“And you shall eat neither bread, nor roasted grain, nor fresh grain, until this selfsame [etzem] day, until you have brought the offering of your God” (Leviticus 23:14), indicating until the essence [itzumo] of the day, and not the night before. And he holds that when the verse states: “Until,” the word until is inclusive, meaning that the grain is permitted only after the conclusion of the sixteenth.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But doesn’t he disagree with him, as it is taught in a baraita: Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that for the entire day of waving the omer offering, it should be prohibited to eat the grain of the new crop. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: Isn’t it prohibited by Torah law, as it is written: “Until this selfsame day,” which means: Until the essence of the day? Apparently, they have two divergent opinions.

The Gemara answers: It is Rabbi Yehuda who is mistaken. He thought that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai is saying it is prohibited by rabbinic law. And that is not so; he is saying it is prohibited by Torah law. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the mishna say: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted, indicating that it is a rabbinic ordinance? The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of instituted? It means that he interpreted the verses in the Torah and instituted public notice for the multitudes to conduct themselves accordingly.

MISHNA: If the first day of the festival of Sukkot occurs on Shabbat, all of the people bring their lulavim to the synagogue on Shabbat eve, as it is prohibited to carry in a public domain on Shabbat. The next day, on Shabbat, everyone rises early and comes to the synagogue. Each and every one recognizes his lulav and takes it. This emphasis that each and every one recognizes his own lulav and takes it is because the Sages said: A person does not fulfill his obligation to take the lulav on the first day of the Festival with the lulav of another, and on the rest of the days of the Festival a person fulfills his obligation even with the lulav of another. Rabbi Yosei says: If the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, and he forgot and carried the lulav out into the public domain, he is exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering for this unwitting transgression because he carried it out with permission, i.e., he was preoccupied with the performance of the mitzva and carried it out.

GEMARA: From where are these matters derived, that one does not fulfill his obligation with the lulav of another on the first day of the Festival? It is as the Sages taught that it is written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm, and boughs of a dense-leaved tree, and willows of the brook” (Leviticus 23:40). The use of second person plural in the phrase: “And you shall take,” indicates that there should be taking in the hand of each and every person. The word yourselves in the phrase “take for yourselves” means: From your own, to exclude a borrowed or stolen lulav. From here the Sages stated: A person does not fulfill his obligation on the first day of the Festival with the lulav of another unless the other gave it to him as a full-fledged gift, as in that case it belongs to him.

There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel, and Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva, who were all traveling on a ship during the festival of Sukkot and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav, which he had bought for one thousand zuz. Rabban Gamliel took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and then gave it to Rabbi Yehoshua as a gift. Rabbi Yehoshua took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and gave it to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya as a gift. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and gave it to Rabbi Akiva as a gift. Rabbi Akiva took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and returned it to Rabban Gamliel.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need to say that Rabbi Akiva returned the lulav to Rabban Gamliel? The crux of the story is that each of the Sages fulfilled his obligation with the same lulav after receiving it as a gift. The Gemara answers: By including that detail, the tanna teaches us another matter in passing, namely that a gift given on the condition that it be returned is considered a full-fledged gift. Even if the owner stipulates from the outset that the gift would be returned, since he gives it as a gift in the interim, its halakhic status is that of a full-fledged gift.

This is like that which Rava said, that in the case of one who says to another: Here is an etrog for you on condition that you return it to me, and the recipient took it and fulfilled his obligation with it, if he returned the etrog, he fulfilled his obligation of taking the etrog. However, if he did not return the etrog, he did not fulfill his obligation. Since he did not fulfill the condition, retroactively he never acquired the gift at all.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need to say that Rabban Gamliel bought this lulav for one thousand zuz? The Gemara answers: It is to inform you how beloved mitzvot were to them to the extent that he was willing to pay an exorbitant sum to purchase a lulav.

§ Mar bar Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: My father would pray with the four species in his hand in an expression of his love for the mitzva. The Gemara raises an objection: A person should not hold phylacteries in his hand or a Torah scroll in his lap and pray while doing so; neither should he urinate with them in his hand; nor should he sleep with them in his hand, neither a deep sleep nor a brief nap.

And Shmuel said: With regard to a knife, a bowl full of food, a loaf of bread, or money, these items are similar to those mentioned above; since he is concerned lest these items fall from his hand, he is distracted and he unable to concentrate on his prayers. Why, then, is that not the case with regard to lulav? It should be prohibited to hold the lulav during prayer for the same reason. The Gemara answers: There, in the cases listed above, they are not related to performance of a mitzva, and he is preoccupied with them. Therefore, that preoccupation distracts his focus from his prayers. Here, in the case of the four species, they are related to performance of a mitzva, so he is not preoccupied with them in a manner that will distract him from his prayers.

The Gemara cites support for the custom mentioned above, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok says: This was the custom of the people of Jerusalem during the festival of Sukkot. A person leaves his house, and his lulav is in his hand; he goes to the synagogue, and his lulav is in his hand; he recites Shema and prays, and his lulav is in his hand; he reads the Torah and a priest lifts his hands to recite the priestly benediction, and he places it on the ground because he cannot perform those tasks while holding the lulav. He goes to visit the ill or to console mourners, and his lulav is in his hand; he enters the study hall to study Torah, and he sends his lulav home in the hands of his son, in the hands of his slave, or in the hands of his agent.

The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us by relating all these details that appear to establish the same practice? The Gemara explains: It is to inform you how vigilant they were in the performance of mitzvot and how much they cherished them.

§ The mishna continues: Rabbi Yosei says that if the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, and one forgot and carried the lulav out into the public domain, he is exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering. Abaye said: