusively by unit, it is not significant. Therefore, the egg of a tereifa should be nullified by a simple majority.

Rav Pappa said: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, this tanna, who said that an egg cannot be nullified, is the tanna of the halakha concerning a litra of dried figs, who, based on his statement, said: Any item that is counted, even if it is prohibited by rabbinic law, cannot be nullified, and all the more so items prohibited by Torah law, e.g., the egg of a tereifa.

As we learned in a mishna: With regard to a litra of dried figs, whose stems were removed, and were dried and pressed in different vessels and shaped into circles, the obligation to tithe fruits is by rabbinic law. If one forgot to tithe the figs, and later remembered that he placed the figs into a barrel, and during the process of producing a circle he pressed the figs onto the mouth of one of the circular vessels in which the circles are formed, and does not know into which circular vessel he pressed it; or, if he recalls that he pressed it on the mouth of a barrel, but does not know in which barrel he pressed it, or if he recalls that he pressed it on the mouth of a straw receptacle, but does not know in which receptacle he pressed it, Rabbi Meir says that in all these cases there is a dispute between the tanna’im of the previous generation: Rabbi Eliezer